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1 first person n neuter gender
2 second person neg nergation
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In 1977 John Lyons wrote rather firmly: “That there is a fundamental, and
ineradicable, difference between first-person and second-person pronouns, on
the one hand, and third-person pronouns, on the other, is a point that cannot
be emphasized too strongly” (Lyons 1977:638). Is the split between first and
second person and third person really that big? In this dissertation I will argue
that it is not. The issue will be introduced more thoroughly in Section 1.1.
In Section 1.2 I will investigate the additional question whether person splits
are innate or learned. Finally, in Section 1.3, I will give an overview of the
remainder of this dissertation.
1.1 Person patterns: first and second vs. third?
Person is the topic of this dissertation and personal pronouns are the most
prominent example of linguistic elements associated with the concept of person
in English. In (1) we find an overview of personal pronouns in English (restricted
to singular number and nominative case for the sake of convenience).
(1) English personal pronouns
first person I
second person you
third person he, she, it
A first-person pronoun like I is the dedicated means to refer to the speaker
of the sentence, a second-person pronoun like you is the dedicated means to
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refer to the addressee of the sentence, and a third-person pronoun like he is
the dedicated means to refer to an entity that is neither the speaker nor the
addressee of the sentence, an other.
All three persons can be seen as values of the grammatical category of
person (see Section 2.2 for the fourth value, the inclusive). Among the values
of a grammatical category there are patterns to be observed. Take for example
the grammatical category of tense, which expresses the semantic concept of
time. In Dutch, verbs that refer to events in the past exhibit one type of tense
marking (conveniently called past tense marking), see had ‘had’ in (2).
Dutch
(2) Ik
1sg.nom
had
had
gisteren
yesterday
een
an
afspraak
appointment
‘I had an appointment yesterday’
The present and the future may also be marked. In roughly half of the languages
there are separate inflectional markers for the present and the future (Dahl and
Velupillai 2005a). Dutch, however, belongs to the other half and has one type
of tense marking for present and future (present tense marking), see heb ‘have’
in (3) and (4).
(3) Ik
1sg.nom
heb
have
nu
now
een
an
afspraak
appointment
‘I’m having an appointment right now’
(4) Ik
1sg.nom
heb
have
morgen
tomorrow
een
an
afspraak
appointment
‘I have an appointment tomorrow’
Thus, for Dutch verbs it can be said that the present and the future pattern
together, while the past is different.
There are also patterns to be observed in the category of person. One ex-
ample is the pattern in which first and second person behave the same with
respect to some linguistic phenomenon. We find an example of such a phe-
nomenon in the data in (5a-c).
(5) a. We scientists like to know the facts
b. You scientists like to know the facts
c. *They scientists like to know the facts
The construction [X scientists] is possible for first- and second-person pro-
nouns, but not for third-person pronouns (see Section 3.5.2 for more on this
phenomenon).
This phenomenon clearly has a first/second vs. third pattern, the pattern
that is postulated by Lyons (1977). This pattern also features in (6), where all
potential patterns with three person values are listed.
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(6) Possible patterns within the category of person
Lyons pattern 1/2 vs. 3
Allowed by Lyons 1=2=3
1 vs. 2 vs. 3
Disallowed by Lyons 1/3 vs. 2
2/3 vs. 1
Another pattern that Lyons’s theory allows is a pattern where all person values
are on equal footing. In other words, the first/second vs. third person split does
not always apply, but if there is a split it should be this one. Lyons’s theory
most probably also allows a third pattern: a pattern where all persons are
different from each other. This could be analyzed as follows. The primary split
is between first and second person on the one hand and third person on the
other hand. The secondary split, then, is between first and second person. When
analyzed in this way the pattern is compatible with Lyons’s theory.
The final two patterns in (6), however, are predicted by Lyons not to occur.
The same predictions are independently made by theoretical linguists (Ben-
veniste 1966:163), formal semanticists (Kaplan 1989) and typologists (Siewier-
ska 2004:5-7). This will be the central question of this dissertation: do the
final two patterns in (6) occur, and in what phenomena?
Some scholars already claim to have found such occurrences; an example
is Croft (1990:149-150), building on work by Greenberg (1966:44-45, 96). Croft
mentions a first/third vs. second pattern for imperative/hortative construc-
tions, for example. Imperative/hortative constructions will be investigated in
Section 4.3.3. One of my own examples involves demonstrative adverbs, see
Section 4.5.1. In English the demonstrative adverb here refers to a place that
is close to speaker, while there refers to a place that is further away from the
speaker. Many languages have a demonstrative adverb system like this, where
only the speaker is considered as the point of orientation (see Diessel 2005).
As second- and third-person individuals are apparently not that important for
demonstrative pronoun systems, we can say that demonstrative pronouns are
subject to a first vs. second/third person split. This split is one of the two final
splits in the overview in (6).
The occurrence of the first vs. second/third pattern and the second vs.
first/third pattern undermine the alleged predominance of the first/second vs.
third person split. The remainder of this dissertation is therefore dedicated to
finding and investigating these two patterns. My main conclusion will be that
any person pattern is possible, and that the nature of the pattern depends on
the associated phenomenon.
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1.2 Person patterns: innate or learned?
The difference of opinion—as stated in the previous section—is whether there
are three person patterns in language (Lyons’s view) or more than three per-
son patterns (my view). That person patterns exist is not in doubt. Yet, the
existence of person patterns brings up the question of the exact nature of these
patterns. One question is whether the attested person patterns are innate or
learned. In other words, are person patterns part of the human genome and are
children born with them, or are these patterns only present in some form in
the world such that children pick up on them?
This discussion is of course part of a broader linguistic discussion on Uni-
versal Grammar. This linguistic discussion is in turn part of a broader cognitive
debate, the nature versus nurture debate. I do not claim to solve either of the
debates with this dissertation, but I can nevertheless contribute to them by
sharing my empirical findings on the behavior of person patterns. The behav-
ior of a person pattern may suggest whether it is a language-internal (innate)
phenomenon or a language-external (learned) one. I will resume this discussion
in Section 4.7 and argue that for person both language-internal and language-
external patterns may be discerned.
1.3 Overview of this dissertation
Until now I have only looked at three person values: first person, second person
and third person. These are the classical three person values, but I think that
a study on person should not be restricted to these three. In Chapter 2 I will
show that there are good reasons to adopt a fourth person value, the inclu-
sive. The existence of this fourth person has important consequences for the
central question of this dissertation, because with four person value the num-
ber of potential patterns within the grammatical category of person increases
drastically.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I will investigate the actual person patterns that occur
in language. Chapter 3 will deal with unitary person patterns, patterns that only
allow one type of language. One of these patterns is that there are restrictions
on multiple first-person occurrences and multiple second-person occurrences. It
is, for example, not always possible to have two or more different addressees in
one sentence, see (7). This phenomenon—addressee shift—will be looked into
in Section 3.1.
(7) *Why do you agree with you ?
[point atA] [point atB]
Another phenomenon can be found in constructions like you scientists, which
we already saw in Section 1.1. The second-person expression you scientists nec-
essarily includes all addressees, while a third-person expression like America’s
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scientists does not necessarily includes all things belonging to America, see
Section 3.5.2.
Chapter 4 will deal with person hierarchies, patterns that allow for more
than one type of language. Such hierarchies occur when person interacts with
other grammatical categories. The grammatical categories that will be dis-
cussed are spatial deixis, gender, politeness, sentence mood and evidentiality.
Sentence mood encodes whether a sentence is a statement, a question, a com-
mand, or some other speech act. In commands, for example, person is important
because second-person commands (i.e. imperatives) are on average shorter than
commands to other persons, see Section 4.3.3. The grammatical category of ev-
identiality encodes how the information expressed by a predicate is obtained. In
the sentence in (8), for example, there is the direct-evidence marker -n, which
conveys that the bread-eating event was seen by the speaker herself (Faller
2002).
Cuzco Quechua
(8) Pilar-qa
Pilar-top
t’anta-ta-n
bread-acc-sens
mikhu-rqa-n
eat-pst-3
‘Pilar ate bread (and I saw that)’
For obvious reasons there are only evidentials for direct evidence gathered by
the speaker. This shows that a speaker–non-speaker distinction is encoded in
evidentials, see Section 4.4.
Chapter 5, finally, will provide the conclusion of this dissertation. I will
summarize the main findings and conclude that first/second vs. third is not the
only person split that may occur in language.

CHAPTER 2
How many persons are there?
The grammatical category of person has values like first person and second
person and these values may pattern in certain ways, which is the main topic
of this dissertation. But if we want to know what person patterns exist we first
have to know how many person values there are. If there are, for example, three
person values (first, second and third person) then there are only five potential
patterns, as was shown in the previous chapter.
The only way to know how many values of some grammatical category
a language has is to look at the markers that a language employs for the
grammatical category. The -s marker of games in (1), for example, shows that
this English noun distinguishes between a plural and a singular number value.
(1) He play-s game-s
In the sentence in (1) we also see that person is marked by two morphemes,
he and the -s from plays. Does this mean that person is marked twice in this
sentence? In Section 2.1 I will argue that the two morphemes should be seen
as one marker.
The classical view—based on languages like Greek, Latin and English—is
that all languages have three person values. And indeed, when one looks at the
singular in spoken languages this view holds. English, for example, has a first-
person pronoun I which is associated with the speaker (S), a second-person
pronoun you which is associated with the addressee (A), and a third-person
he (or she or it) which is associated with an other (O; someone who is neither
speaker nor addressee). In (2) I present an overview of the English system of
singular pronouns, once again restricted to singular, nominative forms.
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(2) English singular pronouns
Syntactic value Pronoun Semantics
1 I S
2 you A
3 he/she/it O
The system in (2) shows that the person values of first person, second person
and third person really are sufficient to describe the English singular pronouns,
and they also suffice for the singular pronouns in other spoken languages. How-
ever, when we look at cross-linguistic data on plural pronouns (Section 2.2), we
will see that languages with inclusive pronouns have four person values, while
the classical view predicts a maximum of three.
Moreover, when we look at data from sign languages (Section 2.3), we
will see that languages may also have less than three person values. This is a
violation of Greenberg’s Universal 42 (Greenberg 1963), as cited in (3).
(3) Greenberg’s Universal 42
All languages have pronominal categories involving at least three persons
and two numbers.
There is also incidental data from spoken languages that violates Greenberg’s
Universal 42. In Section 2.4 we will deal with these data.
The importance of inclusive pronouns for the category of person may lead
to some reanalyses in our theory of language. Some scholars have for exam-
ple argued that the category of number should be reanalyzed accordingly. In
Section 2.5 I will argue that this is not necessary.
2.1 Preliminaries: person markers
This dissertation is about the semantic concept of person, and about the syn-
tactic means to express it. The overt expression of a semantic category is often
called a marker, so the overt expression of the category of person should be
called a person marker. The morphological status of person markers varies
greatly; on the one hand there are independent pronouns like she, and on the
other hand there are affixes like -s, see (4).
(4) She know-s
In Section 2.1.1 we will see that every language has these markers in one
form or another, and in Section 2.1.2 we will find out that person markers may
consist of two or more non-adjacent morphemes.
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2.1.1 The universality of person markers
Person shall be regarded as a grammatical category in this dissertation. I de-
fine the term grammatical category as a semantic concept that is obligatorily
encoded on a subset of linguistic items in one or more of the world’s languages.
Tense is an example of a grammatical category for English verbs: the semantic
concept of time is obligatorily expressed on the English verb, see (5a-b). If the
state of being cold was in the past, the speaker has to choose the past-tense
copula, even if she does not want to put emphasis on the time of the event, see
(5a). But, if the state of being cold is in the present, the present-tense copula
has to be chosen, see (5b). In other words, you cannot describe an event in
English without expressing tense.
(5) a. The water was cold.
b. The water is cold.
For Indonesian verbs, on the other hand, tense is not a grammatical cate-
gory. In other words, the semantic concept of time is not obligatorily encoded
on Indonesian verbs. For example, the state of being cold in (6) can be in the
past, in the present, or in the future (Dahl and Velupillai 2005b).
Indonesian
(6) Air
water
itu
that
dingin
cold
‘The water is/was/will be cold’
Does this mean that there is no tense at all in Indonesian? Well, there are of
course words like kemarin ‘yesterday’, which obviously express the concept of
time. This makes the answer to a question like Do all languages have tense?
rather trivial: the answer is yes if every language has a word for ‘today’ or
‘yesterday’ or even ‘now’. Therefore, it is more informative to take a certain
subset of linguistic items in every language—e.g. verbs—and investigate for
every language whether a grammatical category like tense is present on this
subset. Note that this involves a cross-linguistic definition of the concept of
verb.
An assessment of the grammatical category of person resembles the previ-
ous discussion on tense. There are languages like Japanese that do not obliga-
torily express person with their verbs. Therefore, in these topic-drop languages
the grammatical category of person is not marked on verbs. In (7) there is a
Japanese example; note that the first-person is not expressed syntactically at
all, because it is clear from the context that the person is talking about herself
(Neeleman and Szendrői 2007).
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Japanese
(7) [A person talking about herself]
siken-ni
exam-dat
otita
failed
‘I failed the exam.’
Yet, there are contexts in which there is emphasis on the identity of a
participant. In (8) there is emphasis on the identity of the speaker, because it
could also have been the mother herself who failed the exam.
(8) A: Why is your mother sad?
B: I failed the exam.
In a similar emphasis context in Japanese there will also be a marker of the
category of person present. In the example in (9) this is watashi ‘I’. I predict
accordingly that every language in the world has an obligatory person marker
in such an emphatical context.
Japanese
(9) [Answer to Why is your mother sad? ]
watashi
1sg
siken-ni
exam-dat
otita.
failed
‘I failed the exam.’
Thus, not every language marks person obligatorily in all environments,
e.g. on verbs. There is, however, no language that lacks a manner to explicitly
state that some person is the speaker or the addressee (Siewierska 2004:8-13).
In other words, no language completely lacks person.
2.1.2 Pronouns vs. affixes
Now that we have seen that all languages have person markers somewhere in
their syntax, we can look at the form of these person markers more closely.
The problem that I want to address is sentences that have two morphemes to
mark person (e.g. a pronoun and an affix).
The markers of a grammatical category often have dependent forms, such
as an affix form or a clitic form. Take, for example, the grammatical category
of definiteness, which encodes the semantic concept that can be described as
“being known in the context”. In French the definiteness marker le/la—the
definite article—is a clitic. Clitics are usually seen as different from affixes
because they can attach to different parts of speech depending on their position
in the phrase, see (10a-b)
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French
(10) a. le=vin
the=wine
blanc
white
‘the white wine’
b. le=bon
the=good
vin
wine
blanc
white
‘the good white wine’
Clitics also differ from independent words, because they cannot occur au-
tonomously, see (11).
(11) A: Qui
who
avez
have
vous
2.hon
vu?
seen
‘Who did you see?’
B: *Le
him
Nothing hinges on my definition of clitic, however. The only reason that I bring
them up is to show that there is more to the morphological form of a marker
than the prototypical affix form or the prototypical independent-word form.
Person is also often expressed by affixes or clitics. For example, in English
there is an obligatory -s affix on verbs in the present tense if the verb is third
person singular, see (12).
(12) He sleep-s
Of course, independent person markers are usually referred to as personal pro-
nouns, or pronouns, for short.
One question regarding dependent person marker is whether they have
argumental status. Is, for example, the affix -o in the Italian example in (13),
the subject of the sentence?
Italian
(13) Sedev-o
sat-1sg
in
in
giardino
garden
‘I sat in the garden’
Several scholars have made this claim that an affix can be an argument by itself
(see, for example, Manzini and Roussou 2000). The problem for such an affix-
as-argument approach comes with sentences like the one in (14). In this Italian
sentence there is both a pronoun (Io ‘1sg’ ) and an affix (-o ‘1sg’). If the affix
is the subject of the sentence, then the status of the pronoun is problematic.
It cannot be the subject too because a sentence cannot have two subjects.
(14) Io
1sg
sedev-o
sat-1sg
in
in
giardino
garden
‘I sat in the garden’
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One solution is to say that an overt subject like io in (14) is not a part of
the clause. This would mean that (14) corresponds to the construction in (15)
syntactically. Io in (14) corresponds to the first α in (15), and affix -o in (14)
corresponds to the second α in (15).
(15) As for α, α sat in the garden
For a sentence with a full noun phrase the situation is similar: Gianni in (16)
corresponds to the first α in (15), and affix -a in (16) corresponds to the second
α in (15).
(16) Gianni
John
sedev-a
sat-3sg
in
in
giardino
garden
‘John sat in the garden’
A problem for this solution is a quantifier like nessuno ‘nobody’, see (17). The
sentence in (17) does not correspond to the construction in (15), because #As
for nobody, he sat in the garden does not have the same meaning as (17), in
which nobody sits in the garden
(17) Nessuno
Nobody
sedev-a
sat-3sg
in
in
giardino
garden
‘Nobody sat in the garden’
Thus, demoting one of the person markers to a dislocated position is not a
viable solution.
Another solution involves a hybrid analysis of affixes: when a sentence
also has a pronoun (Io sedevo in giardino ‘I sat in the garden’) the affix is
not a subject, when the sentence does not have a pronoun (Sedevo in giardino
‘I sat in the garden’) the affix is the subject. In other words, we have two
kinds of person affixes: argument affixes and non-argument affixes. However,
the prediction then is that it should not be necessary within a language for
the two types of affixes to have exactly the same form, because they are very
different semantically: the argument affix has semantic content while the non-
argument affix has none. Italian is such a language, however, and Siewierska
(2004) notes that in her 309-language sample 271 languages are like Italian:
their argument affixes and non-argument affixes share the same form. This is
highly unexpected if the hybrid analysis of person affixes were true.
The best solution to the problem of the co-occurrence of pronoun and affix
is to assume that a pronoun and an affix may form a single argument together.
In a sentence like (18), for example, the marker consists of two morphemes, he
and -s.
(18) He know-s
This is a violation of the principle of strict surface compositionality, which
states that every syntactic unit should have its own semantic contribution to
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the sentence. In other words, a marker should correspond to only one mor-
pheme. Violations of compositionality are not uncommon, however. In (19a-b)
the semantic concept of dying is expressed by three morphemes, kick, the and
bucket.
(19) a. He will kick the bucket
b. He kicked the bucket
A person marker consisting of two morphemes is, therefore, not ruled out by
linguistic theory. In fact, many scholars accept the existence of discontinuous
markers by stipulating the existence of agreement. Agreement can take many
different forms: number agreement, gender agreement and sequence of tense.
Also in a sentence like (20) some sort of agreement applies: their depends for
its reference on nobody, which has to be established in one way or another.
(20) Nobody brushed their teeth
All in all, it seems reasonable to accept the possibility of discontinuous person
markers.
It is not the case for all languages that the verb always co-occurs with a
two-morpheme person marker. Italian sometimes (in emphatic contexts) has a
two-morpheme marker and sometimes a one-morpheme one, but a language like
Swedish only has one-morpheme person markers, see (21). The subject pronoun
is obligatory, both in emphatic and non-emphatic contexts (this resembles the
English situation in the past tense, which shows that there are differences within
languages as well).
Swedish
(21) Han
3sg.m
skrattar
laugh
‘He laughs’
A language may also leave person unexpressed in non-emphatic contexts. This
applies to a language like Mandarin (see Huang 1989). When the context is
clear there is no need for a person marker, see (22).
Mandarin
(22) lai
come
le
perf
‘I/you/he/she/it/we/they came’
It seems, therefore, that all combinations of pronoun and affix are attested, see
(23) for an overview.
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(23) Four types of person marking and their example languages
−pronoun +pronoun
−affix Chinese Swedish
+affix Italian English
Languages may have a null-morpheme (Chinese), a one-morpheme (Italian and
Swedish) or a two-morpheme marker (English).
Although all four types of language are attested, language users neverthe-
less have a strong preference for the Italian type of language. Dryer (2005a)
notes that in his 711-language sample there are 437 Italian-type languages.
The Chinese type consists of 61 languages and the English and Swedish type
have 149 languages together (Dryer does not distinguish between the Swedish
type and the English type quantitatively, but he suggests that the English type
is the more marginal one). Thus, a two-morpheme person marker is certainly
not the number one option in language. Yet, the option does occur. Moreover,
person markers can have even more than two morphemes. In the Dutch dialect
of Gent the person marker of an embedded clause can have three morphemes
(see van Craenenbroeck and van Koppen 2002). In the sentence in (24) we see
a clitic (=ze ‘3sg.f’), a stressed pronoun (zaa ‘3sg.f’) and an affix (-t ‘3sg).
Gent Dutch
(24) . . . da=ze
that=3sg.f
ZAA
3sg.f
werk-t
work-3sg
‘. . . that SHE is working’
Thus, a one-morpheme version of a person marker is preferred but in theory
the sky is the limit for the number of morphemes.
One final remark involves the so-called little pro theorem. In this theory
a phonological empty element (represented as pro) is present in the cases in
which there is no phonologically realized pronoun. In Italian, for example, the
sentence sedevo in giardino ‘I sat in the garden’ should be analyzed as in (25).
See Ackema et al. (2006) for an overview of the discussion on the little pro
theorem.
Italian
(25) pro
sbj.1sg
sedev-o
sat-1sg
in
in
giardino
garden
‘I sat in the garden’
For my analysis of person markers the existence of little pro means that the
Chinese-type and Italian-type languages in the overview in (24) have little
pro’s instead of no pronouns. As my analysis does not provide any additional
evidence for or against the little pro theorem I remain agnostic on the matter.
To sum up, person markers may consist of multiple morphemes, which
solves the problem that sentences with both a personal pronoun and a verbal
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person affix pose.
2.1.3 Summary
In this section I have looked at person markers, syntactic elements that mark
whether some argument in the sentence is a speaker or an addressee. Person
markers exist in all languages because all languages need a mechanism to put
emphasis on the identity of speaker and addressee as in (26).
(26) I am right and YOU are wrong
In other contexts person markers are not always present. Not every language
in the world has subject person markers in a context without emphasis or am-
biguity for example. These are the so-called pro-drop languages like Mandarin
and Japanese.
If a sentence does possess a person marker the person marker may have
different morphosyntactic forms (pronoun, clitic, affix) in different languages.
There are even sentences in which the person marker has two or more mor-
phemes. The English sentence in (27) is an example; here the person marker
consists of a pronoun (she) and an affix (-s). The connection between the two
morphemes is commonly known as agreement.
(27) She know-s
Now that we have a better understanding of person markers, we can look
at the person values that the person markers mark. In the next section I will
look at the maximum number of person values between which person markers
can distinguish.
2.2 The inclusive—a fourth person value
Many languages in the world have so-called inclusive pronouns. Ngiti is an
example of a language with inclusive pronouns (Kutsch Lojenga 1994). An
instance of the Ngiti inclusive pronoun (glossed as “ 1
2
”) can be found in (28a).
Ngiti
(28) a. alE`
1
2
k-òdz1`
1
2
-cry
‘We cry’
b. mà
1pl
m-òdz1`
1-cry
‘We cry’
This inclusive pronoun is translated as ‘we’, but it has a more specific meaning:
the sentence in (28a) conveys that the speaker and the addressee(s) and possibly
others are crying. If the speaker wants to convey instead that the speaker and
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one or more others are crying, but not the addressee(s), a different pronoun
(traditionally known as the exclusive pronoun) has to be used. An instance of
this pronoun can be found in (28b).
In this section I will argue that the existence of inclusive pronouns has its
consequences for the grammatical category of person. The effect of the inclusive
pronoun on the interaction between the grammatical categories of person and
number will be discussed in Section 2.2.1. The conclusion will be that a special
fourth person value (aptly named “inclusive person”) has to be used to account
for inclusive pronouns. In Section 2.2.2 it will be discussed how this inclusive
person value leads to an analysis of the grammatical person with parameters
ego and tu. In Section 2.2.3 we will look at the question whether the inclusive
person value is present in every language in the world.
2.2.1 Person and number in pronouns
The main question in this chapter is how many person values are necessary to
describe the languages of the world. But before we can answer this question, we
have to disentangle the grammatical category of person from other grammatical
categories. If one looks at person markers, one will see that these markers not
only express the grammatical category of person, but also other grammatical
categories. In the overview in (29) I listed three grammatical categories that
English personal pronouns also may express: semantic role, number and gender.
For the sake of simplicity I have not displayed reflexive pronouns (e.g. myself ).
(29) English personal pronouns
first second third
sbj
sg
m
I you
he
f she
n it
pl we they
obj
sg
m
me you
him
f her
n it
pl us them
poss
sg
m
my your
his
f her
n its
pl our their
From the overview in (29) it is evident that the pronouns he, she and it all have
the same person value (third person), but differ with respect to the grammatical
category of gender. Only when we abstract away from the expression of gender
and the expression of other grammatical categories like semantic role, we are
left with the pure grammatical category of person.
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Probably the hardest grammatical category to separate from person is the
category of number. We will therefore have a closer look at the interaction of
number and person in personal pronouns in this section. Our starting point is
that personal pronouns are used to refer to a group of salient entities in the
context (note that when the personal pronoun is singular such a group consists
of only one entity). What the grammatical category of number expresses is
simply how many entities there are in that group.
What the grammatical category of person expresses exactly is less obvi-
ous. Intuitively, it should account for the pronouns in a sentence like (30). In
this sentence there is a pronoun, I, that refers to the speaker, and a different
pronoun, you, that refers to the addressee.
(30) I know you
A first thing to note is that one entity can either be a speaker (S) or an addressee
(A), but not both. In other words, those two functions are mutually exclusive.
This is illustrated by the scenario in (31). If one talks to oneself, one can either
think of oneself as a speaker and use a pronoun like I—see (31a) – or think of
oneself as an addressee and use a pronoun like you—see (31b). As far as I know,
there is no language that has a special pronoun that refers to a person who
speaks to herself, being both the speaker and the addressee of the utterance.
Frequency is probably the driving force behind this: in almost all cases speaker
and addressee are distinct individuals.
(31) [Talking to oneself for motivational purposes:]
a. I can do this!
b. You can do this!
On the other hand, there are entities that are neither speaker nor ad-
dressee. We will refer to such an entity as an other (O). English uses personal
pronouns like he to refer to others, see (32) for an example.
(32) He knows
Thus, if we look at groups with only one member there are three possibilities
with respect to the expression of person: a single speaker, a single addressee,
or a single other.
However, looking at groups with more than one member makes matters
more complex. For groups with two entities there are in theory six possibilities:
SS, SA, SO, AA, AO and AA. I have to note in advance, however, that it is
impossible in language to have more than one speaker in a single sentence. See
Section 3.1.2 for the argument. With this restriction a group with two speakers
is impossible, which brings the number of two-entity groups down to five. Five
is of course still more than the three possibilities in the singular. Moreover, for
groups with three entities there are already seven possibilities and the number
of possibilities increases with the size of the group, see (33).
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(33) Potential groups of entities marked by person
One entity Two entities Three entities Four entities . . .
S SA SAA SAAA
A SO SAO . . .
O AA SOO
AO AAA
OO AAO
AOO
OOO
Languages do not have a dedicated pronoun for each possibility. This would
lead to an infinite number of personal pronouns. In theory such a language can
exist but it would need a mechanism to generate its pronouns from a finite set
of items. This mechanism would come down to naming each single individual
in the reference group, so saying he, she, you and I instead of we. Very few
languages use such conjunctions of singular pronouns as the only strategy of
referring to groups (Cysouw 2005) because it would make referring to large
groups rather tedious.
Thus, languages tend to have a finite set of personal pronouns, but this
means lumping together some of the infinite possibilities in (33). As a conse-
quence, these languages will have at least one pronoun that covers an infinite
number of possibilities. One way in which languages lump together possibilities
is by having only a few values in the grammatical category of number. Most
languages have a singular–plural system, which means that they only distin-
guish between groups of one entity (singular) and groups of more than one
entity (plural). There are slightly more complicated number systems—like the
singular–dual–plural system, where the distinction is between groups of one
entity (singular), groups of two entities (dual) and groups of more than two
entities (plural)—but the number of values is never more than a handful. In
this dissertation we will mainly focus on singular–plural systems.
However, unless the category of person is restricted as well, there would
still be an infinite number of personal pronouns. This is shown in the overview
in (34): in a singular–plural language the number of singular pronouns would
be finite (three, to be exact), but the number of plural pronouns would still be
infinite, as every combination of S, A and O would still need its own pronoun.
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(34) Potential groups of entities in a singular–plural language
Singular Plural
S SA
A SO
O AA
AO
OO
SAA
SAO
SOO
. . .
So how do languages restrict their number of pronouns? This is where the
precise definition of the values of the grammatical category of person comes in.
Let us look at German, an example of a singular–plural language. An
overview of pronouns in German can be found in (35). For ease of exposition
we will restrict the discussion to subject pronouns in this chapter. Note that
English is similar to German but does not distinguish between second-person
singular and second-person plural.
(35) Interaction of number and person in German personal pronouns
Singular Plural
Pronoun Semantics Pronoun Semantics
1 ich S wir SA, SO, SAA, . . .
2 du A ihr AA, AO, AAA, . . .
3 er/sie/es O sie OO, OOO, OOOO . . .
The common analysis of person in a pronoun system in a language like German
has three person values (first-person, second-person and third-person), defined
as in (36). Note that I allow only one S in a group, see Section 3.1.2.
(36) Definitions of person values in a German-style language.
1 a group with a speaker
2 a group with one or more addressees and no speaker
3 a group with neither speaker nor addressees
With these definitions the German pronouns are categorized as follows: ich
‘I’ and wir ‘we’ are first-person, du ‘you (singular)’ and ihr ‘you (plural)’ are
second-person, and er ‘he’ and sie ‘they’ are third-person (note that the names
of the labels “first person”, “second person” and “third person” are unimportant;
one could have used labels like “X”, “Y” and “Z” instead, but it is tradition to use
numeric names for person values in linguistics). Thus, with a minimum of three
person values and two number values and abstracting away from things like case
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(i.e. semantic roles) and gender the six German pronouns are as expected.
Yet, six is not the maximum of personal pronouns in a singular–plural
language; in a language like Evenki there is a separate inclusive pronoun (mit),
which brings the total (again abstracting away from case, gender, etc.) to seven
pronouns. In (37) we find an overview of Evenki pronouns (see Nedjalkov 1997).
(37) Interaction of number and person in Evenki personal pronouns
Singular Plural
Pronoun Semantics Pronoun Semantics
mit SA, SAO, . . .
bi S bu SO, SOO, . . .
si A su AA, AO, . . .
nungan O nungartyn OO, OOO, . . .
Obviously, the definitions in (36) that have been used for German do not suffice
for Evenki (and there are more languages like Evenki), as they would not distin-
guish between inclusive mit and first-person plural bu, because both pronouns
refer to a group with a speaker.
Traditionally, both types of pronouns have been analyzed as first-person
pronouns. The mit-type pronoun has been known as the first-person inclusive
pronoun—i.e. the group includes the addressee(s)—and the bu-type pronoun
as the first-person exclusive—i.e. the group excludes the addressee(s). However,
as the matrix in (37) has already suggested, I will follow a different analysis
in this dissertation: a mit-type pronoun does not have a first-person value, but
a person value of its own, the inclusive-person value (Bobaljik 2008, Cysouw
2010). This inclusive-person value is then the fourth person value (besides the
first-person, second-person and third-person values) and will be represented
with a 1
2
in matrices and glosses in this dissertation. In (38a) there is an Evenki
example of the inclusive pronoun mit.
Evenki
(38) a. Esi
now
mit
1
2
oron-mi
reindeer-poss.refl.sg
e-get
neg- 1
2
.imp
sokor-ro
lose-ptcp
‘Let us (inclusive) not lose our (inclusive) reindeer’
b. Bu
1pl
oro-r-vor
reindeer-pl-poss.refl.pl
etejet-chere-v
guard-prs-1pl
‘We (exclusive) guarded our (exclusive) reindeer’
In addition, in (38b) we find an example of the pronoun bu. The bu-type pro-
nouns will from now on be referred to as first-person plural pronouns; calling it
a first-person plural exclusive pronoun is superfluous since now all first-person
pronouns are by definition exclusive—they exclude the addressee(s) by defini-
tion.
We now have a view that competes with the traditional view that inclusive
pronouns are first-person. One argument in support of the inclusive as a fourth
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person value can be extracted from typological work by Cysouw (2003:187).
Cysouw looks at homophony between person-number markers, i.e. cases in
which one morphophonological form may express more than one person-number
combination. A well-known example is English you, which may be either second-
person singular or second-person plural. To tease apart the homophony pat-
terns of the inclusive from the homophony patterns of the first person Cysouw
selected a sample of 121 languages in which the inclusive person marker and
the first-person plural marker were not homophonous with each other. In other
words, he looked at 121 languages that are like Evenki. What he found was
that in 23 languages (19.0%) in his sample there was homophony between
the first-person singular and the first-person plural, and in only one language
(0.8%) there was homophony between first-person singular and the inclusive.
Homophony between singular and plural within a person value occurs on a reg-
ular basis—31 languages (25.6%) for second person and 47 languages (38.8%)
for third person—so if the inclusive really is a first-person pronoun, the per-
centage of 0.8% should have been higher.
A similar argument is made by Daniel (2005b). This argument involves the
derivation of plural pronouns from singular pronouns. A language has such a
derivation when a plural pronoun may be analyzed morphologically as a singu-
lar pronoun plus a marker of plurality. This is not a very frequent phenomenon,
but it does occur. In Mandarin, for example, the second-person plural form is
nıˇ-men, which can be analyzed as the second-person singular form nıˇ plus plu-
rality marker -men. Now, if the inclusive pronoun were a first-person pronoun,
one would expect that the number of languages in which an inclusive pronoun
is derived from the first-person singular is approximately equal to the num-
ber of languages in which a first-person plural pronouns is derived from the
first-person singular. Yet, in reality the number of cases in which the inclusive
pronoun is derived from a first-person singular pronoun is much lower: 1% of
250 languages vs. 20% of 250 languages (Daniel 2005b). So, it seems indeed that
inclusive pronouns are not first-person, and the hypothesis that the inclusive
is a person value in its own right seems warranted.
This leaves us with four person values instead of the classical three. But
is it even possible to have more than four person values? In the next section I
will argue that this is not possible in language.
2.2.2 Four is the maximum
As a number of scholars have noted, seven pronouns—as in Evenki, see (37)—is
the de facto maximum for a singular–plural language (Bobaljik 2008, Cysouw
2010). This means, for example, that no language distinguishes between a group
consisting of two addressees (AA) and a group consisting of a single addressee
and an other (AO). In (39a) there is an English sentence with a context for an
AA group, and in (39b) there is one for an AO group. As predicted, in both
cases the pronoun you is used.
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(39) a. Alice and Bob, could you explain yourselves?
b. My husband and I had a blast last night; did you enjoy yourselves
as well?
This observation, which extends to all other languages, is in need of explanation,
since people can distinguish between an AA group and an AO group at a
conceptual level. Thus, as there is a meaningful difference between an AA
group and an AO group, why does no language acknowledge this difference by
having two separate lexical items?
The most viable solution to this issue is to find out why the person category
in human language is severely restricted. We have already seen in the previous
section that languages need a restriction on the values in their person category
(i.e. some speaker–addressee–other combinations need to be lumped together),
because otherwise an infinite number of person values is needed. Apparently,
the restriction that rests upon human language is severe: only four person
values are allowed to describe the pronoun systems of the languages in the
world (inclusive person, first person, second person and third person). In other
words, infinity is brought down to four. So why is the restriction on the values
in the category of person so severe?
In theory, a language with for example a seven-person system could be
conceived of. Let us define the seven person values of this language as in (40).
Note that, again, the names of the labels of the person values are irrelevant.
(40) Definitions of person values in a hypothetical seven-person singular-
plural language
1 a group with a speaker, one or more addressees, and one or more
others
2 a group with a speaker, one or more addressees, and no others
3 a group with a speaker, one or more others, and no addressees
4 a group with a speaker, no addressees, and no others
5 a group with one or more addressees, one or more others, and no
speaker
6 a group with one or more addressees, no speaker, and no others
7 a group with one or more others, no speaker, and no addressees
With these definitions the pronoun system of such a seven-person language
would follow the matrix in (41). Each cell in the matrix represents one pronoun,
so there is a total of nine pronouns.
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(41) Personal pronouns in a hypothetical seven-person language
Singular Plural
1 SAO, SAAO, SAOO, . . .
2 SA, SAA, SAAA, . . .
3 SO, SOO, SOOO, . . .
4 S
5 AO, AAO, AOO . . .
6 A AA, AAA, AAAA . . .
7 O OO, OOO, OOOO . . .
It seems that theoretically a language with more than four person values is
possible.
Why do languages like this not exist? One thing to note about this lan-
guage is that it will take some time before the right pronoun can be chosen
when referring to a large group of people. An AAAAO group, for example,
corresponds to another person value (and therefore another pronoun) than an
AAAAA group, so every member of the group should be assessed before the
right pronoun can be chosen. Thus, plural pronoun selection will be quite time-
consuming in this language.
In contrast, the situation in a four-person singular-plural language is rather
different. Only two questions have to be answered before a pronoun can be
selected, see (42).
(42) Questions to answer before pronoun selection in a four-person language
1. Is the speaker part of the group?
2. Pick one addressee; is she part of the group?
If the answer to both questions is yes, choose the inclusive-person pronoun; if
the answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the second question
no, choose the first-person pronoun; if the answer to the first question is no
and the answer to the second question yes, choose the second-person pronoun;
and if the answer to both questions is no, choose the third-person pronoun.
The crucial point is that in this system only one non-speaker has to be
assessed (so only two questions), while in the seven-person system every non-
speaker had to be assessed (so as much questions as there are persons in the
group). The reason that the simple two-question system in (41) works is that
addressees may not be separated. A group of referents either includes all ad-
dressees, or none of them. This can be illustrated with the example in (43), in
which Alice and Bob are the addressees.
(43) #Alice and Bob, why are you men so easy to manipulate?
In this example the pronoun you can only refer to Bob and others (all other
men), but not to Alice because Alice is not a man. Yet, this sentence is in-
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felicitous, because Alice and Bob are both addressees at the beginning of the
sentence and the you refers to only one of them. See Section 3.1 for a deeper
analysis on why this sentence is infelicitous.
In addition, take for example the context in (44).
(44) [At a party while among a group of people:]
So are you enjoying yourselves at this party?
The speaker of such a sentence is usually not very precise about who is an
addressee and who is not. It is quite bothersome to make eye contact with
everyone in the group. The speaker probably only wants that somebody gives
an answer. It does not really matter whether this person is really addressed by
means of eye contact or just an overhearer of the conversation or something
in between. For these situations it is convenient that a word like you is rather
vague in English.
We may operationalize the two questions in (43) as two parameters – the
labels ego and tu will be used for these two parameters in this dissertation.
The parameter ego has the value + if the speaker is part of the group under
discussion, otherwise the value is −. The parameter tu has the value + if there
are one or more addressees in the group under discussion, otherwise the value
is −. By using these two parameters, precisely the seven number–person value
combinations of a language like Evenki will be generated (cf. Silverstein 1976,
Harley and Ritter 2002, Heim 2008). In (45) there is an overview of the seven
pronouns in such a singular-plural language, generated with ego and tu. Thus,
for example, in an SAO group there is a speaker, which gives us as a +ego
value, and also an addressee, which gives us a +tu value. Together this gives us
a [+ego +tu] pronoun, which is, of course, the inclusive pronoun. Note that
the inclusive-person singular cell is empty; languages do not allow for a single
entity to be both a speaker and an addressee, as we saw above.
(45) Pronoun system generated with ego and tu
Parameters Value Singular Plural
[+ego +tu] 1
2
SA, SAO, . . .
[+ego −tu] 1 S SO, SOO, . . .
[−ego +tu] 2 A AA, AO, . . .
[−ego −tu] 3 O OO, OOO . . .
All in all, with the assumption of two parameters (ego and tu) it is correctly
predicted that the maximum of person values in language is four.
To sum up this section, four persons (inclusive person, first person, second
person and third person) is the maximum number of person values that a lan-
guage can have. These four persons can be generated by the stipulation of two
parameters, ego and tu. One remaining issue is singular–plural languages (e.g.
German) that only have six pronouns, lacking a dedicated inclusive pronoun.
There are many of these languages, which is unexpected as the matrix in (45)
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predicts that a singular–plural language should have seven pronouns. This issue
is in need of an explanation and I will provide one in the next section.
2.2.3 The inclusive is not universal
We have established so far that the maximum of person values in a language
is four. But what can we say about the minimum number of person values?
Greenberg’s Universal 42 stated that all languages have at least three person
values (Greenberg 1963), but do all languages have all four person values as
well?
At first sight, there is no need for an inclusive person value for the de-
scription of a language like Dutch or English. The consequence of this would
be that Dutch and English only need three person values in their grammar to
produce all the relevant forms. A three-person analysis of, for example, Dutch
personal pronouns would be the same as the classical analysis (as described in
Section 2.2.1) of such a paradigm. In (46) such a three-person analysis of Dutch
personal pronouns can be found.
(46) Three-person analysis of Dutch personal pronouns
Singular Plural
1 ik wij
2 jij jullie
3 hij zij
However, it is sometimes claimed that even languages like English and
Dutch have a construction in which the distinction between inclusive and
first person is important syntactically: the hortative (Fillmore 1971, Levin-
son 1983:69). The hortative construction corresponds semantically to an act of
exhortation, i.e. inciting someone to do something. In (47) we find an example
of such an exhortation.
(47) Let’s buy some new clothes
The morpheme ’s, the subject of buy in this sentence, seems to refer to a group
that needs both the speaker and the addressee(s) among its referents. Indeed,
it does not seem possible to have a (+ego −tu) first-person interpretation
for ’s; in other words, the ’s morpheme cannot refer to a group that includes
the speaker and others but excludes the addressee(s). This would mean that
the English hortative is restricted to the inclusive; to express an exhortation
to a first-person plural group a longer construction should be used, (48) for
example.
(48) We should buy some new clothes, me and her
As a consequence, English needs a fourth person value (inclusive person)—
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because three values do not suffice—at at least one point in its grammar.
Yet, there are data that contradict the hypothesis that the hortative in
English cannot apply to a first-person group of referents. Consider the following
newspaper example in (49).
(49) Feeling fine? Let’s give you a blood test and quickly prove that you
aren’t.
In this sentence the ’s morpheme does not refer to a speaker–addressee com-
bination, as the sentence is not an invitation to the addressee to assist in a
blood test on herself. Rather what the sentence means is ‘My colleagues and
I will perform a blood test on you’. Similar sentences can be found in Dutch,
as the Internet example in (50) shows. What this sentence means is ‘The other
editors of this magazine (i.e Veto, Leuven’s student magazine) and I will put
your mind at ease’, not ‘You and I will put your mind at ease’.
Dutch
(50) Maar
but
laten
let
we
1pl
je
2
meteen
immediate
geruststellen:
reassure
de
the
studenten
students
Germaanse
Germanic
talen
languages
kunnen
can
nog
still
altijd
always
het
the
beste
best
spellen
spell
‘But let’s put your mind at ease: students of Germanic languages are
still the best at spelling’
Thus, it seems that first-person hortatives are possible in English and Dutch.
Yet, first-person hortatives are rare compared to inclusive-person horta-
tives, which has to be explained. The sentences in (49) and (50) show us that
a situation with a first-person hortative involves a speaker, one or more ad-
dressees and one or more others, in which the others but not the addressees are
urged to do something. This is a rather unusual situation and should not occur
very frequently. Thus, while first-person hortatives do occur, they are rather
rare.
Because first-person hortative constructions may occur in English in
Dutch, these constructions are not syntactically sensitive to the distinction
between inclusive and first person. Moreover, I know of no other syntactic phe-
nomenon in English or Dutch where the inclusive person is needed. This means
that these languages have no need for a fourth person value in their grammar.
Thus, languages with only three person values do exist.
In fact, these three-person languages seem to be extremely common. Ac-
cording to Cysouw (2005) most languages in the world do not distinguish be-
tween an inclusive and a first-person plural pronoun. In his sample of 200
languages 130 languages do not have this distinction while 68 languages do
(the other two languages do not have plural pronouns to describe groups in-
cluding a speaker, but use periphrastic constructions instead). Presumably, the
120 languages without a special inclusive have no need for an inclusive person
value in the rest of their grammar either, which makes them three-person lan-
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guages. Thus, three-person languages occur presumably more frequently than
four-person languages.
How do we account for the high occurrence of three-person languages? If
four person values are theoretically possible, why does a language go for only
three? One possible explanation involves the importance of the singular and
could be called singular-centricity. This singular-centricity can be illustrated
by a corpus investigation. In a convenience sample from the CGN (Spoken
Dutch Corpus, see Oostdijk 2000) I found 9909 singular personal pronouns and
1669 plural personal pronouns. Thus, singular pronouns occur approximately
six times more often than plural pronouns. The next step is to conclude that
for the singular only three person values are needed (first person, second person
and third person). So, if a language takes this singular-centric perspective and
forces it upon the less frequent plural, three person values suffice for the whole
category of person.
One way to represent the pronoun system in such a three-person language
using the ego and tu parameters from the previous section is in (51)—the
example language is Dutch. In such an analysis we have a pronoun like wij ‘we’
that is underspecified for the tu parameter.
(51) Dutch personal pronouns, generated with ego and tu
Singular Plural
Pron Sem Pron Sem
[+ego] 1 ik S wij SA, SO, . . .
[−ego +tu] 2 jij A jullie AA, AO, . . .
[−ego −tu] 3 hij O zij OO, OOO . . .
However, this is not the only strategy to the pronoun paradigm that a
three-person language might take. An equally plausible strategy is shown by the
Tiwi language (Osborne 1974). Tiwi is the mirror image of Dutch with respect
to person: in this language the inclusive pronoun is not equal to the first-person
plural pronoun, but to the second-person plural. This can be represented by
leaving the ego parameter underspecified for this pronoun, see (52).
(52) Tiwi personal pronouns, generated with ego and tu
Singular Plural
Pron Sem Pron Sem
[+tu] 2 m@n”i- A mani- SA, AA, AO, . . .
[+ego −tu] 1 m@ni- S m@w@ni- SO, SOO . . .
[−ego −tu] 3 ∅- O w@ni- OO, OOO . . .
The Tiwi strategy is extremely rare in the languages of the world, however
(Daniel 2005b). What we need is an explanation why the inclusive pronoun is
far more often homophonous with the first-person plural, than with the second-
person plural. Arguably, languages do not only exhibit singular-centricity, but
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also egocentricity (cf. Givón 1976, Daniel 2005b). Indeed, speakers seem to talk
more about themselves than about their addressees. Van Bergen (2011:Ch. 1)
reports that in the Spoken Dutch Corpus (Oostdijk 2000) first-person pronouns
occur much more frequently than second- or third-person pronouns in Dutch;
the nominative singular first-person pronoun is even the most-frequent referen-
tial expression in the corpus. This egocentricity may explain why speakers tend
to look at a group from a first-person perspective instead of a second-person
perspective. The Tiwi homophony may just be a historical accident. In sum-
mary, singular-centricity and egocentricity may explain why so many pronoun
paradigms in the world look like the Dutch three-person paradigm in (51).
One final thing to note is that in the account provided in this section that
a marker of the first-person value has a different use in a language with an
inclusive person value and a language without an inclusive person value. In a
language with an inclusive the group referred to by a first-person marker can
be indicated as [+ego −tu] and may not include an addressee. In a language
without an inclusive, on the other hand, the group referred to by a a first-
person marker can be indicated as [+ego] and such a group may include an
addressee. Perhaps the term first/inclusive-person marker would be technically
more correct in the latter case, and I will use this longer term if the need arises.
To sum up, in this section we have seen that not every language is a four-
person language. Some languages lack the inclusive person as a syntactic person
value. Inclusive person is therefore not a universal person value in syntax.
2.2.4 Summary
In this section we have looked at inclusive pronouns and their relation to the
grammatical category of person. It became apparent that there are languages
with an inclusive pronoun and languages without an inclusive pronoun. For
the languages with an inclusive pronoun an additional person value is needed,
which brings the number of person values to four (inclusive person, first person,
second person, third person). These four person values are expected under an
analysis of the grammatical category of person in terms of two parameters, ego
and tu. However the existence of languages with only three person values is
unexpected under this analysis. Apparently it is possible for languages to take
a singular-centric perspective to their pronominal paradigm, which results in
only three person values.
The resulting picture is that languages are either three-person or four-
person. In the remainder of this chapter we will see that this is not completely
true. In Section 2.3 I will look at the person values in sign language and in
Section 2.4 I will look at phenomena with less than three person values within
spoken languages.
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2.3 Person in sign language
In this section we will look at person in sign languages. The sign language
equivalent of person markers is rather different from person markers in spoken
language. In sign languages a speaker (I will use the term speaker instead
of signer so a first-person entity will have the same terminology throughout
this dissertation) can integrate a real-world entity into a sentence by pointing
at the entity. Thus, the speaker can express ‘you are crazy’ to her addressee
by pointing at the addressee followed by the sign for ‘crazy’. Others that are
present in the room can also be directly pointed at, but this is obviously not
possible for others that are not present. These others first have to be localized,
i.e. a physical location is appointed to them (Liddell 2003, Zwets 2012:Ch. 5).
These localized others then behave like truly present others, so in the remainder
of this section we will abstract away from the distinction between present and
non-present referents. What is important is that pointing at a referent is in
many ways different from the use of a pronoun in spoken language.
The difference between pointing and pronoun is accompanied by another
difference. In the previous section we have seen that spoken languages either
have three or four person values. This is in line with Greenberg’s Universal 42,
which states that all languages have at least three persons (Greenberg 1963).
In Section 2.3.1 I will demonstrate that sign languages have less than three
persons, which refutes Greenberg’s Universal 42. As a consequence, there is
a categorical difference between signed and spoken languages with respect to
person values. In Section 2.3.2 I will provide an explanation for this categorical
difference by looking at the difference between pronouns and pointing. Finally,
the claim that sign languages have less than three person values should be
made precise: do sign languages have one or two person values? This issue will
be addressed in Section 2.3.3.
2.3.1 Second person=third person in sign language
Several authors have noted that there is no formal difference between a point
to an addressee and a point to an other (see Meier 1990, Liddell 2003). For
example, the hand shapes of the two pointing signs are completely similar (an
extended index finger is most common, yet other variants exist). Crucially, this
observation violates Greenberg’s Universal 42, which states that every language
should have distinct first-person, second-person and third-person pronouns.
That pointing signs in sign language do not distinguish between second
person and third person is already intriguing, but there is an even stronger
claim to make: the syntax of sign language does not distinguish between se-
cond and third person at all, so not only within pointing signs but also within
other grammatical constructions (see Meier 1990, Lillo-Martin and Klima 1990,
Neidle et al. 2000). One prediction this claim makes has been investigated by
Maier et al. (2011). This prediction is that in sign language the semantic con-
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cept of commands is not sensitive to being directed to an addressee or being
directed to an other. Such a prediction is in sharp contrast with the behavior
of commands in spoken languages. In spoken language there is always a dis-
tinction between a second-person and an third-person command, so the null
hypothesis would be that sign languages also have this distinction. This is not
the case however.
One can distinguish between two types of spoken languages with respect
to commands. The first type has one kind of marking for second-person com-
mands (commonly called imperative marking), and another kind of marking
for third-person commands. An example of this type is English. English uses
what is called the imperative construction for the second-person command—see
(53a)—and the let-construction for the third-person command—see (53b). Note
that, confusingly, the sentence in (53b) can also have a causative second-person
command reading (‘You should have him prepare for war’); the third-person
reading that we are after can be paraphrased as ‘He should prepare for war’
(Mastop 2005).
(53) a. Prepare for war if you desire peace
b. Let him prepare for war if he desires peace
Interestingly, the let-construction is ungrammatical in case of a second-person
subject, see (54).
(54) *Let you prepare for war if you desire peace
So, the English type of language shows a difference in construction between
second-person and third-person commands.
The arguments in this section rest on the claim that second-person com-
mands and third-person commands only differ in person and that for the rest
the commands are conceptually the same thing. In Section 4.3.3 I will present
arguments for this claim. If they are not then the whole point of discussing
commands is moot. The main message of this section—that the distinction be-
tween second and third person is absent in the syntax of sign languages—is
also true in that case, however. And it is all the more striking then that sign
languages do not formally distinguish between second-person and third-person
commands if they are so different conceptually.
The second type of spoken language with respect to commands uses the
same basic construction for second-person and third-person commands, but
makes use of distinguishing person markers. In Evenki, for example, for all
persons the verb expressing a command consists of the verb stem without tense
marking (Nedjalkov 1997). For the verb with the meaning ‘to find’ the stem
without tense marking is baka in Evenki. This stem then takes a second-person
marker if a second-person command is intended, and a third-person marker if
a third-person command is intended, see (55).
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(55) Evenki imperative paradigm of the verb baka ‘to find’
Singular Plural
1
2
baka-gat
1 baka-kta baka-kta-vu
2 baka-kal baka-kallu
3 baka-gin baka-ktyn
An overview of the two types of spoken language can be found in (56).
(56) Types of command marking in spoken languages
second-person third-person
English type no person marking third-person marking
Find! Let him find!
Evenki type second-person marking third–person marking
Baka-kal! Baka-gin!
As I already mentioned above, both types of spoken language clearly distinguish
between second-person and third-person forms.
Sign languages differ from spoken languages with respect to commands.
For a sign language a third-person pointing sign looks the same as a second-
person pointing sign (and it depends on the context whether the sign refers
to an addressee or an other). Thus, the Evenki type of command marking is
not available for sign language. This leaves the English type (i.e. the use of
different constructions) as the only way for a sign language to distinguish be-
tween second-person and third-person commands. However, sign languages do
not seem to have different constructions. In SLN (Sign Language of the Nether-
lands) for both types of commands a verb is used (which is how declaratives are
expressed) with the possible addition of the markers in (57). Note that none of
these markers are a obligatory condition for command marking (Maier et al.
2011).
(57) Characteristics of command marking in Sign Language of the Nether-
lands
Syntax subject omission
Manner of signing increased speed; heavy, accentuated move-
ments
Non-manual marking frowning; squint; wrinkled nose; inclined
head
Modal particles COME_ON; GO AHEAD; GO_ON; RE-
QUEST
An example of a third-person command is in (58a), and an example of a second-
person command is in (58b), both elicited from the same SLN informant (Maier
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et al. 2011).
Sign Language of the Netherlands
(58) a. [Pete runs into John and says: “Hey, have you heard? Frank quit
his job. He wants to make a trip around the world on a unicycle!”
John just sighs and says:]
CRAZY
crazy
palm_up
come_on
NORMAL
normal
DO
do
palm_up
come_on
‘That’s crazy! He should get real!’
b. [Two days later, John meets Frank himself. Full of enthusiasm,
Frank starts telling how he is planning to make a trip around
the world. John interrupts him and says: “Yeah, I heard all about
that. . . ”]
CRAZY
crazy
palm_up
come_on
NORMAL
normal
DO
do
palm_up
come_on
‘You’re crazy! Get real!’
What we see here is that for both commands the same construction is used
(NORMAL DO palm_up).
From the above we may conclude that sign language does not make a
grammatical distinction between second and third person. Furthermore, for
no other aspects of the grammar it is necessary to have the addressee–other
distinction in sign language, so the distinction is not needed at all in sign
language syntax. There are no spoken languages without this distinction in
their syntax, however, and in the next section we will investigate why there is
such a categorical difference between signed and spoken languages.
2.3.2 Index elements and symbol elements
We have seen that while spoken languages always have a distinction between se-
cond and third person, sign languages do not. It is rather unexpected that there
would be such a categorical syntactic difference between spoken and signed
languages. The null hypothesis is that spoken and signed language may differ
categorically in the phonological module, as the difference between speaking
and signing is essential for phonology, but that the syntactic module should
not be so sensitive to the medium of communication that this gives rise to a
categorical difference. Why would there be such a difference in the combination
of meaningful elements between signed and spoken languages?
Let us look at pointing signs more closely. One important thing to note is
that pointing signs are part of the syntax (Liddell 2003:Ch. 3). I will use the
following rather uncontroversial definition of syntax in this dissertation: ‘the
mechanism that combines meaningful elements into larger units’. One further
thing to note is that the direction of a pointing sign is meaningful: a pointing
sign in one direction gets a different interpretation (i.e. another referent) than
a pointing sign in another direction. In other words, a pointing sign towards
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person A gets a different interpretation than a point towards person B. This
brings us to the following question: are two different pointing signs different
linguistic elements? As the difference between the two signs is meaningful, the
above definition of syntax suggests that the signs should be considered separate
linguistic elements. However, because there is an infinite amount of directions
in which to point (pointing occurs on an analogue scale after all) there is also an
infinite amount of pointing signs (Lillo-Martin and Klima 1990). Sign language
therefore has an infinite amount of linguistic elements, which is in contrast
with spoken languages because there are only a finite number of morphemes—
the smallest meaningful unit—in spoken language. But how can we deal with
infinity in the syntax of any language?
For a better analysis of pointing the semiotic concepts “index” and “sym-
bol” as defined by Peirce (1955) are rather useful. Both concepts stand in some
relation to a real-world object. An index draws attention to its real-world ob-
ject, like a signpost that points in the direction of some landmark. A symbol, on
the other hand, only has an arbitrary relation with its referent, like an octago-
nal road sign that refers to the command ‘stop’. Moreover, it is inherent to the
nature of the concept “index” that there is an infinite number of indices; it can
be illustrated by the aforementioned signpost, which can point in an infinite
number of different directions. Thus, a single signpost already embodies an in-
finite number of indexes. Similarly, it is inherent to the nature of the concept
“symbol” that there is a finite number of symbols: every symbolic relation has
to be established by a human being, so there are as many different symbols as
there are established symbolic relationships. So, when comparing the signpost
to the octagonal road sign, we may observe that every instance of the road sign
always constitutes the same symbol (‘Stop!’)—whatever the context is—until
a person decides to give it a new symbolic meaning.
Now, for sign language we may also make a division between indices and
symbols, and split a pointing sign into an indexical element and symbolic ele-
ment. The symbolic element may signal, for example, whether we are dealing
with a possessive or a non-possessive interpretation, but it is the symbolic ele-
ment that deserves the most attention (Liddell 2003). If we confine the infinite
number of directions in which to point to the indexical elements, the set of el-
ements in the symbolic part of grammar can still be finite. For a pointing sign
the symbolic element is the form of the handshape (note that sign language
grammar also has iconic elements but these are not relevant for the current
discussion). For pronouns in spoken language there is only a symbolic part.
Because spoken languages use the auditory medium they cannot make use of
a spatial index system: one cannot point spatially with sound waves. There-
fore, spoken languages only have symbolic elements in their pronouns. I will
use this difference between pronouns and pointing signs to explain why spoken
languages have a syntactic distinction between addressees and others, while
signed languages do not.
Of course, a spoken language can make use of indices—also in the form
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of pointing gestures—to differentiate between persons. Especially for second
and third persons this is a useful mechanism; in (59) we find an example sen-
tence that is infelicitous without accompanying pointing gestures (or equivalent
indexical elements like head nods).
(59) You should stay and you should go
[point atA] [point atB]
However, gestures have an auxiliary status in spoken language: spoken language
is set up in such a way that not every sentence needs gestural support. This is
supported by research by Lascarides and Stone (2009). They have found that
in spoken language gestures always have a dependent role: they may only mod-
ify elements that are introduced in speech. Consequently, in spoken language
speech is the dominant form of communication, not gestures.
But why should spoken language (i.e. language from people that can use
both the visual and the auditory medium) look like this? In the remainder
of this section I will show why hearing people developed person (with optional
gestures) to refer to speakers and addressees, while deaf people only use pointing
gestures. Several conflicting constraint are at play in this matter and I will
address them each in turn.
First, let us formulate our observations on medium dominance as a con-
straint. Gentilucci and Corballis (2006) list a number of reasons why humans
might have chosen speech over gesture as the dominant form of communication
in their evolution: less energy requirements, the possibility to communicate in
darkness and at a distance, and the possibility to communicate and use tools
at the same time. So because of the advantages of speech, hearing people are
motivated only to use speech in their communication. For deaf people spoken
language is ill-suited, of course; they have the visual medium as their dominant
medium. The associated constraint is that people want to use their dominant
medium when communicating. I will call this constraint UseDominant, see
(60).
(60) OnlyDominant: only use the dominant medium when communicating
The effect of this constraint is that hearing people prefer speech and deaf people
prefer signs.
My second constraint is what people have referred to asAvoidAmbiguity,
although this principle could perhaps be replaced by looking at language bidi-
rectionally (Blutner et al. 2006). In (61) the constraint is defined with respect
to referring expressions.
(61) AvoidAmbiguity: make clear which contextual entity is referred to
A linguistic item with an indexical element fares rather well here, since one can
simply point to the referent. A symbolic element is less useful, because with this
element one can only distinguish between things on the basis of grammatical
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categories like person and gender. Thus, using person only leads to a three-way
distinction between individuals: speakers, addressees and others. A symbolic
element cannot distinguish between two addressees (at least not as easily as
simply pointing at them).
My third constraint concerns innovations. People should not invent new
linguistic elements because other people have to learn them first. My definition
of the constraint is in (62).
(62) AvoidInnovations: do not invent new elements
I assume that pointing gestures have always been a part of modern man. Person,
on the other hand, I consider an innovation.
The final constraint is the well-known principle of Economy. A suitable
definition of this principle can be found in (63).
(63) Economy: reduce the number of elements used
For this principle a system with both types of elements (index and symbol),
for example, is worse than a system with only one of them because it has more
elements.
With the above constraints we can simulate how referring expressions de-
veloped in sign language should have, and how they developed in spoken lan-
guage. For sign language consider the Optimality-Theoretic tableau in (64). To
avoid the issue of pro-drop the tableau only applies to situations in which there
is choice between referents (the answer to the question Who should make fire?
for example). Four different outputs are compared to each other: no linguistic
item, a pointing sign (i.e. indexical element only), a personal pronoun or other
element that expresses person (i.e. symbolic element only) and a combination
of pronoun and pointing sign.
(64) Optimal linguistic item for reference in sign language when speaker
and addressee are both possible as referent
AvAmb UseDom AvInnov Econ
a. ∅ ∗!
b. + point ∗
c. person ∗! ∗
d. point+person ∗! ∗∗
This tableau predicts that a referring expression in sign language should only
have an indexical element (i.e. a pointing gesture). Such a linguistic item only
violates the principle of Economy. The two items with a “person” element also
violates the AvoidInnovations constraint, because the grammatical category
of person has to be constructed before it can be used. In addition, the item
without any elements is suboptimal because is violates the AvoidAmbiguity
constraint. Because the pointing sign is optimal, it follows that the constraint
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AvoidAmbiguity is stronger than the principle of Economy. The UseDomi-
nant constraint, finally, is never violated in sign language. All in all, the tableau
shows that person is not a useful grammatical category for sign languages, as
they can make use of indexical elements.
For spoken language I have constructed the tableau in (65). This tableau
uses the same context as the previous tableau.
(65) Optimal linguistic item for reference in spoken language when speaker
and addressee are both possible as referent
AvAmb UseDom AvInnov Econ
a. ∅ ∗!
b. + point ∗! ∗
c. person ∗ ∗
d. point+person ∗! ∗ ∗∗
This tableau shows that for a spoken language a referring expression with
both an indexical element and a symbolic element is the optimal choice in
such a context. This is different from the optimal choice for sign language,
which was a referring expression with only an indexical element. The reason
for this divergence is the principle UseDominant, which is violated by the
spoken-language set uses spatial index component, which are not in the auditory
communication domain. The other principles display the same violation pattern
as we saw with sign language. This means that in a situation with ambiguity
between, for example, speaker and addressee a symbolic morpheme (a personal
pronoun) will be invented for a spoken language. Note that if there is additional
ambiguity – e.g. when the choice is between two addressees – a spoken-language
user has to make use of both person and pointing gestures.
In conclusion we can say that with respect to the person category signed
and spoken languages differ, because they have different dominant mediums.
For spoken language the primary medium is the auditory medium, and for
signed language it is the visual medium. Furthermore, speakers prefer linguistic
elements that are compatible with their primary medium. This is why sign-
language users make extensive use of index components (i.e. pointing), while
spoken-language users do not. Yet, pointing is a rather convenient device for
reducing ambiguity—and for other reasons (Zwets 2012)—when referring to an
entity. Spoken-language users therefore employ pointing signs as well.
2.3.3 First person in sign language
In Section 2.3.1 I argued that in sign language there is no syntactic difference
between addressees and others. We may see them as a single person value and
give them the label non-first person. In addition, I do not know of a sign lan-
guage that differentiates between speaker groups and inclusive groups. Cormier
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(2005) mentions exclusive pronouns in sign language but those do not by defi-
nition exclude addressees. Speaker groups and inclusive groups can, therefore,
also constitute one person value: first person. The only remaining question is
whether first person is distinguished syntactically from non-first person.
If there is such a distinction sign language has two person values: first
person and non-first person. If there is no such distinction sign language only
has one person value. From an empirical point of view this is the same as saying
that there is no person at all in sign language (Lillo-Martin and Klima 1990,
McBurney 2002). The two analyses of person in sign language can be seen in
(66).
(66) Possible analyses of person in sign language
Distinction No distinction
1
2 first person
person12 non-first person3
The tableaux from the previous section predict that there is no distinction
between first and non-first person. Just pointing at the referent suffices for sign
language and they have no need for a superfluous symbolic person element
in their referring expressions. But what do the data say: are there really no
distinctions in person in sign language?
Incidental data from some sign languages show a distinction between first
person and non-first person (cf. Zwets 2012:Ch. 1). One such sign language is
American Sign Language (ASL). In ASL ‘we’ can be expressed by pointing at
the individual referents that constitute the ‘we’ group, as is the case in most
sign languages. Yet, there is also a dedicated form for ‘we’ consisting of two
pointing signs to the chest on a virtual, horizontal line (Cormier 2005). There
are no such dedicated forms for plural ‘you’ or for ‘they’; for those only the
alternative method of pointing to the referents directly is used.
Further data comes from Japanese Sign Language (JSL). In this language
a speaker may point to her chest or her nose to indicate a first-person refer-
ence. Pointing to the nose resembles the way hearing Japanese point to them-
selves during conversation (see McBurney 2002) and pointing to the chest is
the method used in most other sign languages. Reference to other persons only
happens by means of pointing to the chest of that person. Thus, also in JSL
there is a special strategy for first-person reference (pointing to the nose) that
is not available for non-first-person reference.
So can we maintain the prediction from the previous section that the gram-
matical category of person is unimportant in sign language in light of these
data? One possibility is to appeal to phonology. One phonological difference
between a pointing sign to a speaker and a pointing sign to a non-speaker is
that, by default, a pointing sign to the speaker touches the speaker’s body.
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Pointing signs to non-speakers do not touch the non-speaker’s body, because
non-speakers are usually further away, and because it is impolite to touch other
people’s bodies. This would make the distinctions in the data from ASL and
JSL a phonological distinction. Touching signs and non-touching signs are not
a syntactic distinction between first person and non-first-person: if you are al-
lowed to touch your referent you can have an alternative sign to refer to that
referent.
Whatever the strength of the above appeal to phonology is, I think that
we can conclude that the grammatical category of person is mostly irrelevant
for sign language. First of all, sign languages have at most two person values,
which is a sharp contrast with the three or four person values from spoken
languages. This means that there has to be some explanation for why the
category of person is less important in sign language, and I have posited such a
theory in the previous section. Second, the potential counterexamples against
the complete absence do not occur in all sign languages. As far as I am aware,
only American Sign Language and Japanese Sign Language have them. Third,
the two counterexamples did not rule out the coexisting construction that does
not distinguish between persons (pointing to the chest in JSL and pointing
at each referent in ASL). So, if there is a distinction between first person and
non-first person in sign language, it is very marginal.
2.3.4 Summary
The syntax of sign languages has either two person values (first and non-first)
or one person value (which means the category of person is irrelevant). This
is less than the three person values predicted by Greenberg’s Universal 42:
“All languages have pronominal categories involving at least three persons and
two numbers” (Greenberg 1963). It is apparently not possible to make any
universal claims about the number of person values in language. Instead there is
a categorical difference between spoken languages (three or four person values)
and signed languages (no or two person values). This difference stems from a
difference in medium: signed languages use the visual medium, which allows
them to limitlessly use pointing instead of personal pronouns, while spoken
languages use the auditory medium and are therefore confined to using personal
pronouns by default.
2.4 Less than three persons in spoken language
Although there is a maximum of four persons in language, sign languages have
at most two persons while spoken languages have three of four. In Section 2.3.2
we saw that spoken languages need so many persons to distinguish between
potential referents: a spoken-language referring expression does not by default
possess an indexical element, so at least three person values are needed to make
a minimal but important distinction between speakers, addressees and others.
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Occasionally, however, there is a spoken-language pronoun paradigm that has
less than three persons. In this section we will see what this means for my
earlier claim that spoken languages have three or four person values.
An example of such a pronoun paradigm that has less than three persons
is the neutral singular pronoun in Jambi City Malay (Lukman 2009). This
language has four politeness levels (friendly, neutral, respectful to family, re-
spectful to non-family), which are sensitive to the social status of the addressee.
At the neutral politeness level (used between colleagues, for example) there is
a pronoun, awak, which is ambiguous between first person singular and second
person singular. The following sentence in (67) is therefore ambiguous when
there are no clues in the context as to the identity of the referent of awak.
Jambi City Malay
(67) Fauzan
Fauzan
nak
want
ngasih
give
awak
1sg/2sg
hadiah
present
besok
tomorrow
‘Fauzan wants to give me a present tomorrow’
‘Fauzan wants to give you a present tomorrow’
It is not possible for a speaker to choose a different, unambiguous pronoun, as
the other first-person pronouns have a different politeness level—see (68)—and
violating the politeness level is not an option.
(68) First-person singular pronouns in Jambi City Malay
Politeness Person values
aku friendly 1sg
∅ friendly 1sg, 2sg, 3sg, 1
2
pl, 1pl, 2pl, 3pl
awak neutral 1sg, 2sg
kami respect family 1sg, 1pl
sayo respect non-family 1sg
Of course, there are ways to resolve the ambiguity of awak. One strategy is
to include the name of the referent (similar to English He wants to give you,
Ann, a present). The pronominal person paradigm itself is still unexpected for
a spoken language, however.
A similar issue arises with so-called topic-drop languages. Interestingly,
Jambi City Malay is also partially a topic-drop language. The overview in (68)
shows that in a context with a friendly politeness level it is possible to drop a
first-person subject or object. In (69) there is an example of a topic-dropped
first person (Lukman 2009).
(69) [A man has just arrived in a place where he is supposed to meet his
friend. His friend has been waiting for him for some time and says:]
Maaf
sorry
telat,
late
jalan
street
macet
jam
kerno
because
ado
exist
demo
rally
‘I am sorry for being late, there was a traffic jam because there was a
rally’
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In this example the first person does not need to be expressed, because in
the accompanying context there is no potential ambiguity with respect to the
identity of the person who is late. What is different from the awak case here,
is that in this case an emphatic pronoun can be used for disambiguation: the
dedicated first-person friendly person aku.
The issue can be related to Greenberg’s Universal 42 (Greenberg 1963).
This universal was refuted by sign languages in Section 2.3, but in a revised
form it may still hold, see (70).
(70) Revised Universal 42
An emphatic pronominal paradigm in spoken language minimally has
different forms for a speaker, an addressee and an other
The topic-drop case is not a violation of this universal, as there is an emphatic
pronoun, aku, that can be used for reference to a speaker. This is fortunate,
because topic-drop is a rather frequent phenomenon in the languages of the
world. The ambiguous awak, on the other hand, is a violation of the universal
in (70). In this case, there is no suitable pronoun that distinguishes between
first and second person. However, this phenomenon is so infrequent—Cysouw
(2003:50) did not find any occurrences—that the universal in (70) can still be
considered near-absolute.
To summarize this section, it is possible for a spoken language to violate the
Revised Universal 42 in (70): the language may have a pronominal paradigm
with less than three persons, but this is extremely rare. It seems that the
categorical difference between spoken languages (three or four person values)
and signed languages (mostly no person values) still holds, by and large.
2.5 Singular–plural or minimal–augmented?
I think that the existence of inclusive person as the fourth person value is
important for linguistic theory. I expect that linguistic theory may undergo
some changes to fit this fourth person value. One of the proposed changes
is a reanalysis of the category of number in terms of a minimal–augmented
system (Section 2.5.1). In this section I want to argue against such a reanalysis,
using arguments from suppletion (Section 2.5.2), morphology (Section 2.5.3)
and language change (Section 2.5.4).
2.5.1 The inclusive as a problem for number
Up until now I have analyzed number on personal pronouns just like number on
other nominals. If a group of nurses has one individual, the singular (nurse) is
used, and if a group of nurses has more than one individual, the plural (nurses)
is used. Similarly, if a group with a speaker in it consists of one individual, the
singular pronoun I should be used, and if a group with a speaker in it consists
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of more than one individual, the plural pronoun we should be used. Thus, in a
singular–plural language (note that for ease of explanation I will abstract from
other number values like dual as much as possible) “singular” can be defined
as ‘a group with one individual’, and “plural” as ‘a group with more than one
individual’.
Yet, Bobaljik (2008) and Cysouw (2010) propose a split between nom-
inal and pronominal number, and a reanalysis of pronominal number. They
base these changes on the existence of languages like Ilocano. In this language
there is an inclusive pronoun ta restricted to two entities (i.e. a speaker and
an addressee) and an inclusive pronoun tayo for groups with more than two
entities. The other pronouns do not make this number distinction, and a tradi-
tional analysis of pronominal number would need to pose a dual number value
specifically for these inclusive pronouns, as the matrix in (71) shows.
(71) Ilocano pronouns under a singular-dual-plural analysis
Singular Dual Plural
1
2
ta tayo
1 co mi
2 mo yo
3 na da
There are a lot of empty cells in this analysis, so scholars have come up with an
alternative analysis without empty cells. This alternative analysis makes use of
the terms “minimal” and “augmented”. The term minimal means ‘the minimum
amount of individuals needed for this person value’. For the inclusive this is
two (a speaker and an addressee) and for the other three persons this is one
(a speaker for first person, an addressee for second person and an other for
third person). The term augmented means ‘more than the minimum amount
of individuals needed for this person value’. For the inclusive person this is
three or more individuals and for the other three persons this is two or more
individuals. An overview of the Ilocano pronouns under a minimal–augmented
analysis can be found in (72).
(72) Ilocano pronouns under a minimal-augmented analysis
Minimal Augmented
1
2
ta tayo
1 co mi
2 mo yo
3 na da
This analysis only needs two number values for languages like Ilocano.
However, Bobaljik (2008) and Cysouw (2010) extend the minimal–aug-
mented analysis to all other languages. With respect to the pronoun system all
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languages should have minimal–augmented values instead of singular–plural
values in their grammatical category of number. In other words, they split
number into nominal number—which has singular–plural number values—and
pronominal number—which has minimal–augmented number values.
Language has a lot of grammatical categories so it is not a priori wrong
to split up a grammatical category in two. It makes, for example, perfect sense
to keep the categories of number and aspect apart. In a sense both deal with
quantities, but number is found on nouns and (traditionally) has values like
singular and plural. Aspect, on the other hand, is found on verbs and has values
like semelfactive and iterative (besides more well-known values like perfective
and progressive). It is, therefore, rather uncontroversial to say that aspect and
number are two separate grammatical categories. But are there enough reasons
to say that pronominal number and nominal number are separate grammatical
categories?
A conceptual reason for a universal split between nominal and pronominal
number is the difference in group forming between nouns and pronouns. For a
noun like nurses all individuals in the group have to be nurses, while in the
plural pronoun you not all individuals in the group have to be addressees, see
Section 2.2.1. In other words, the plural of a pronoun may lead to an associative
meaning: a group of people associated to an individual. The individual is the
speaker, the addressee or the other. Some languages also have a plural mor-
pheme with an associative meaning for nouns, however. Turkish is an example
of such a language (see Görgülü 2011). The morpheme -ler ‘pl’ can have either
the associative or the normal (sometimes called additive) plural interpretation,
see (73). According to Daniel and Moravcsik (2005), these associative plural
markers for nouns are very common in the languages of the world (but not in
Europe). In their sample of 273 languages, 105 languages have an associative
plural marker for nouns that is similar to the normal additive plural marker, 48
languages have an affixal associative plural marker for nouns that is different
to the normal additive plural marker, 47 language have a special periphrastic
construction to mark an associative plural on nouns, and only 37 languages
(English for example) not even have such a periphrastic construction.
Turkish
(73) Ahmet-ler
Ahmet-pl
‘Ahmets’ (two or more people by the same name)
‘Ahmet’s family or company or group’
The difference between nouns and pronouns, however, is that plural pronouns
always may have the associative meaning in the languages in the world (so even
in English), while this is not always the case for plural nouns.
This categorical difference between nouns and pronouns cannot be a reason
to split up a grammatical category, however. It is not the case that pronom-
inal number is a separate grammatical category and that nominal number is
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a separate grammatical category; they are clearly related as the difference be-
tween associative and additive meaning is present in both categories. I there-
fore predict that languages have the same number values for both nominal and
pronominal number (i.e. the singular–plural values). In the next three sections
I will present data that support my prediction.
2.5.2 Suppletion in person paradigms
In the next two sections I will look at person paradigms because the singular–
plural analysis and the minimal–augmented analysis of pronominal number
make different predictions with respect to these paradigms. But before we can
look at these data I have to make one important remark: most languages do not
use a group-marking morpheme in their pronominal system. Most languages
use suppletion instead, i.e. different stems are used for singular and plural pro-
nouns. German is an example of a language with suppletive number marking on
pronouns: the first-person pronouns are ich ‘I’ and wir ‘we’, the second-person
pronouns are du ‘you (singular)’ and ihr ‘you (plural)’, and the third-person
pronouns are er ‘he’ and sie ‘they’, so in every case the singular pronoun has a
different stem than the plural pronoun. In his sample of 261 languages Daniel
(2005a) found 114 languages with suppletive pronominal number marking, and
only 42 languages where pronominal number is expressed by an affix. Inter-
estingly, there are also 69 languages in which pronominal number is expressed
both by suppletion and by an affix—an example is the language Amele (Roberts
1987) with ija ‘1sg’ versus e-ge ‘1pl’, and hina ‘2sg’ versus a-ge ‘2pl’—so even
this double strategy is more common than using a straightforward plurality af-
fix. Thus, overt marking of the grammatical category of number in pronouns is
not the number one strategy in this domain.
But what does the high frequency of suppletion in pronominal number
paradigms mean? Does it mean that pronominal number is categorically dif-
ferent from nominal number, as suppletion is an infrequent means of marking
plurality in nouns? I do not think that suppletion shows a categorical differ-
ence between pronominal and nominal number. As Haspelmath (2006) notes,
irregular paradigms—of which a suppletion paradigm is an example—most of-
ten occur with highly-frequent items. An example of an irregular, suppletive
paradigm is the English verb to be, which is indeed highly-frequent. An overview
of the to be paradigm can be seen in (74).
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(74) Forms of the English verb to be
be.3sg.prs is
be.1sg.prs am
other be.prs are
be.1/3sg.pst was
other be.pst were
be.inf be
be.prs.ptcp being
be.pst.ptcp been
Suppletion is a means of keeping a form short, because a suppletive form does
not need an additional morpheme to mark number. Because highly-frequent
items tend to be short (see Zipf 1965 [1949], Lestrade 2010:Ch. 1) suppletion is
an adequate strategy for such items. Therefore, it seems convenient to think of
number marking in nouns and pronouns as a continuum, see (75). On the left
side there are high-frequency items with an irregular plural form, and on the
right side there are low-frequency items with a regular plural form (using the
-s morpheme). Pronouns are items on the left side.
(75) Number marking in nouns and pronouns as a continuum
frequent infrequent
irregular regular
she woman aunt
they women aunts
Thus, pronominal number is not categorically different from nominal num-
ber with respect to suppletion. So suppletion in itself is not a reason to make
a categorical split between nominal and pronominal number. This makes the
predominance of suppletion orthogonal to the choice between a singular–plural
analysis and a minimal–augmented analysis of pronominal number. In the next
section I will look at person paradigms without suppletion to see which analysis
they support best. In the section after that I will look at person paradigms with
suppletion.
2.5.3 Number in non-suppletive paradigms
Pronoun paradigms that are non-suppletive have a group-marking morpheme
by definition. Under a minimal–augmented analysis of pronominal number it is
expected that these morphemes have an augmented meaning and not a plural
meaning. The blueprint of a language with an augmented morpheme is in (76).
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(76) Language with an augmented morpheme for pronouns
Minimal Augmented
1
2
α α-augm
1 β β-augm
2 γ γ-augm
3 δ δ-augm
The blueprint of a language with a plural morpheme is in (77).
(77) Language with a plural morpheme for pronouns
Singular Plural
1
2
α-pl
1 β β-pl
2 γ γ-pl
3 δ δ-pl
The difference between the two languages is clear: the language in (76) has
an inclusive pronoun without a group-marking morpheme and the language in
(77) does not. The next step is to see which type of language occurs most often.
Cysouw (2003:85) looked at such languages and found that there are no
languages with an augmented morpheme. In contrast, languages with a plural
morpheme do exist. The Mandarin morpheme -men is an example, see (78).
Note that the inclusive form zán- does not stem from the singular, as the
inclusive has no singular form, but historically derives from the compound zì-
jia¯ ‘self-family’.
(78) Mandarin pronouns
Singular Plural
1
2
zán-men
1 woˇ woˇ-men
2 nˇı nˇı-men
3 ta¯ ta¯-men
The absence of a language with an augmented morpheme for pronouns argues
against the minimal–augmented analysis of pronominal number.
As most languages in the world lack a dedicated inclusive pronoun, many
languages with a group-marking morpheme will also lack a dedicated inclu-
sive pronoun. The minimal–inclusive analysis predicts that in such languages
the first-person minimal pronoun also expresses an inclusive group of two indi-
viduals. Cysouw (2003:Ch. 8). The singular–plural analysis predicts languages
in which the first-person plural also expresses all individual-person groups
and such languages do exist. An example is the group of southern (i.e. non-
Mandarin) Chinese languages, which did not develop the inclusive zán-men
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pronoun, see (79).
(79) Southern Chinese pronouns
Singular Plural
1 woˇ woˇ-men
2 nˇı nˇı-men
3 ta¯ ta¯-men
Thus, also in this case it is the singular–plural analysis which makes the better
predictions.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there is some morphological evidence
in favor of the minimal–augmented analysis. A language with such evidence is
Rembarrnga (McKay 1978, Cysouw 2003:265). In this language the element
-bbarrah is attached to plural pronouns to derive their dual counterparts, except
for the inclusive. For inclusive pronouns -bbarrah is used to derive the trial,
while the dual has a separate form, y0kk0. An analysis of this pronoun system
in terms of singular, plural, dual and trial can be seen in (80).
(80) Singular-plural analysis of the Rembarrnga pronoun system
Singular Dual Trial Plural
1
2
y0kk0 ngakorr-bbarrah ngakorr0
1 ng0n0 yarr-bbarrah yarr0
2 k0 nakorr-bbarrah nakorr0
3 naw0/ngad0 barr-bbarrah barr0
In this case, a minimal–augmented analysis produces a more insightful
overview, provided that an additional number value called unit-augmented (‘the
minimum amount of individuals needed for this person value plus one’) is added.
The corresponding matrix can be found in (81).
(81) Minimal–augmented analysis of the Rembarrnga pronoun system
Minimal Unit-augmented Augmented
1
2
y0kk0 ngakorr0 ngakorr-bbarrah
1 ng0n0 yarr0 yarr-bbarrah
2 k0 nakorr0 nakorr-bbarrah
3 naw0/ngad0 barr0 barr-bbarrah
Two comments should be made here. First, these languages overtly mark
the distinction between augmented and unit-augmented (roughly the dual–
plural distinction); the question why there is no language which overtly marks
the much more common distinction between minimal and augmented (roughly
the singular–plural distinction) is still unanswered under a minimal–augmented
analysis. Second, Cysouw (2003:268) has only eight languages in his sample
and he states that paradigms with overt unit-augmented markers are almost
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completely restricted to only one geographical area, Australia.
The singular–plural analysis also predicts a paradigm in which the third
number value (the dual) is overtly marked. The Maori language has such a
paradigm (see Harlow 1996, Cysouw 2003:258). The paradigm is shown in (82).
Cysouw has twenty-seven of these paradigms in his sample and notes that they
also occur outside of Australia, most notably in North-America.
(82) Singular–plural analysis of the Maori pronoun system
Singular Dual Plural
1
2
ta¯tou ta¯ua
1 au ma¯tou a¯ua
2 koe koutou ko¯rua
3 ia ra¯tou ra¯ua
In other words, the occurrence of overt markers of unit-augmented number
is unexpected under a singular–plural analysis, but the higher occurrence of
markers of dual number is even more unexpected under a minimal–augmented
analysis.
To sum up this section, overt marking of minimal–augmented number val-
ues is a rather marginal phenomenon, more marginal than the overt marking
of singular–plural number values. This is in line with my view that language
users predominantly think of number in terms of singular and plural, both for
nouns and for pronouns.
2.5.4 Number in suppletive paradigms
In Section 2.5.2 I showed that suppletion is very common in person paradigms.
Because number is not overtly marked in these paradigms it is somewhat diffi-
cult to see whether the suppletive paradigms that occur support the minimal–
augmented analysis of number or the singular–plural analysis. It is not impos-
sible, however, which I will show in this section. I will focus on the number of
forms that each analysis predicts to occur in person paradigms.
Look at an example of what I will call a four-form paradigm in (83). This
specific paradigm is from Sierra Popoluca (see Elson 1960).
(83) Sierra Popoluca person markers
1
2
ta-
1 Pa-
2 mi-
3 ∅a-
This paradigm is number-neutral : it does not distinguish between minimal
and augmented (or between singular and plural for that matter). A minimal–
augmented analysis would expect that such a paradigm may be historically
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connected to a paradigm with eight forms (Cysouw 2003:212); a blueprint of
such a language is in (84). At a point in time the four-form paradigm in (83)
may develop into the eight-form paradigm in (84), or it may have happened
the other way around in the past.
(84) Hypothetical eight-form paradigm connected to Sierra Popoluca
Minimal Augmented
1
2
ta- X1
1 Pa- X2
2 mi- X3
3 ∅a- X4
Such paradigms have been attested in the languages of the world. An
example is Tagalog (see Cysouw 2003:211). The Tagalog paradigm is shown in
(85).
(85) Tagalog pronouns under a minimal–augmented analysis
Minimal Augmented
1
2
kata tayo
1 ako kami
2 ikaw kayo
3 siya sila
Yet, eight-form languages like Tagalog have never been historically connected
to four-form languages like Sierra Popoluca; they are never found in the same
geographical areas. Thus, a minimal-augmented analysis makes the wrong pre-
diction on language change here: the eight-form paradigm does not derive from
only-inclusive paradigms.
What does the singular–plural analysis predict with respect to supple-
tive paradigms? Instead of an eight-form paradigm it predicts a seven-form
paradigm. An example paradigm from the Bororo language (see Cysouw
2003:206) can be found in (86). The seven forms are expected because there is
nu such thing as a singular inclusive.
(86) Bororo person affices
Singular Plural
1
2
pa-
1 i- xe-
2 a- ta-
3 u-/∅− e-
These seven-form paradigms (67 paradigms in Cysouw’s sample) occur more
often than the eight-form paradigm (24 paradigms in Cysouw’s sample). More-
over, there are diachronic links between the seven-form paradigm and the four-
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form inclusive. In (86) we saw an example of a seven-form paradigm from the
Bororo language; in (87) there is the four-person paradigm of another Macro-Gé
language, Canela-Kraho. These paradigms are most probably related.
(87) Canela-Kraho person affices
1
2
pa-
1 i-
2 a-
3 ih-
Thus, the suppletive person paradigms in the languages of the world also favor
the singular–plural analysis.
The only downside to a singular–plural analysis seems that an eight-form
paradigm like the one from Tagalog needs a dual number value that is restricted
to the inclusive, see (88).
(88) Tagalog pronouns
Singular Dual Plural
1
2
kata tayo
1 ako kami
2 ikaw kayo
3 siya sila
It is not unexpected that there are languages where only the inclusive has a dual
form, however. As Plank (1996) notes, in many languages the dual is restricted
to so-called natural pairs (eyes is an example), and the speaker–addressee duo
may be such a natural pair. Perhaps pairing the speaker and the addressee
together is not that natural, but eight-form paradigms—in which such a pairing
happens—are not that common either, so this is actually as expected. At any
rate, a special dual form for the inclusive happens more often than a special
dual form for a speaker–other duo, for example, so the speaker–addressee duo
should only be more natural than a speaker–other duo.
In sum, the suppletive paradigms in the languages of the world also support
a singular–plural analysis of pronominal number, especially when predictions
on diachronic relations are taken into account.
2.5.5 Summary
In this section we have looked at the question whether number on pronouns
should be seen in terms of singular and plural or in terms of minimal and
augmented. Under a minimal–augmented analysis, an inclusive duo (a group
with one speaker and one addressee) is treated as having the same number value
as a singleton speaker, a singleton addressee or a singleton other. I have shown,
however, that more paradigms in the languages of the world can be explained by
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a singular–plural analysis of number than by a minimal–augmented analysis.
Thus, language users take a singular–plural perspective to both nouns and
pronouns.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that the existence of inclusive pronouns leads to a
grammatical category of person with maximally four values: inclusive person,
first person, second person and third person. More person values are not en-
countered in language. The reason is probably that additional distinctions in
person would lead the speaker to decide for every individual in a group whether
this person is an addressee or an other; such a decision is apparently not worth
the effort of a language user.
In addition, we saw that languages do not need to have all four persons.
Many spoken languages do not have an inclusive pronoun, so their grammar
only needs the classical three persons (first person, second person and third
person). Moreover, sign languages have at most two persons (first person and
non-first person), which disproves Greenberg’s Universal 42 that no language
has less than three persons (Greenberg 1963).
One characteristic of the inclusive person is that it is impossible to be
inclusive and singular at the same time, as the inclusive person needs at least
two individuals (a speaker and an addressee). Some scholars have questioned
whether the traditional singular–plural analysis of number still holds for person
markers in light of this special relationship between the inclusive person and
number. I have shown with cross-linguistic data, however, that the singular–
plural analysis still makes the best predictions.
Now that the inclusive is a member of the category of person, the main
question of this dissertation is in need of an update. The main question used
to be Is first/second versus third the predominant person pattern in language?
and I think that the inclusive person should fit in there, as it is a bona fide
person value. Because the inclusive person is clearly on the side of first and
second person—all three deal with speakers, addressees or both—I propose
that the new main question have the following form: Is inclusive/first/second
versus third the predominant person pattern in language? With this new main
question I will investigate the person patterns of the world’s languages in the
following two chapters.
CHAPTER 3
Rigid person patterns
In this dissertation I want to look whether there are more person patterns in
language than inclusive/first/second person versus third person. In this chapter
I want to look specifically at rigid person patterns, i.e. person patterns that
are the same for every language in the world.
The first phenomena that I want to look at are addressee shift and speaker
shift, see Section 3.1. Addressee shift occurs when the identity of the addressee
shifts during a sentence. A sentence like (1) is generally infelicitous in language.
(1) *So you know you
[points atA] [points atB]
The sentence in (2) shows that having two you’s in a sentence is not infelicitous
by itself, which makes addressee shift an interesting phenomenon
(2) So you and you know each other
[points atA] [points atB]
Speaker shift has similar issues, but also shows that a sentence can only have
one speaker. This is the first rigid person pattern of this chapter: a sentence
can contain references to more than one addressee and to more than one other,
but not to more than one speaker. Moreover, when we look at speaker shift and
addressee shift together, a second rigid person pattern emerges: the identities
of speaker and addressee(s) are fixed at the beginning of a sentence, but the
identity of others is not.
This last principle of InterlocutorFixation is important in many lin-
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guistic domains, especially the semantic domains of quantification and binding.
Examples of quantifiers are quantifier DP nobody and quantificational deter-
miner every. Quantifiers strongly resist first and second person; quantifier DP
nobody cannot be the antecedent of a second-person pronoun (3a) and quantifi-
cational determiner every cannot combine with a second-person pronoun (3b)
to form a second-person constituent.
(3) a. *Nobody enjoyed yourself
b. *Every you laughed
In section 3.2 I argue that these phenomena are universal. I will use the above
rigid person pattern on InterlocutorFixation to explain (3a) and the DP
hypothesis to explain (3b).
The other semantic domain that is important for person is binding (see
Kaplan 1989, Rullmann 2004, 2008, Heim 2008, Kratzer 2009). In this dis-
sertation I will look especially at accommodational binding. For basic (non-
accommodational) binding person is not all that relevant. Compare, for exam-
ple, the sentences in (4a) and (4b). He may be bound by every man in (3a), but
you may not be bound by every addressee in (3b). In other words, (4b) may
not mean ‘Every addressee x thinks that x is smart’. However, we can already
explain these facts, because we know that quantifiers generally resist first and
second person, see Section 3.3.
(4) a. Every man thinks he’s smart
b. Every addressee thinks you’re smart
So, the problem in (4b) involves quantification, not binding.
The situation for accommodational binding is rather different. Basic bind-
ing as in Every man thinks he’s smart mainly occurs with pronouns as bindee.
Yet, there is a type of binding in which full noun phrases (the mayor is an ex-
ample of a full noun phrase) are commonly bound. This other type of binding
can be observed in the sentence in (5).
(5) In each city the mayor was a man
Such a sentence involves the accommodation that a city may have a mayor
(see Zeevat 1992, Geurts and Beaver 2011b). In (6) there is a simplified version
of the semantics of (5). In a sense, the mayor is bound by city, because the
wordmayor is interpreted locally with respect to each individual city (cf. Partee
1989). Yet, this accommodational binding is rather different from basic binding:
it is not mayor that combines with the quantifier but city. The mayor is not
bound because it is the city but because it stands in some relation to the city.
(6) ∀x, y(x was a city and y was the mayor of x→ y was a man)
‘For each city x it was the case that the mayor of x was a man’
Again, second-person pronouns (and first-person pronouns) behave rather dif-
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ferently. The sentence in (7) exemplifies this.
(7) During each monologue you remained silent
This sentence does not have a reading in which you is interpreted locally as
the addressee of each individual monologue (‘During each monologue x the
addressee of x remained silent’). Thus, it looks as if a second-person pronoun
cannot be situationally bound in (7). The only available reading is the one in
(8), in which the representation of pronoun you is not interpreted relative to
each individual monologue.
(8) ∀x(x is a monologue→ you remained silent during x)
‘For each monologue it is the case that you remained silent during this
monologue’
Note that for the full noun phrase the addressee it is possible to be situationally
bound—just like the mayor earlier—which makes (9) a minimal pair with (8).
(9) During each monologue the addressee remained silent
Once again I will explain these observations with the help of the rigid person
pattern of InterlocutorFixation in Section 3.4.
In Section 3.5 we will encounter the third rigid person pattern of this chap-
ter; it involves in what Potts and Roeper (2006) call expressive small clauses.
Expressive small clauses occur when a speaker adds a phrase like idiot! to a
sentence. Crucially, such phrases may only refer to a second person. There is
no a priori reason why an added expression like idiot! cannot refer to a first
or a third person. Yet, in a sentence like (10) the phrase idiot! cannot refer to
Carol, only to Bob.
(10) [Alice and Bob approach Carol’s house. Alice says to Bob:]
#The door is unlocked, idiot!
Expressive small clauses can be seen as a type of vocative. The universal incom-
patibility of secondary insults with first or third person and other characteristics
of the vocative will feature in Section 3.5.
In the previous chapter, we saw that person in sign languages works in
quite a different way compared to spoken languages: sign languages do not
make a syntactic difference between second and third person. However, in this
chapter we will encounter three rigid person patterns, two of which have a
person split between second and third person. In Section 3.6 we will see how
sign languages deal with these rigid person patterns.
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3.1 Addressee shift and speaker shift
In most sentences that are uttered the identity of the addressee remains con-
stant, whether there is an overt second-person person marker in the sentence
(11a) or not (11b). In both (11a) and (11b) person B is the addressee for the
full duration of the sentence.
(11) a. [A says to B:]
Did you like the movie?
b. [A says to B:]
That was a fun movie, right?
Yet, there are sentences in which the addressee changes. Sentence (12) is an
example. Note that such sentences always involve pointing or some other kind
of visual gesture; otherwise it would not be clear which person is meant by
which you.
(12) So you and you know each other
[points atA] [points atB]
However, addressee shift seems to be subject to some restrictions. The exact
mechanics of this addressee shift will be investigated in Section 3.1.1
Do sentences like the one in (12) only pertain to second-person? For third
persons shifting seems to be no problem, as (13) shows. See Section 3.1.3 for
more details.
(13) So he and he know each other
[points atA] [points atB]
For the first-person it seems impossible to get a shift. There seems to be
no way to attach a sensible meaning to the first-person equivalent of (12) and
(13) in (14).
(14) #So I and I know each other
[points atA] [points atB]
In Section 3.1.2 I will explain the impossibility to shift speaker reference.
3.1.1 Addressee shift
It is impossible to shift the identity of the addressee in a sentence like (15).
(15) *So you went to school with you
[points atA] [points atB]
It must be the addressee shift that makes the sentence ungrammatical, because
the minimally different sentence in (16) is grammatical.
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(16) So you went to school with him
[points atA] [points atB]
There are, however, cases that show that show that there is more to ad-
dressee shift than the example in (16). First of all, it must be noted that it is
possible to have two second-person pronouns in a sentence that refer to two
different individuals. The sentence in (17) is perfectly acceptable.
(17) So you and you went to school together
[points atA] [points atB]
What is special in this sentence is that the two you’s are part of one coordinated
argument. This suggests that there is not really an addressee shift in a sentence
like (17a); rather, there is a specification of the addressee.
The second case consists of sentences like (18).
(18) So after you made the amazing discovery you wrote about
[points atA] [points atB]
it in the paper
Although there is an addressee shift here, the sentence is quite acceptable. It is
not exactly clear to me what causes the acceptability; it could be the number of
words between the two you’s, the structural relation between them or something
else. I will leave it to future research as this problem is orthogonal to my point
in this section. My point is that there is some constraint on addressee shift
that leads in at least some cases to ungrammaticality. This in sharp contrast
with the shifting of others (two he’s for example); in such a case there is no
restriction on shifting, see Section 3.1.3.
3.1.2 Speaker shift and multiple speakers
Addressee shift is possible but only when the shift happens between clauses. In
this section I want to find out whether such a constraint also holds for speaker
shift.
The problem is that by default a sentence only has one speaker, because
usually a sentence falls within a single utterance. Speaker shift is only possible
if there are multiple speakers in one sentence. Thus, what I want to do in this
section is look for non-default cases with multiple speakers in order to find out
whether speaker shift is similar to addressee shift.
Cysouw (2003:70-71) notes that mass speaking is such a special case. We
find an example of mass speaking in (19).
(19) [Shouted by three friends at a concert:]
We want more!
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Cysouw sees the situation in (19) as the first-person equivalent of a present
audience addressee as in (20).
(20) [Mother to her three children:]
I’m praying for you
Indeed, in this example a group of multiple addressees can be discerned. The
sentence in (20) can be rewritten as in (21), with addressee specification in
order to point out the individual addressees.
(21) [Mother to her three children:]
I’m praying for you and you and you
[points atA] [points atB] [points atC]
Yet, for mass speaking a similar rewrite leads to ungrammaticality. We want
more! cannot be rewritten as in (22).
(22) [Shouted by three friends at a concert:]
* I and I and I want more!
[points atA] [points atB] [points atC]
In fact, We want more! should be rewritten as (23), which means that it only
has one speaker. Note, however, that three instances of the sentence are uttered
simultaneously. Because for each speaker my friends and I (and therefore we)
comes down to the same group of people, it makes sense to shout in unison.
This does not make We want more! a sentence with multiple speakers, though,
as this would wrongly predict that (22) is felicitous.
(23) [Shouted by three friends at a concert:]
My friends and I want more!
In sum, there are no sentences that involve multiple speakers.
This observation is a huge contrast with addressees and others, since sen-
tences can easily contain multiple instances of addressees or others. This is the
first rigid person pattern that we encounter in this chapter. It is supposed to
hold for all languages in the world. I will visualize such a pattern by crossing
out the person values that show the deviant behavior, see (24). Note that this
pattern is an instance of a speaker vs. addressee/other pattern.
(24) Acceptance of multiple referents
///S/A O
We have just seen that mass speaking is not an instance of speaker shift.
The sentence in (25) shows an example that does have speaker shift. The exam-
ple involves an individual finishing the sentence of another individual. Except
for Walt Disney’s Huey, Dewey and Louie Duck, speakers normally do not utter
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such sentences, which is why the context feels rather odd. Syntactically there
is nothing wrong with the sentence, though.
(25) A: They forced me. . .
B: . . . and me. . .
C: . . . and me to wear the same outfit
One complication is encountered if the first-person pronouns are the subject
of the sentence, see (26). It is ungrammatical to have the finite verb in the
singular here (am), since one person cannot ‘finish each other’s sentences’. On
the other hand, a plural finite verb (are) is also slightly odd because the unity
of the DP I and I and I is disrupted by the speaker shifts, which hampers the
group interpretation of the DP.
(26) A: I. . .
B: . . . and I. . .
C: . . . and I *am/?are able to finish each other’s sentences
But despite this complication it is possible to have speaker shift in a sentence,
as (25) showed. Yet, because an utterance can only have one speaker, speaker
shift can only occur if the sentence is finished by another speaker.
To conclude this section, an utterance may only have one speaker. This con-
stitutes a rigid first vs. second/third person pattern. This means that speaker
shift can only happen within a sentence if a sentence started by one speaker is
finished by another speaker. In other respects, speaker shift is very much like
addressee shift.
3.1.3 InterlocutorFixation
Both speaker shift and addressee shift can only occur between clauses. In this
section I will show that this restriction does not hold for shifting others (i.e
third persons).
The third-person equivalent of shift after an adverbial clause is grammati-
cal, see (27). This is expected as speaker and addressee shift are also acceptable
in this case.
(27) So after he made the amazing discovery he wrote about
[points atA] [points atB]
it in the paper
The sentence in (28a) is also grammatical. Here we find a contrast with first and
second person, however. The second-person equivalent, for example, is hardly
acceptable, see (28b).
(28) a. So he works for him
[points atA] [points atB]
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b. *So you work for you
[points atA] [points atB]
It seems that shifting others is rather different from speaker or addressee shift.
Where does this difference in restrictions between first and second person,
on the one hand, and third person, on the other, come from? One big difference
between first person and third person is that every sentence automatically has
a speaker. This is so by definition—without a speaker there can be no speech.
The function of addressee shows the same automaticity: an utterance is always
directed at someone. Communication needs a receiver, as it turns out. Even
screaming when in pain, which seems like a counterexample at first sight, shows
the omnipresence of the addressee: the only reason why screaming evolved as
a knee-jerk response to pain is that it is evolutionarily convenient to let your
peers know when something is wrong with you (see Sullivan et al. 2001). It is
no surprise, then, that more conscious utterances automatically come with an
addressee (which might be a group, of course). Thus, sentences automatically
have a speaker and an addressee.
For the third person, on the other hand, things are differently. Sentences do
not automatically have a salient third-person individual or third-person group.
For one thing, it is extremely uncommon to have a third-person pronoun in
the first sentence of a conversation. The reason is that a third-person pronoun
needs context in order to be employed, and the first sentence of a conversation
only has such a context if accompanied by a gesture or by a past history as in
(29). Nevertheless, as soon as a third-person individual or group is mentioned
it becomes possible to use a third-person pronoun in other cases.
(29) [Woman who always complains about her husband to her friends:]
Would you believe what he did just now!?
Furthermore, it is possible to shift the identity of a third-person pronoun. There
is a huge difference with first- or second-person pronouns, however. The exact
words in a sentence with a third-person pronoun may influence which referent
the pronoun picks up. In (30a), for example, third-person pronoun they picks
up the new clothes as referent, while in (30b) they picks up the children as
referent.
(30) a. I provided the children with new clothes; they seemed to fit per-
fectly
b. I provided the children with new clothes; they seemed happy with
my choices
Yet, with first or second-person pronouns the words in the sentence cannot
influence the referent that gets picked up, because the identity of the speaker
and the addressee is already fixed.
This obligatory InterlocutorFixation constitutes the second rigid per-
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son pattern of this chapter. The message of this pattern is that only the identity
of speakers and addressees is automatically fixated at the beginning of a clause
(cf. Kaplan 1989).
(31) InterlocutorFixation
S A ///O/
To sum up, shifting between one or more others does not have any restric-
tion, while shifting between speakers or addressees is heavily restricted. I have
argued that this stems from the fact the identity of speaker and addressee is
fixated at the beginning of a clause.
3.1.4 Summary
In this section we have encountered two rigid person patterns. The first pattern
follows from the observation that a sentence can only have one speaker (*I
and I and I want more! ) but multiple addressees or others. This is a first vs.
second/third person pattern. The second abolute pattern is connected to the
fact that the identities of speaker and addressee are fixed at the beginning of
a clause. When a speaker opens her mouth she is automatically the speaker,
and communication needs an addressee by definition. This is a first/second vs.
third person pattern.
This second pattern explains why there are restrictions on speaker and
addressee shift. The identity of both the speaker and the addressee (or set of
addressees) is fixated at the beginning of a clause and should not be altered.
This is only one example of the explanatory power of the identity-fixation
pattern. We will encounter more examples in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.4 of this
chapter.
3.2 Quantifier DPs and person
In this section I will look at quantifiers. A language like English has quantifier
DPs (everyone) which form a DP by themselves, and quantificational deter-
miners (every) which need a noun to form a DP. I will use the term quantifier
as an umbrella term for these two types.
The main message of this section will be that quantifiers are incompatible
with first and second person. I will explain this by an appeal to the principle of
InterlocutorFixation from Section 3.1.3. Our first stop is quantifier DPs.
Quantifier DPs are always third-person syntactically. No language in the world
has a dedicated quantifier DP that is syntactically first- or second-person. In
Section 3.2.1 I will give an account of why this is the case.
After quantifier DPs—which may be seen as quantificational pronouns—
we will take a look at quantificational determiners. Quantificational determiners
like every may combine with a noun.
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(32) Every addressee laughed
An English pronoun like you, on the other hand, cannot be combined with a
quantificational determiner, see (33).
(33) *Every you laughed
Yet, there have been claims in the literature that in languages like Japanese
and Thai constructions like (33) are possible (see Déchaine and Wiltschko 2002,
Siewierska 2004). In Section 3.2.2 I will argue that this is only apparently so.
These short introductions to quantifier DPs and quantificational deter-
miners already make it clear: first and second person and quantifiers do not go
together well.
3.2.1 First- and second-person quantifiers
An English quantifier DP like everyone is syntactically third-person, which
comes to light in the example in (34). A verb like to be must have a subject
with which it agrees syntactically in person and number. The only possible
antecedent is everyone but this DP apparently does not agree with are, which
can be second-person. Note that semantically there is nothing wrong with the
sentence; if second-person are had been grammatical it could have meant ‘Every
one of you is here’.
(34) *Everyone are here
In other words, quantifier DP everyone cannot be a second-person person
marker syntactically. Also for the other quantifier DPs in English it is im-
possible to have a first- or second-person verb, see (35a-b).
(35) a. Somebody *am/*are/is there
b. One of us *am/*are/is there
Note that I will exclude DPs with only from the set of true quantifiers, because
a phrase like only you cannot be paraphrased as ’all/some/. . . of you’. For more
information on only and person see Section 3.3.4.
From the above data we can safely conclude that there are no first- or
second-person quantifier DPs in English. Moreover, as far as I can see, all
languages in the world lack syntactically first- or second-person quantifiers.
Therefore, there must be some a priori reason why such DPs do not exist. This
reason is not that quantification is incompatible with first- and second-person.
In (36) we find a DP that has both quantification and second person.
(36) So [all/some/few/none of you] already saw the movie
Nor can the reason be that quantifiers are unable to express anything besides
quantification. The French quantifiers tous ‘all.m’ and toutes ‘all.f, show that
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gender can be expressed by a quantifier. If gender can be expressed then why
not person?
French
(37) a. Tous
All.m
sont
be.3pl
arrivés
arrived.m.pl
‘All have arrived’
b. Toutes
All.f
sont
be.3pl
arrivées
arrived.f.pl
‘All have arrived’
Hence, it seems that we should look elsewhere to find the a priori reason that
first- and second-person quantifiers do not exist in language.
I propose that the reason for this absence is that the speaker and the
addressee of a sentence are fixed at the beginning of a sentence, which we dis-
covered when looking at speaker and addressee shift in Section 3.1. In other
words, once a speaker starts a sentence she is stuck with herself as the speaker
and with the person she addresses as the addressee. We saw that it is possible
to specify the individual members of the sentence’s addressee group within a
DP, but that this specification does not change the sentence’s addressee group.
Hence, in (38) the sentence starts with the set of individuals A and B as the
sentence’s addressee group, and after DP you and you this set is still the sen-
tence’s addressee group, which is visible in the plural value of the reflexive
pronoun yourselves.
(38) So [you and you] are enjoying yourselves
[points atA] [points atB]
We see the effect of the InterlocutorFixation when we compare (38) with
(39). The sentence in (39) starts with the set of persons A, B and C as the
sentence’s addressees. Yet, the DP some of you has the subset consisting of
persons A and B as its referent. If this DP some of you had been second-person
syntactically, the addressee of the sentence would have shifted from the set of
A, B and C to the set of A and B, and such a shift in addressee is not allowed.
This is why the DP Some of you and the corresponding reflexive pronoun
themselves are syntactically third-person although their referents belong to the
set of addressees.
(39) [To persons A, B and C, when A is bored:]
So [some of you] are enjoying themselves
In sum, if you quantify over a set that you consider your addressee, the resulting
set cannot be the addressee because a sentence only has one addressee set.
A similar argument can be made for the speaker and first person, of course.
This is why there are no first- or second-person quantifiers in language: such a
quantifier would harbor a speaker or addressee shift in itself.
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There are nevertheless examples attested in English in which the quantifier
has a quantificational pronoun like some, while the reflexive pronoun in the
same predicate is first of second person (Rullmann 2008). We find an example
in (40).
(40) Some of you are enjoying yourselves
This does not mean that some of you is second-person, however. My reason for
saying this is that the verb agreement in these cases is still third-person. This
can be shown by looking at the singular. An example with a singular quantifier
DP shows that the fact that the quantifier contains you does not license second-
person verb agreement, see (41a). Instead, third-person verb agreement should
be used (41b). The pervasive ungrammaticality of a second-person verb shows
that a quantifier like one of you is syntactically third-person.
(41) a. *One of you are enjoying yourself
b. ?One of you is enjoying yourself
There is still an unresolved issue regarding sentence (40), however. Your-
selves is second-person and does not refer to the addressees but to a subset of
the addressees (some of you), so one could argue that an addressee shift occurs
on the reflexive pronoun. In other words, on uttering yourselves the speaker
changes the identity of the addressee from the original set to the subset. I do
not think there really is an addressee shift here. A sentence-final vocative like
children does not refer to the subset but to the original set, see (42). It is
therefore unlikely that there is an addressee shift in a sentence like (42).
(42) Some of you seem to be enjoying yourselves, children
It seems better to look at the person value of yourselves as agreement. Your-
selves is not referential itself, but it depends on an antecedent for its reference.
This is similar to the verbal affixes -s and -es in (43): these also depend on
another element and should be regarded as pure agreement.
(43) The man come-s and go-es
If we assume that shifts involve referential elements, the issue why shifts should
be incompatible with non-referential elements like yourselves, -s and -es is
solved.
Note that it remains odd that yourselves in (42) syntactically agrees with
you, although referentially it corresponds to some of you. In a language like
Dutch such a mismatch is impossible, at least for first person, see (44).
Dutch
(44) Sommigen
some
van
of
ons
2pl
vermak-en
enjoy-pl
*ons/zich
2/3.refl
prima
great
‘Some of you are enjoying themselves’
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I will not try to answer the question why mismatches are possible in English and
other languages. For me the important thing is the observation that speaker and
addressee shifts can only occur with referential elements, not with agreement
(i.e. bound elements).
Quantifiers like some of you have led Bhat (2004:48-49) to claim that per-
sonal pronouns like we and possessive pronouns like our can have an indefinite
interpretation. Bhat cites the English sentence in (45).
(45) Some of us like our beer chilled
He states that “here the first person plural pronoun our has indefinite reference
that is identical with that of the phrase some of us”. It is rather strange, how-
ever, to claim that a pronoun is indefinite because its antecedent is indefinite.
One would have to claim that the bastard in (46) is also indefinite, as it is
bound by someone.
(46) If someone touches my beer I will hit the bastard
Hence, it seems better to stick to the traditional claim that first- and second-
person pronouns are inherently definite.
Finally, I should note that I do not predict that quantifiers and first and
second person are completely incompatible. Instead, I predict that a first- or
second-person person marker can be combined with a quantificational element
if the quantificational element does not induce a speaker or addressee shift.
This explains why (47a) is grammatical and (47b) ungrammatical: some in
(47b) restricts the addressee set to a subset, but all in (47a) does not.
(47) a. You all/both think I’m weird
b. *You some/none think I’m weird
Note that third-person DPs do not allow a shift here either, see (48a-b).
(48) a. They all/both think I’m weird
b. *They some/none think I’m weird
All in all, what we have seen in this section is that the absence of first- and
second-person quantifier DPs pronouns can be explained by the independent
observation that the identities of the speaker and the addressee are fixated at
the beginning of a sentence. If a phrase like some of you were second-person it
would lead to an addressee shift that is not allowed by the principle of identity
fixation from Section 3.1.3.
3.2.2 Pronominal nouns and the DP hypothesis
A quantificational pronoun like nobody is not the only way to make a quantifier
DP. There is also the possibility to combine a common noun with an quantifi-
cational determiner. An example is in (49), no being the indefinite determiner
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and boy the common noun.
(49) No boy won
Such a DP is third-person in its entirety—this is as expected in light of the
previous section. There is another relevant restriction however. The English
pronoun you, for example, cannot combine with a determiner like no, see (50).
Yet, the intended meaning is clear: ‘None of you is there’.
(50) *No you are there
In this section we will see that this restriction has to do with pronouns, not with
person. Moreover, I will claim that the restriction is universal, pace Déchaine
and Wiltschko (2002) and Siewierska (2004).
Interestingly, the incompatibility between pronouns and determiners also
goes for plural pronouns. The sentence in (51) is ungrammatical, but the in-
tended meaning is also clear: ‘Few of you are there. Plural pronoun you is
apparently not compatible with plural determiner few.
(51) *Few you are there
Hence, there is no difference between singular and plural here.
The incompatibility of pronouns and determiners—whether in the singular
or in the plural—may receive a syntactic explanation: under the DP hypothesis
(see Postal 1966, Elbourne 2005) both you and every are Ds (head of a deter-
miner phrase) but there is only room for one D in a DP. The DP hypothesis
accounts, as a consequence, for the ungrammaticality of (50) and (51). Addi-
tional evidence for the unification of pronouns and determiners is that many
forms double as pronoun and determiner, see (52a-b).
(52) a. These/those/few/some/both are present
b. These/those/few/some/both students are present
The difference between determiners and pronouns is that pronouns have an
empty NP argument (Elbourne 2005). All in all, it seems warranted to claim
that pronouns are incompatible with quantificational determiners because they
are both Ds.
Importantly, a sentence like (53) is as ungrammatical as (51); this is in
line with the DP hypothesis since third-person pronouns are taken to be Ds as
well.
(53) *Few he are there
Hence, no person distinction applies to this incompatibility, which makes the
construction uninteresting for the main research question of this dissertation.
The construction, however, touches upon the issue of pronominal nouns, which
is an important issue for any study on personal pronouns.
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Scholars like Déchaine and Wiltschko (2002) have contested that pronouns
are Ds in every language of the world. According to them, being a pronoun
and being a noun is not mutually exclusive: there are languages with elements
that are both noun and pronoun, and we could call those pronominal nouns.
Elbourne’s DP hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that there is no such
thing as a pronominal noun. Let us therefore look at Déchaine and Wiltschko’s
analysis in more detail to find out whether person markers can truly be nouns
in some languages of the world.
Déchaine and Wiltschko distinguish between three nominal elements:
nouns, φ-markers (φ stands for person/number/gender features) and determin-
ers. Elements like the and that are determiners. These may occur with an overt
noun like boy. Determiners are subject to binding condition C, which means
that they may not be c-commanded by their antecedent, see Section 3.3. This
is why in (54) that boy cannot be coreferential with the boy.
(54) That boy said the boy won
Elements like he and they are φ-markers, and φ-markers are not subject to
binding condition C. This means that he in (55) may be coreferential with that
boy.
(55) That boy said he won
However, the difference between determiners and φ-markers will be of no im-
portance to us here. The difference that is important for this section is between
nouns on the one hand and non-nouns (i.e. determiners or φ-markers) on the
other. For the sake of simplicity let us call such non-nouns Ds, which is consis-
tent with the terminology in the previous section. Now that we only distinguish
between nouns and Ds we can reduce Déchaine and Wiltschko’s claim to the
claim that pronouns are either Ds or nouns. The controversial part of the claim
is whether pronouns can really be nouns.
The English pronoun one, when used as in (56), is a case in point. Just
like a normal noun like boy it may combine with an adjective and a determiner.
(56) I like [every single one]
Indeed it seems that one in (56) is a noun syntactically. But one in (56) is
not a personal pronoun like I or you, and because my interest is first- and
second-person pronouns I am looking for a language that can have a personal
pronoun in a quantifier DP, because personal pronouns distinguish between
different person values. Thus, what we have to find is a language with, for
example, a second-person element that means ‘you’ and that can combine with
an quantificational determiner like every to get the meaning ‘every one of you’.
If we find such a language we have found a proper instance of a pronominal
noun.
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Languages that are good candidates for these pronominal nouns are Thai
and Japanese. Siewierska (2004:12-13) notes that the pronouns in these lan-
guages are very noun-like. This is also noted by Déchaine and Wiltschko (2002),
who classify Japanese pronouns as nouns. Let us first look at Thai. Siewierska
(2004) states that the Thai first-person singular pronoun can take an indefinite
determiner, giving the example in (57).
Thai
(57) raw1
I
tháN2
all
laˇaj3
several [as glossed by Siewierska (2004)]
‘we all’
Analyzing the structure of the phrase in (57) as “every I”, however, leads to
a problem. Semantically, “every I” would be equal in meaning to ‘a group of
multiple speakers’. This is different from the meaning of we all, the translation
of the construction in (57). What we all rather means is ‘all the members of the
group associated with the speaker’. Thus, since according to Smyth (2002:41)
the pronoun raw can also be the first-person plural pronoun, the example in
(57) could be better glossed as ‘we all several’. Yet, a quantifier with a plural
pronoun is not what I am looking for, since we already saw in Section 3.2.1 that
such plural pronouns may combine with a quantificational element like all. The
prediction is that tháN2 ‘all’ in (57) cannot be replaced by other quantificational
pronouns, just like all in (58) cannot be replaced by none, some or many.
(58) we all/*none/*some/*many slept
Moreover, a phrase like we all has a different construction than a real quantifier
DP like all men. It can be seen as a definite description plus a floating quantifier,
similar to the men all. Quantifier DPs and definite descriptions with a floating
quantifier are not the same thing. A quantifier DP like all men in combination
with present tense is usually used as a generalization. This is why (59a) is
slightly odd: wearing pink hats is not a defining characteristics of men. The
men all, on the hand, cannot be a generalization. A context with a specific
group of men is therefore created automatically, see (59b). The same goes for
(59c): this is not a generic statement about members of a speaker group, but
a specific statement about a specific speaker group. This shows that we all
resembles the men all more than quantifier phrase all men.
(59) a. #All men wear pink hats
b. The men all wear pink hats
c. We all wear pink hats
We can, therefore, conclude thatWe all is not a real quantifier DP like somebody
or none of you in light of the above data. Hence, it seems that the Thai phrase
above is not an instance of a first- or second-person quantifier DP.
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A real quantifier phrase that is both first-person and plural would be unex-
pected anyway. The meaning of such a quantifier phrase would be ‘each group
with a current speaker’. This becomes evident when we replace the semantics
of man with the semantics of we ’speaker group’ in (60a-b), which results in
(61a-b).
(60) a. Every man slept
b. ∀x(x is a man→ x slept)
‘For each man x it is the case that x slept’
(61) a. *Every we slept
b. ∀x(x is a group of current speakers→ x slept)
‘For each speaker group x it is the case that x slept’
Meaning (61b) is a very unnatural meaning, as the context would involve mul-
tiple speaker groups and hence multiple speakers, which is impossible without
each speaker taking over the sentence, see Section 3.1.2. The meaning of a
second-person singular quantifier phrase (this would be *every you( sg) in En-
glish) would be more natural: ‘every current addressee’. There are certainly
situations in which a speaker wants to quantify over her current addressees;
every one of you can be used is such a situation and this expression is not
uncommon. In (62) we find an overview of the meanings that combinations of
the determiner every and first- and second-person pronouns would have.
(62) Meanings of combinations of pronouns with quantifier every
1sg *every I ‘every current speaker’
2sg *every you ‘every current addressee’
1pl *every we ‘every group with a current speaker’
2pl *every you ‘every group with a current addressee’
So while in theory it is semantically possible that first-person singular, first-
person plural and second-person plural quantifiers exist, it seems more likely
that a language has a second-person singular quantifier DP. I have no evidence
that Thai has such a quantifier DP, so I will turn my attention to Japanese.
In Japanese every X is expressed by dono X-mo ‘which X-ever’ (Yurie
Hara, personal communication), see (63).
Japanese
(63) dono
which
gakusei-mo
student-ever
suteki
nice
‘Every student is nice’
The Japanese pronoun anata ‘you’ may be used in this construction, but it
does not lead to the intended reading (‘every current addressee’), see (64).
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(64) ?dono
which
anata-mo
2sg-ever
suteki
nice
‘?Every you is nice’
This sentence can only be used in a context in which there are, for example,
multiple pictures of the addressee, but not in a context in which there are
multiple addressees. Note that even then the construction is a little odd. The use
of the Japanese pronoun in (64) resembles an English phrase like the real me, as
discussed by Elbourne (2005:211-213). In both cases we seem to be dealing with
nominalized versions of a pronoun, and the existence of nominalized versions
of pronouns does not mean that every occurrence of the pronoun is a noun. In
English real personal pronouns and nominalized versions of pronouns behave
differently syntactically. A phrase like the real me is third-person—this is visible
in English because this is a language with subject–verb agreement—see the
Internet example in (65).
(65) The real me does not care about her health
Moreover, in a distributional reading like (64) such nominalized versions re-
fer to multiple versions of one individual, not multiple individuals. Because a
quantifier phrase with every and a real second-person singular pronoun should
have the meaning ‘every current addressee’, the Japanese phrase dono anato-
mo ‘every instance of you’ in (64) is not a second-person quantifier phrase. So,
Japanese does not have a second-person pronominal noun either.
It must again be noted that this issue is about pronouns and not about
person. A Japanese third-person singular pronoun like kare ‘he’ suffers the same
fate as a second-person pronoun, see (66).
(66) ?dono
which
kare-mo
3sg.m-ever
suteki
nice
‘?Every he is nice’
The same argument can be made for first person. Thus, no Japanese personal
pronoun can form a quantifier phrase with a quantificational determiner like
every without being nominalized. In this sense they resemble their English
counterparts.
The above data argue against Déchaine and Wiltschko’s analysis of the
determiner phrase. As we saw above, they claim that in some languages pro-
nouns are always nouns. In this section we have seen, though, that by default
personal pronouns do not behave like nouns in Japanese, Thai and English:
they do not combine well with quantifiers like every. But since Déchaine and
Wiltschko based the existence of languages where personal pronouns are al-
ways nouns on languages like Japanese and Thai, and it turns out under closer
inspection that in both languages personal pronoun are virtually never nouns,
then there are probably no languages at all in the world that have pronouns
that are always nouns.
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We started this section with the DP hypothesis, which claims that pro-
nouns and determiners are syntactically similar—they can both head a DP—
and that a DP may have only one head—a pronoun or a determiner. The
DP hypothesis predicts why quantifier phrases like English *every you are un-
grammatical: the DP contains two heads, the quantificational determiner and
the personal pronoun. This prediction turns out—pace Déchaine and Wiltschko
(2002) and Siewierska (2004)—to hold universally. The DP hypothesis also pre-
dicts that person should not matter here; this turns out to be correct as well,
since *every I and *every he are universally ungrammatical too.
3.2.3 Summary
The term pronoun derives from Latin pronomen, which means ‘instead of a
nomen’. Personal pronouns like I and you are not placeholders of nouns,
though. Following the DP analysis they should be seen as similar to deter-
miners like the and every. This holds for every language and explains why
constructions like *every you do not exist.
It is the determiner or the pronoun that provides the person value of the
DPs. Quantificational determiners and quanitificational pronouns are always
third-person. This is explained by the principle of InterlocutorFixation:
the identities of the speaker and the addressee are both fixated at the be-
ginning of the sentence (see Section 3.1.3 for details). InterlocutorFixa-
tion explains why there are third-person quantifiers (like English few) but no
second-person quantifiers (meaning ‘few addressees’ for example) in language.
A second-person quantifier would reset the identity of the sentence’s addressee
to a subset (e.g. the aforementioned few addressees) of the sentence’s original
addressee (i.e. the set of all addressees) and such resets go against the idea of
InterlocutorFixation.
3.3 Binding and person—the basics
Cases of binding are ubiquitous in language. We already saw an example in
Section 3.2.1, see (67). In this example our is bound by some of us.
More on bound readings (and their counterpart, referential readings) can
be found in Section 3.3.1.
(67) Some of us like our beer chilled
In this Section we will see that the binding of singular and plural pronouns does
involve any person splits. I will investigate singular pronouns in Section 3.3.2
and plural pronouns in Section 3.3.3. These sections serve as an introduction
to accommodational binding in Section 3.4.
A special case of binding is formed by sentences with only. An example of
a sentence with only is in (68).
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(68) Only I tried my best
Such a sentence is special because, in a sense, two sentences are uttered here: I
tried my best and Nobody else tried their best. The use of only may lead to some
interesting agreement phenomena. In the sentence in (69) both a first-person
and a third-person possessive are possible. (Kratzer 2009).
(69) I’m the only one who tried my/his best
In Section 3.3.4 I will look at constructions like (69) in more detail and conclude
that they do not involve person patters either.
3.3.1 Bound versus referential
A sentence like (70) can be analyzed in two ways, depending on the semantic
representation of possessive pronoun his. If the sentence is equivalent to ‘x likes
his job applies to him ’ the possessive pronoun has a referential reading, and
if the sentence is equivalent to ‘x likes x’s job applies to him’ the possessive
pronoun has a bound reading.
(70) He likes his job
The distinction between the two readings comes to light in so-called VP-ellipsis
constructions. An example of VP-ellipsis can be seen in (71).
(71) He likes his job but she doesn’t
This sentence can have two readings. Under the first reading the sentence means
that the female person does not like the male person’s job, see (72a). In this
reading the possessive pronoun refers independently and may be considered
not-bound (or referential). Under the second reading the sentence means that
the female person does not like her own job, see (72b). In this reading the
possessive pronoun obligatorily has the same referent as the personal pronoun
and may be considered bound.
(72) a. Referential
λx[x likes his job](he)&λx[¬ x likes his job](she)
‘x likes his job applies to him and not to her’
b. Bound
λx[x likes x’s job](he)&λx[¬ x likes x’s job](she)
‘x likes x’s job applies to him and not to her’
In Section 2.3.2 we come across deixis as a mechanism to establish refer-
ence, see demonstrative this in (73). The reference in (73) only goes through
if there is a real-world entity that has been made salient (e.g. because it is
pointed at).
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(73) I want this one
This example can be seen as both deictic and referential; it is referential because
it does not structurally depends on another linguistic element. An example
that is both deictic and bound is also possible, see (74a-b). Here in (74a) and
there in (74b) are both bound by the discourse participant created by a house
(Geurts and Beaver 2011a). The demonstrative adverb here also has a deictic
component, however (cf. Levinson 1983:67). The utterance in (74a) is only
felicitous if it is uttered in the house under discussion, which is not true of the
utterance in (74b).
(74) a. Now I finally have a house that I like, I want to die here
b. Now I finally have a house that I like, I want to die there
Thus, both deictic an non-deictic (anaphoric) may combine with both bound
and referential readings, see (75).
(75) Types of reference
Referential Bound
Deictic I want this one Now I finally have a house
that I like, I want to die here
Non-deictic John knows; he al-
ways does
Nobody tried their best
In sum, we have come across the distinction between bound and referential
readings. A pronoun with a bound reading is structurally dependent on some
other element to get a proper referent. A pronoun with a referential reading,
on the other hand,
3.3.2 Singular pronouns
In this section we will look at the binding of singular pronouns. Our objective is
to see whether first-, second- and third-person singular show different behavior.
We saw above that element a is bound by element b if element a depends
on b for its reference. This automatically brings us to sentences like (76). The
issue is whether the possessive pronoun my depends on I for its reference, or
whether they both refer to the speaker independently of each other. I will revisit
this issue in Section 3.3.4 on only DPs.
(76) I raised my hand
In this section I want to focus on uncontroversial cases of binding. These
cases involve a quantifier DP like every boy, see (77).
(77) Every boy said he won
In (77) the pronoun he is bound by singular quantifier DP every boy. The term
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“singular” is of great importance here; the bound reading only goes through
if the the antecedent is singular. A comparison with (78) shows this: a plural
antecedent does not evoke the bound reading, not even if this antecedent is a
quantifier DP like all boys.
(78) All boys said he won
Thus, the conclusion must be that the antecedent of a singular pronoun needs
to be singular as well.
The best explanation for this observation involves syntactic agreement.
Syntactic agreement means two things for a DP, as seen in (79).
(79) Syntactic agreement for DPs
a. The DP has the same person, number and gender values as its
antecedent
b. The DP is c-commanded by its antecedent
Condition (79a) corresponds to the observation that the antecedent of a singular
pronoun is also singular. Let us look at (80) for condition (79b).
(80) The woman who loved every man decided to leave him
In this sentence the quantifier DP every man is embedded in a relative clause
(cf. Huang 1995). Because of this, every man cannot c-command the pronoun
him, which means that the quantifier cannot function as the antecedent of him.
In sum, a bound singular pronoun needs to agree syntactically with its an-
tecedent, which involves shared person/number/gender values and c-command.
Importantly, this obligatory syntactic agreement in the singular also goes
for first- and second-person pronouns. This means that first-person and second-
person pronouns can only be bound if their antecedent is also first or second
person, since antecedent and bindee have to have the same person values. How-
ever, in Section 3.2.1 we have seen that first- and second person quantifiers do
not exist. We already established that as a person pattern, which means that
the binding of singular pronouns does not provide any new person patterns.
Thus, there are no person splits with respect to the binding of singular pro-
nouns.
3.3.3 Plural pronouns
Plural pronouns behave somewhat differently with respect to binding. In this
section I will investigate the ways in which plural pronouns differ from singular
pronouns and see if there are person patterns to be found in that area.
The first thing that is necessary to understand plural pronouns is the
difference between group and distributive readings. Consider the sentence in
(81) as a first example.
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(81) They voted
This sentence can have two readings. The first reading of (81) is the group
reading. Under this reading a they is treated as one entity, a group. As a result
only one vote is cast in (81). Link (1983) has provided an account of how to
map the multiple entities of we onto the one group entity, but this is of no
importance here as the group reading will be disregarded in the remainder of
this dissertation.
The other reading of (80) is the distributive reading. Under this reading
there are multiple voted events, one for each individual. The semantics of the
distributive reading is in (82).
(82) Distributive reading
∀x(x is one of them→ x voted)
‘For each x that is one of them it is the case that x voted’
Reading (82) shows that under the distributive reading a pronoun like they
introduces a quantifier (∀x) into the semantics. Note that in the syntax I will
still refer to DPs like they as definite descriptions, not quantifiers, but this is a
matter of definition.
The power to introduce a quantifier into the semantics is not restricted
to pronouns. A plural definite description like the men—I will not go into the
internal semantics of the men—can also have a distributive reading, see (83a)
and the accompanying semantics in (83b).
(83) a. The men voted
b. ∀x(x is one of the men→ x voted)
‘For each x that is one of the men it is the case that x voted’
Interestingly, the bound reading is not restricted to the third person either.
The first- and second-person plural pronouns we and you may also have a
distributive reading, see (84a-b) and (85a-b).
(84) a. We voted
b. ∀x(x is one of us→ x voted))
‘For each x that is one of us it is the case that x voted’
(85) a. You voted
b. ∀x(x is one of you→ x voted))
‘For each x that is one of you it is the case that x voted’
Thus, with respect to the introduction of quantifiers into the semantics by
plural pronouns there is no difference between first person, second person and
third person.
Plural pronouns can also be bound. Let us look at the sentence in (86).
(86) They think that they have to vote
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If we ignore the group readings of the pronouns the sentence can have two read-
ings. Under the first reading every one of them thinks that every one of them
has to vote. There is no binding under this reading: both pronouns introduce
their own quantifiers into the semantics, see (87a). Under the second reading
every one of them only thinks about his or her own voting. The second they
does not introduce its own variable; instead it depends on the first they for its
reference. This means that the second they is bound by the first they. Notice
that the second they is represented by a single variable x in the semantics (the
x of that x has to vote), see (87b). The plural person value is absent from the
semantics—the value is only there because the pronoun has to agree with its
antecedent.
(87) a. ∀x(x is one of them→ ∀y(y is one of them→ x thinks that y has
to vote))
‘For each x that is one of them it is the case that x thinks that for
each y that is one them it is the case that y has to vote’
b. ∀x(x is one of them→ x thinks that x has to vote)
‘For each x that is one of them it is the case that x thinks that x
has to vote’
The tendency to agree is not absolute, however. In some varieties in English
it is possible to have a plural possessive pronoun, and a singular antecedent,
see (88a). This violation of agreement is exceptional, however. First of all, the
finite verb still has to agree with the antecedent, see (88b).
(88) a. Every boy has done their homework
b. *Every boy have done their homework
Second, the agreement violation only goes in one direction; a plural antecedent
and a singular bindee may not result in a bound reading, see (89).
(89) All boys have done his homework
Third, in a language like Dutch the tendency to agree cannot be violated. The
sentence in (90), for example, does not have the bound reading that (88a) has.
Dutch
(90) Elke
each
jongen
boy
heef-t
have-3sg
hun
3.pl.poss
huiswerk
homework
gemaakt
made
‘Every boy has done these people’s homework’
To sum up, plural pronouns may be bound by an antecedent and in nearly all
cases antecedent and bindee agree in person, number and gender values.
There is again no difference with first and second person. For both first-
(91a) and second-person pronouns (91b) it is possible to be bound by another
pronoun.
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(91) a. We think that we have to vote
b. You (all) think that you have to vote
Instead there is a difference between pronouns and definite descriptions (i.e.
DPs with a noun and a definite determiner). The second definite description
the men in (92) cannot be bound by the first one, so this sentence cannot mean
that every man only thinks about his own voting. This observation is known
as principle C of the binding theory.
(92) The men think that the men have to vote
To sum up this section, plural pronouns are different from singular pro-
nouns in that they can introduce their own quantifier into the semantics. Plural
and singular pronouns are therefore different as antecedents. As bindees they
are rather similar, however: both tend to agree with their antecedent in per-
son, number and gender values. No differences between first, second and third
person have been observed.
3.3.4 Kratzer’s (2009) the only one who construction
In Section 3.3.2 I noted that it is debatable whether the personal pronoun he
in a sentence like (93) binds the possessive pronoun his. Note that the debate is
not restricted to the binding of possessive pronouns, but for ease of explanation
I will only use examples with possessive pronouns.
(93) He likes his job
The debate will lead us to VP-ellipsis and only constructions in this section
(cf. Kratzer 2009). Especially the only construction is interesting from a person
perspective as the construction shows some variation in its person agreement,
see (94).
(94) I’m the only one who tried my/her best
Having these two readings is not restricted to third-person pronouns. The
first-person possessive pronoun in (95a) can have both the referential and the
bound reading, and so does the second-person possessive pronoun in (95b).
(95) a. I like my job and you don’t
b. You like your job and I don’t
Does this mean that first- and second-person singular pronouns can be bound?
According to scholars like Heim (2008) and Kratzer (2009) it does. For scholars
like Dalrymple et al. (1991), Maier (2009) and Maier and de Schepper (2009),
however, VP-ellipsis is a pragmatic process, which means that the binding of
the pronoun is not a part of semantic proper. Yet, what is important for this
dissertation is that there is no difference between first, second and third person
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here; the referential and the bound reading are allowed regardless of person.
So, in order to find any person patterns, we have to look further. It is often
noted that a sentence with an only-DP has striking similarities with VP-ellipsis
(see Maier and de Schepper 2009). Consider the sentence in (96).
(96) Only I like my job
The possessive pronoun in such a sentence has a referential reading (97a) and
a bound reading (97b).
(97) a. Referential
λx[x likes my job](I)&∀y(y 6= me→ λx[¬ x likes my job](y))
‘x likes my job applies to me and not to any y that is not me’
b. Bound
λx[x likes x’s job](I)&∀y(y 6= me→ λx[¬ x likes my job](y))
‘x likes x’s job applies to me and not to any y that is not me’
The parallels between VP-ellipsis and only DPs are interesting, but still not
very relevant for this dissertation as second person and third person again show
the same ambiguity, see (98a-c).
(98) a. Only you like your job
b. Only he likes his job
c. Only she likes her job
A potential area of person differences, though, can be found in the German
the only one who construction as discovered by Kratzer (2009). A first-person
example of the construction is given in (99).
German
(99) Ich
1sg
bin
be.1sg
der
the.m.sg
einzige,
only.one
der
who.m.sg
meinen
1sg.poss
Sohn
son
versorg-t
attend-3sg
‘I am the only one who is taking care of my son’
This sentence has three first-person singular elements: personal pronoun ich,
verb bin and, crucially, possessive pronoun meinen. To construct a the only one
who construction with a different person–number value all three elements have
to be changed into that person–number value. In addition, for a plural value
the DP der einzige, relative pronoun der and verb versorgt have to be changed
as well. For all six person–number values the possessive pronoun may have a
referential reading; see (100) for the referential reading of (99).
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(100) Referential
λx[x is taking care of my son](I)&∀y(y 6= me→ λx[¬ x is taking
care of my son](y))
‘x is taking care of my son applies to me and not to any y that is not
me’
The bound reading of the possessive pronoun (‘x is taking care of x’s son’),
however, is only available for some person–number combinations: third person
singular, first-person plural and third-person plural, see (101).
(101) Bound readings of the possessive pronoun in the German the only one
who-construction
1sg −
2sg −
3sg +
1pl +
2pl −
3pl +
If this really is a person pattern then it is a very remarkable one. Let us therefore
look into the German examples in more detail.
One part of the puzzle is that there is an alternative the only one who
construction available (cf. Kratzer 2009). In this alternative construction the
possessive pronoun is third-person. A sentence with such a third-person con-
struction and a first-person matrix subject can be seen in (102).
(102) Ich
1sg
bin
be.1sg
der
the.m.sg
einzige,
only.one
der
who.m.sg
seinen
3sg.m.poss
Sohn
son
versorg-t
attend-3sg
‘I am the only one who is taking care of his son’
This sentence can have a bound reading for the possessive pronoun. In fact, all
person–number variants can have a bound reading for their possessive pronouns
in this alternative construction. The reason seems to be that for a bound reading
the possessive pronoun (seinen ‘his’) and the embedded verb (versorgt ‘takes
care of’) have to agree.
This constraint immediately explains why the third-person singular and
the third-person plural version of the original the only one who construction
may have a bound reading for the possessive pronoun: the possessive pronoun
is third-person and the embedded verb is third-person, so the bound reading
can go through. (Note that this may not come as a surprise as for third-person
singular and plural the original and the alternative the only one who construc-
tion are exactly the same.) The reason that the embedded verb is third-person
is that the relative pronoun is third-person. An embedded verb that does not
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agree with this relative pronoun—its subject—leads to ungrammaticality, see
(103).
(103) *Ich
1sg
bin
be.1sg
der
the.m.sg
einzige,
only.one
der
who.m.sg
meinen
1sg.poss
Sohn
son
versorg-e
attend-1sg
The reason that the relative pronoun is third-person is that the quantifier DP
der einzige ‘the only one’ is third-person. Quantifier DPs, finally, are obliga-
torily third-person as we have seen in Section 3.2.1. Moreover, the DP has a
definite article (der) and definite articles are syntactically third-person. Thus,
because der einzige ‘the only one’ is third-person, the possessive pronoun also
has to be third-person for a bound reading. This explains why third person
is different for the the only one who construction: a bound reading can only
go through if the possessive pronoun agrees with the embedded verb and the
embedded verb is obligatorily third-person. Now we only need an explanation
for why the first person plural is different.
For the first-person plural the situation is essentially the same as for the
third person, but a little more complicated. The first-person plural the only one
who construction can be found in (104); what is crucial in this sentence is that
the person marker on the embedded verb (-en) can agree with elements that
are first-person plural or third-person plural. The possessive pronoun unseren
‘our’ is first-person plural, so here the agreement with the embedded verb
holds, satisfying the principle that for a bound reading possessive pronoun
and embedded verb should agree. The relative pronoun die ‘who’ is third-
person plural, so here the agreement with the embedded verb also holds, which
results in a grammatical sentence. Because both instances of agreement hold,
the possessive pronoun in (104) can have a bound reading.
(104) Wir
1pl
sind
be.1/3pl
die
the.pl
einzigen,
only.ones
die
who.pl
unseren
1pl.poss
Sohn
son
versorg-en
attend-1/3pl
‘We are the only ones who are taking care of our sons’
Thus, the remarkable behavior of the first-person plural with respect to the the
only one construction is due to an accidental homophony in the German verb
endings: 1pl=3pl.
In sum, in this section we have investigated the German phenomenon that
in the the only one who construction some possessive pronouns (third-person
singular, first-person plural, third-person plural) allow a bound reading, while
the other ones (first-person singular, second-person singular, second-person plu-
ral) do not. We have reduced this phenomenon to a clash between the person
value of the relative pronoun (which can only be third-person, as it is connected
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to a third-person quantifier, see Section 3.2.1) and the possessive pronoun. The
embedded verb has to agree with both for a bound reading for the possessive
pronoun. This double agreement happens by default in case of a third-person
possessive pronoun and by accident in case of a first-person plural possessive
pronoun (because of homophony in the German verb endings). Apparently, the
first-person plural bound reading is not due to a deep conceptual split in the
category of person, but to a historical incident in German. This means that the
person–number patterns in the German the only one who construction do not
constitute a fundamental person split themselves, but can be fully explained
by independent phenomena.
3.3.5 Summary
I have not found a single person pattern with respect to binding in this section.
The German the only one who construction looked most promising (third-
person singular, first-person plural and third-person plural patterning together)
but the patterning could be explained by accidental homophony and quantifiers
being obligatorily third-person. Quantifiers being obligatorily third-person also
explains why first- and second-person pronouns cannot be bound by quantifiers.
But, although I have found no person patterns with respect to binding so
far, some other interesting patterns can be distinguished. First of all, there is a
split between pronouns and nouns: in most languages in the world it is impos-
sible to bind a DP that consists of a determiner and a noun (binding principle
C). Second, there is a split between singular and plural. Plural pronouns can
introduce their own quantifier into the semantics, while singular pronouns can-
not. Plural pronouns do not have to bring their own quantifier, though; they
can be bound and in that case they correspond to a simple single variable in
the semantics: The candidates all hope they will become the next president.
3.4 Accommodational binding
In the previous section we observed no person patterns with respect to binding.
In this section we will see that a person pattern emerges if we add accommo-
dation to the binding.
Take a look at the sentence in (105).
(105) In every Italian city the air is polluted
In this sentence an accommodation is made (see Zeevat 1992, Geurts and Beaver
2011b): a city has air. The result of this accommodation—which is common
knowledge—is that for each city in the set of Italian cities there is a local
variable that represents the air in that city. Thus because the x that is con-
nected to air is bound by every Italian city we can say that the air in its
entirety is bound by every Italian city. Elbourne (2005) calls this type of bind-
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ing situational binding but because it involves accommodation I will call it
accommodational binding.
(106) ∀x(x is an Italian city → (∃y(y is air in x & y is polluted)
‘For each Italian city x there is y which is air in x and polluted’
In the remainder of this section we will investigate how different types
of DP behave under accommodational binding. We will first look at third-
person pronouns like he and definite descriptions like the man in Section 3.4.1.
Names like John will be the focus of Section 3.4.2. First- and second-person
pronouns—which do not tolerate accommodational binding at all—will be the
focus of Section 3.4.3.
3.4.1 Third-person pronouns
We already saw that a definite description like the air can be accommodation-
ally bound by a quantifier DP like every Italian city. Third-person pronouns
can also be accommodationally bound. In (107a) the third-person plural pro-
noun they is accommodationally bound. The accommodation is that a company
consists of a set of one of more persons. For each company the pronoun they
picks up this set. It fulfills the same function as the definite description the
people in (107b).
(107) a. In most companies, they don’t care about the environment
b. In most companies, the people don’t care about the environment
A pronoun like they is more often used anaphorically, however. In this
dissertation I will take anaphoric reference to mean that the referent refers to
an entity that has been introduced earlier. In (108), for example, there is the
pronoun they referring to the DP travelers. What is also very common is that
a pronoun like they refers back over a sentence boundary.
(108) Travelers might get used to jet-lag in the sense that they learn to live
with it
Thus, there are two ways for such a definite DP (i.e. a definite description
or a pronoun) to get a referent: anaphoric reference (reference to an earlier-
mentioned individual) or accommodational binding. The difference between
the two is that the referent of an anaphoric DP has been previously mentioned,
but the referent of an accommodated DP has not.
It seems that some DPs prefer anaphoric reference and others accommo-
dational binding. A DP like the winner probably most often occurs accommo-
dated; (109a-c) are examples of accommodated the winner. The accommodation
in (109a), for example, is that a game tends to have a winner. The other two
sentences have modal contexts and involve possible worlds.
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(109) a. In most games the winner is the best player
b. The winner will win one of these fabulous prizes
c. The winner might have been a woman
Occurrences of the winner with referential reference like (110) are probably
much rarer. A convenience sample from the Spoken Dutch Corpus (Oostdijk
2000) confirms this: only one of the forty-six occurrences of de winnaar ‘the
winner’ could be seen as having referential reference.
(110) The winner said he was very happy
Other DPs like the suspect may both occur frequently as accommodated DP
(111a) and as referential DP (111b).
(111) a. A person has been robbed and the suspect has been arrested
b. The suspect’s father issued a statement
There is a difference between singular definite descriptions and pronouns,
however. A definite description like the man can be accommodationally bound,
see (112).
(112) In many households the man only watches TV
The third-person pronoun cannot have this accommodational reading, see
(113). It is probably the gender value that causes this, as such a split be-
tween pronoun and definite description is not visible in the plural, which is
genderless. Apparently, the gender value of a personal pronoun is not as sen-
sitive to accommodation (‘a household tends to include a male individual’) as
the gender value of a definite description.
(113) In many households he only watches TV
Yet, in a sentence with enough contrast it is possible to construe an accommo-
dational reading for third-person pronouns, see (114).
(114) In many households HE only watches TV while SHE does all the work
In sum, even singular third-person pronouns may be accommodationally bound,
but it takes some effort.
To conclude this section, third-person DPs may be accommodationally
bound, but there are some differences within this group. Some third-person
DPs prefer accommodational binding to get a referent while others prefer ref-
erential reference. Third-person pronouns all fall into the latter group. More-
over, singular third-person pronouns can only be accommodationally bound in
a situation with heavy contrast.
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3.4.2 Names
There is, beside pronouns and definite descriptions, a third category of third-
person DPs that I want to investigate with respect to accommodational bind-
ing: names. Names are even harder to situationally bind than third-person
pronouns. It is possible, though, as we will see in this section.
The reason that names are so hard to situationally bind is that the seman-
tic content is important for situational binding, while the content of a name
is for most purposes quite irrelevant. Names have a meaning, etymologically,
but this meaning is usually irrelevant in communication. The only reason that
a name has content is that it makes names different from each other so that
we can refer to someone by a unique label. In other words, in sentences that
feature the given name Faith, for example, the original meaning of the name
(‘belief/trust’) is hardly ever of importance in the sentence.
I will try to find ways to make the content of a name important, so that
the name becomes eligible for situational binding. Geurts (1997) notes some
names that have a special status because they can be associated with a certain
function. The names of the four Beatles, for example, can be associated with a
function, see (115). In (115) not the actual Ringo is meant, but the person who
plays Ringo in the act. This means that Ringo in (115) is accommodationally
bound by every time we do our Beatles act.
(115) Every time we do our Beatles act, Ringo gets drunk afterwards
Names are usually not associated with a function, however. Yet, Geurts
(1997) provides us with another example, see (116).
(116) a. In English, Leslie may be a man or a woman
b. But John is always a male
Leslie in (116a) is accommodationally bound and so is John in (116b). This
becomes clear when (116a) is rewritten as (117). In (117) Leslie is accommo-
dationally bound by some English families (and by some in the second part of
the sentence).
(117) In some cases in the English-speaking world Leslie is a man, in some
a woman
It seems that the gender associated with a name can facilitate accommo-
dational binding. This raises the question what else can facilitate accommoda-
tional binding. With the sentences (118a-b) I investigate social class. Gregory
is considered a posh name in the English language. In (118a) there is the def-
inite description the one who’s named Gregory and this DP can certainly get
a accommodationally bound reading. How about the name Gregory by itself
(118b)? It can have the anaphoric reading where a specific Gregory is meant
but this reading is rather odd. The accommodationally bound reading that
(118a) has also seems possible for (118b), although (118a) is decidedly better.
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(118) a. In most circles of friends the one who’s named Gregory is the one
with the rich parents
b. In most circles of friends Gregory is the one with the rich parents
It seems, therefore, that even social class can induce a accommodationally
bound reading in names, albeit a somewhat marked reading.
All in all it appears that—with some effort—names can be accommoda-
tionally bound. Thus, it seems possible for all third-person DPs to be situa-
tionally bound.
3.4.3 First- and second-person pronouns
Third-person DPs may be accommodationally bound, as it turns out. This
raises the questions whether first- and second-person pronouns can be accom-
modationally bound as well. The answer to this question is no. I have found no
accommodationally bound readings of first- and second-person pronouns.
Situations that involve speakers and addressees seem like good candidates
for accommodationally bound first- and second-person pronouns. We have seen
that semantically the third-person masculine pronoun he is similar to definite
description the man. The pronouns I and you seem equally similar to the
definite descriptions the speaker and the addressee. A situation that involves
both a speaker and an addressees is “sermon” (in its ‘admonishing lecture’
sense). This is therefore an appropriate context to look at the accommodational
binding of first and second person. The sentence in (119a) has a reading in
which the definite description the speaker is accommodationally bound by most
sermons. If the first-person pronoun I behaves the same as the speaker, it should
be able to be accommodationally bound in this sentence as well. However, the
definite description the speaker cannot be replaced by the pronoun I while
maintaining the same reading, as (119b) shows.
(119) a. During most sermons the speaker seems to enjoy herself
b. During most sermons I seem to enjoy myself
Thus, it seems that a first-person pronoun cannot be bound accommodationally.
In (120a) there is an example with definite description the addressee accommo-
dationally bound. Again it seems not possible to replace the definite description
by a conceptually similar pronoun, in this case the second-person pronoun, and
maintain the accommodationally bound reading, see (120b).
(120) a. During most sermons the addressee seems to enjoy herself
b. During most sermons you seem to enjoy yourself
To sum up, first- and second-person pronouns cannot be accommodationally
bound in context with a speaker and an addressee.
Putting the pronoun in the plural does not help. You in (121) is not equal
to a accommodationally bound the addressees.
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(121) During most sermons you seem to enjoy yourselves
Adding a noun to a first- or second-person DP does not help either (see Sec-
tion 3.5.2 for more information on this operation). We teachers in (122) is not
equal to the teachers who are speaking or something like that.
(122) During most classes we teachers want the students to be quiet
There seems no way to get a first- or second-person DP to be accommodation-
ally bound.
In order to explain the incompatibility between accommodational binding
and first and second person I repeat the principle of InterlocutorFixation
from Section 3.1: the identity of the speaker and addressee of a sentence is
fixed at the beginning of that sentence. A pronoun like I can therefore not
be accommodationally bound by a phrase like during most talks because the
identity of I is already fixed.
A problematic sentence for the claim that first- and second-person DPs
may not be not accommodationally bound is given by Nunberg (1993), see
(123).
(123) [Condemned prisoner:]
I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal
What the sentence means is that a condemned prisoner—whoever he is—is
traditionally allowed to order whatever he like for his last meal. Being a con-
demned prisoner is an aspect of the speaker and this prisoner aspect certainly
seems to have some sort of binding relation with adverb traditionally. A first-
person pronoun normally does not mean ‘a condemned prisoner’, however, but
‘the speaker of the sentence’. Some kind of special mechanism adds the con-
demned prisoner to the sentence. This special mechanism may also apply in
a sentence with a third-person pronoun, see (124). He is normally equal to
‘the man’ when accommodationally bound, but here the ‘condemned prisoner’
meaning is also added (cf. Maier 2009).
(124) [About a certain condemned prisoner:]
He is traditionally allowed to order whatever he likes for his last meal
Hence, there seems to be some special mechanism in play here that adds dis-
course. The entities introduced in this discourse may be accommodationally
bound but the corresponding first- or second-person may not.
In brief, a first-person pronoun or a second-person pronoun may never be
accommodationally bound, as the identity of these pronouns is fixated. This is
in contrast with third-person pronouns, as there are certain situations in which
third-person pronouns allow accommodational binding.
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3.4.4 Summary
The conclusion to this section is as follows. Third-person DPs may be accom-
modationally bound. First- and second-person DPs, on the other hand, may not
be accommodationally bound, which means that we are dealing with a person
effect here. The underlying reason for this person effect is again Interlocu-
torFixation: the identity of the speaker and the addressee is fixated right
at the beginning of the sentence, so their person markers cannot be bound by
other elements during the rest of the sentence.
3.5 The vocative
In this section we will take a look at the vocative. An example of a vocative is
the name Alice in (125).
(125) Stop moving, Alice!
The vocative has several characteristics that are interesting for the grammatical
category of person. First of all, the vocative can be used for a number of func-
tions. In (126) we see the function that Potts and Roeper (2006) call expressive
small clauses: the speaker expresses something (my car has been scratched) and
adds some secondary insult (you are a bastard).
(126) [Alice to Bob:]
My car has been scratched, bastard!
The remarkable thing to observe is that bastard in (126) can only refer to Bob—
Alice’s addressee—although Bob has not been referred to in the sentence. If it
had been some third person that has scratched the car, Alice could not have
used bastard to refer to that person. In other words, the expressive small clause
may only refer to addressees. This means that we can identify a person pattern
here. In Section 3.5.1 I will present the argument in more detail.
A second interesting characteristic of vocatives is that they may consist of
a singular DP with a first- or second-person determiner, see (127).
(127) Stop hitting me, you idiot!
Outside of a vocative such a construction is not possible, see (128).
(128) *You idiot should stop hitting me!
In Section 3.5.2 I will look at the properties of constructions with a first- or
second-person determiner.
Finally, the common assumption is that the vocative is always second-
person. There are, however, sentences like (129); in Section 3.5.3 I will argue
that the quantifier here is third-person, which is in conflict with its addressee-
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directed semantics.
(129) I have good news, everybody!
This still leaves us with sentences like (130a-b) that have an imperative verb
and a quantifier that looks like a vocative. I will argue in Section 3.5.4 that
these quantifiers are not vocatives.
(130) a. Everyone behave yourselves!
b. Everyone behave themselves!
3.5.1 The vocative as a person pattern
The vocative can have a number of functions. For (131), for example, it can be
argued that the vocative Alice is used to show how serious the speaker is.
(131) I really want you to be honest, Alice
In this section I want to focus on a single function. Potts and Roeper (2006)
has named this function the expressive small clause, and an example is shown
in (132). Alice expresses some information (‘I forgot my keys’) and insults Bob
in addition (‘You’re an idiot’).
(132) [Alice to Bob:]
I forgot my keys, idiot!
In this section I will use expressive small clauses as an example to show that
the vocatives harbors a bona fide second vs. first/third person pattern.
The interesting part about the sentence in (132) is that idiot may only
refer to Bob, although Bob is not referred to earlier in the sentence. I want
to argue that Bob has this special position because he is the addressee of the
sentence. It is also plausible in (132) that Alice considers herself an idiot for
forgetting the keys. She may, however, not express this with the phrase idiot
in (132). Phonology is essential here. In the sentence in (133) it is possible to
refer to the speaker with Idiot! meaning ‘I am such an idiot!’
(133) [Alice to Bob:]
I forgot my keys. Idiot!
The difference is that (133) consists of two separate sentences, I forgot my keys
and Idiot! This shows itself by a pause between keys and idiot and a different
intonation pattern. In this section I will only focus on insults that are added to
a sentences, so cases like (132). For these cases it is clear that the insult may
not refer to the speaker.
The same goes for others : the insult in expressive small clauses may not
refer to an other. Consider the example in (134), repeated from above. This
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sentence cannot be used in a situation in which bastard refers to a third person,
even if this is the person who has scratched the car.
(134) [Alice to Bob:]
My car has been scratched, bastard!
To sum up, secondary insults may only be used for addressees, not for speakers
or others.
From these data we can construe a person pattern: second person is allowed
as a referent for expressive small clauses, but first person and second person
are not. The expressive small clause is only one example of a function that only
vocatives can fulfill, but there are certainly more functions that exclusively
belong to the vocative and the peson pattern will apply to these functions as
well. For this reason I will call this pattern VocativeFunction: constructions
with a function that is associated with the vocative may only have the addressee
as their referent, see (135).
(135) VocativeFunction
///S/A ///O/
This pattern is a rigid person pattern, because—as far as I can see—the pattern
holds universally. There is, unfortunately, very little cross-linguistic research on
vocatives, though (cf. Levinson 1983:71).
To sum up this section, the vocative is an unusual construction and has a
number of unusual functions like the expressive small clause. These functions
can only be performed by the vocative, but there is no principled reason why
no other construction could express these functions. As a result, these functions
constitute a addressee vs. speaker/other rigid person pattern.
3.5.2 First- and second-person determiners
A vocative can take many different forms. A secondary insult can occur without
a determiner (136a), but also with a determiner (136b). This determiner is
necessarily second-person.
(136) a. I’m irresistible, fool!
b. I’m irresistible, you fool!
One remarkable aspect of these second-person determiners is that they may
also occur outside of the vocative, but only in the plural, see (137a-b).
(137) a. *You boy should be able to defend yourself
b. You boys should be able to defend yourselves
Less surprisingly, outside of a vocative such a determiner may also be first-
person. These and other characteristics of first- and second-person determiners
will be the focus of this section.
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We have seen in Section 3.2.1 that quantifiers (e.g. a determiner like no or
a pronoun like everyone) may not be first- or second-person and neither may
nouns. It might therefore seem that single pronouns like I, you and we are
the only first- and second-person DPs that are allowed. A sentence like (137b)
shows that this is not true: the person marker you may combine with a noun
like boys to form a DP. Such a construction is unmistakenly second-person—
the second-person reflexive pronoun in (137b) shows this—so it makes sense to
study it in a dissertation on person.
One question is whether you in a construction like (137) is a determiner or
a pronoun. In this section I want to argue that it is a determiner. An important
observation for my argument is that the noun in a construction like you linguists
does not have a comma intonation, i.e. there are no pauses before and after
linguists, see (138a). A sentence with comma intonation on linguists is also
possible, however, see (138b).
(138) a. You linguists should know
b. You, linguists, should know
This last sentence has a different syntactic structure, which can be shown by
the sentences in (139a-b)
(139) a. *You the linguists of the Netherlands should know
b. You, the linguists of the Netherlands, should know
In (139a) linguists has its own determiner, the, and now the sentence is un-
grammatical. When comma intonation is applied, however, the sentence is still
grammatical (139b). The explanation is that in a construction without comma
intonation (139a) person marker you is a determiner and linguist the accompa-
nying noun. The DP hypothesis says that a DP cannot have two determiners,
see Section 3.2.1, so a DP with both you and the as its head is impossible. In a
construction with comma intonation (139b), on the other hand, person marker
you is a pronoun and a DP by itself, and the linguists of the Netherlands is
a second DP acting as a parenthetical construction (see Heringa 2011). Ad-
ditional evidence for the difference between the two constructions in (139a-b)
comes from words that can be either pronoun or determiner. The word they
can only be a pronoun (see below for them as a determiner), and is therefore
only okay in the construction with comma intonation, see (140a-b)
(140) a. *They linguists should know
b. They, linguists, should know
The word the, on the other hand, can only be a determiner and is therefore
only grammatical in the construction without comma intonation, see (141a-b)
(141) a. The linguists should know
b. *The, linguists, should know
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Thus, if a first- or second-person person marker is combined with a noun and
comma intonation is absent, the person marker is a determiner.
First- and second-person determiners have a rather special meaning. Nor-
mally the meaning of a DP is the function denoted by determiner with the
noun as an argument So, our linguists means ‘the things that can be called
ours regarding linguists’. This is why (142a) is a meaningful sentence: your
linguists and your philosophers pick out different groups of people, and only
different groups of people can disagree with each other, cf. (142b)
(142) a. So your linguists disagree with your philosophers
b. #So your linguists disagree with your linguists
Non-possessive first- and second-person person markers like we and you, how-
ever, do not induce such a meaning as determiners. What a phrase like you
linguists rather means is just ‘the addressee group’, while an additional pro-
jected meaning component is added to the sentence that the members of the
addressee group are all linguists. Thus, the sentence in (143a) has (in its dis-
tributive reading) the semantics in (143b). Note that for ease of explanation I do
not distinguish between truth-conditional and projected (or presuppositional)
meaning components.
(143) a. You linguists have won
b. ∀x(x is in the current addressee’s group →
((x has won)& (x is a linguist)))
‘For each person x it is the case that if x is one of you then x has
won and x is a linguist’
This special meaning of the first- and second-person determiner explains why
(144) is infelicitous: disagreeing only makes sense if you linguists and you
philosophers pick out two different groups. For this to happen, however, the
addressee has to be shifted but such a shift within a sentence is ungrammatical,
see Section 3.1.1.
(144) #So you linguists disagree with you philosophers
[points at groupA] [points at groupB]
To sum up, first- and second-person determiners have a meaning that is rather
atypical of determiners: within a sentence every instance of determiner you
picks out the same group of people, and the same goes for determiner we. This
is predicted by the by now familiar InterlocutorFixation principle: every
first-person person marker refers to the same person because the identity of the
speaker is fixated and the same goes for second-person person markers and the
addressee(s).
It might seem that the group referred to by, for example, you linguists not
only obligatorily equals the whole addressee group but also all linguists in the
world. The sentence in (145) shows that this is not always the case. The group
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referred to by you three girls does not refer to all girls in the world or all groups
of three girls in the world.
(145) You three girls have been a great help
Let us now compare first- and second-person determiners with third-person
determiners. As already noted by Postal (1966), third-person pronoun they
cannot be a determiner, see (146).
(146) *They linguists should know
One explanation for why they should be impossible here is that there already
is a linguistic item for this purpose—article the or demonstrative these—and
that the use of they for the same purpose is therefore blocked. What should
be noted, however, is that in some variants of English them, the third-person
object pronoun, can be used as a determiner. Belfast English is one of these
varieties, but—as Henry (1997) notes—it seems that this them is not a personal
pronoun, but a distal demonstrative, see (147a-b).
Belfast English
(147) a. I like them books
b. Them’s no good
Yet, whether a third-person determiner is a distal demonstrative or a definite
article does not matter here. What is important is that third-person determiners
are fundamentally different from determiners like we and you, because they
have a function–argument meaning. Them books for example, means ‘the things
that are distant regarding books’, and the books means ‘the things that are
salient regarding books’. DPs with a first- or second-person determiner do not
have this intersective reading. We can therefore conclude two things. First of
all, third-person personal pronouns are not as good determiners as first- or
second-person personal pronouns in English. Yet, this can be accounted for by
the phenomenon of blocking. A language like English has extremely frequent
third-person determiners like the article the and has no need for its third-person
personal pronoun to act as a determiner as well. Second, there is a meaning
difference between third-person determiners on the one hand, and first- and
second-person determiners on the other hand. This person split can again can be
explained by InterlocutorFixation from Section 3.1.3: only the identities
of speaker and addressee are fixed at the beginning of the sentence.
Now that the characteristics of first- and second-person determiners are
clear we can return to the difference between singular and plural, see (148a-b).
(148) a. What do you linguists do anyway?
b. *What do you linguist do anyway?
It remains a bit of a puzzle why there should be such a huge gap in grammati-
cality between singular and plural here. To me the most plausible explanation
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is that plural pronouns are more in need of additional identification than sin-
gular pronouns. The reason is that plural pronouns represent a group so it may
be unclear which entities are a part of this group. Additional identificational
material may help to clarify the group so I expect that plural pronouns oc-
cur more often with such information than singular pronouns. Because of this
higher frequency it has been possible for the combination of first- and second-
person determiner and noun with additional information to grammaticalize in
the plural, but not in the singular. What this analysis predicts is that in general
DPs with a singular person marker as head have less additional information
than DPs with a plural pronoun as head. To test this I have looked at the
Spoken Dutch Corpus (Oostdijk 2000) and extracted all DPs that have a per-
son marker as their head and additional elements beside this head from the
syntactically annotated part. After I excluded all DPs in which the additional
element was a focus particle (e.g. zelfs ‘even’ in zelfs ik ‘even I’) and therefore
not identificational, 42 DPs remained. Most of these DPs (34) were plural, see
(149).
(149) First- and second-person DPs with additional identification in a Dutch
corpus
Pron Det Total
1sg 4 4
2sg 6 6
1pl 36 18 54
2pl 7 3 10
Only a minority of these plural DPs had a first- or second-person determiner
(150a). Most had a first- or second-person pronoun, which was combined with,
for example, a locative phrase (150b), a with-phrase (150c), an as-phrase (150d)
or a relative clause (150e).
(150) a. wij
1pl
volledig
fully
rechts-handigen
right-handed
b. wij
1pl
in
in
Nederland
Netherlands
c. wij
1pl
met
with
ons
our
muziek-groupje
music-group
d. wij
1pl
als
as
stichting-bestuur
foundation-administration
e. wij
1pl
die
who
altijd
always
veel
many
postzegels
stamps
in
in
voorraad
stock
hebben
have
The relative numbers are even more telling. Singular first- and second-person
occur more frequently than their plural counterparts, so the percentage of sin-
gular first- and second-person pronouns with additional identification is neg-
ligible, see (151). For plural first- and second-person pronouns, however, one
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or two out of every one hundred occurrences have additional information. This
shows that it was to be expected that a construction that combines a pronoun
with additional identification grammaticalized for the plural but not for the
singular.
(151) Percentage first- and second-person DPs with additional identification
in a Dutch corpus
All occurrences With addit. ident. %
1sg 28034 4 0
2sg 13838 6 0
1pl 8214 54 0.6
2pl 543 10 1.8
In sum, the absence of singular first- and second-person determiners can be
explained by the low frequency of additional information surrounding first-
and second person singular pronouns: there is no need to grammaticalize a
construction that adds information to these pronouns.
We already know that there is one exception to the incompatibility of
second-person singular and determiners: the vocative. Example sentence (152)
has a vocative (you idiot), which has second-person singular you as determiner.
In the remainder of this section I want to argue that second-person determiner
for vocatives are rather different in function from normal second-person deter-
miners.
(152) Stop it, you idiot!
Interestingly, vocatives consisting of a second-person determiner and a
noun as in (152) usually have a negative connotation. These vocatives can also
be used as standalone sentence—see (153a)—with the same negative connota-
tions. You is semantically the subject in (153a), and the noun is the predicate.
Formally the person marker is still best analyzed as a determiner, as this ex-
plains why an additional determiner seems to be prohibited (153b).
(153) a. You idiot!
b. *You an/some/no idiot!
The predicative function is probably why the noun in these vocatives has a
negative connotation: the vocative in its entirety is used in its expressive small
clause function, which we encountered in the previous section. For non-negative
nouns a vocative is therefore odd if the second-person determiner is added
(154b), while the same construction is acceptable outside of the vocative, as
they are plural (154a).
(154) a. You teachers/parents/singers have to stop!
b. #Stop it, you teachers/you parents/you singers!
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Assuming that expressive small clauses occur with a certain frequency, we have
an explanation for why the construction with second-person singular determin-
ers only developed for the vocative.
A further distinction between vocatives and the rest of the sentence with
respect to second-person determiners is that the determiner is not obligatory
in a vocative. A single noun can be a vocative by itself, which applies to both
insulting (155a) and non-insulting vocatives (155b).
(155) a. Stop it, moron/bastard/maniac!
b. Stop it, sir/buddy/dear!
Yet, if the determiner is added then only the vocatives that are expressive small
clauses seem to go through, see (156a-b).
(156) a. Stop it, you moron/you bastard/you maniac!
b. #Stop it, you sir/you buddy/you dear!
This once again shows that there is a strong connection between secondary
insults and the second-person singular determiner. This connection is proba-
bly why a second-person singular determiner construction developed for the
vocative.
To sum up this section on first- and second-person determiners, such de-
terminers do exist but they have not grammaticalized across the board. For
vocatives the construction with a singular or plural second-person determiner
grammaticalized because of the frequency of secondary-insults vocatives. Out-
side of vocatives the construction with plural first- or second-person determiners
grammaticalized because of the frequency of additional identification around
plural first- or second-person person markers.
3.5.3 Third-person vocatives
In this section we will look at vocatives that are syntactically third-person, see
(157). Such a vocative constitutes a mismatch between syntax and semantics:
semantically vocatives refer to the addressee so in the syntax they are expected
to be second-person.
(157) Stop it, everyone!
The next section will show us that an imperative verb like stop in (157)
already complicates the person mapping by itself. It is, therefore, better to
look at vocative and imperatives separately. Fortunately, vocatives may occur
without imperative verbs, which is shown by the vocatives everyone and little
girl in (158a-b).
(158) a. I have good news, everyone
b. I have good news, little girl
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The issue that I will discuss in this section is whether the vocatives in (158a-b)
are second-person or third-person.
I will first focus on the construction in (158b). First of all, little girl in (158)
does not behave like a third-person DP in a normal sentence. A countable,
singular noun like girl is normally ungrammatical without a determiner, see
(159).
(159) *I saw little girl
In the previous section we saw that determiners like the or that make a DP
third-person. Hence, a vocative like little girl is not a priori third-person.
Let us therefore look at vocatives with relative clauses in order to deter-
mine the person value of the vocative little girl. Relative clauses that modify a
second person are rare but they do occur. In (160) we find a part from a prayer
from Saint Symeon to God. The vocative in this sentence—o you who always
remain immobile—shows that relative clauses can have second person verbs:
the verb remain is second-person singular. Note that a third-person relative
clause might also have been grammatical, but the point of this example is to
show that second-person relative clauses are possible.
(160) Come, o you who always remain immobile
If we compare this with a relative clause inside a vocative we see that the verb
in such a clause can only be third-person (161a), not second-person (161b).
As the relative clause is connected to the phrase little kid, this means that the
vocative in its entirety is also third-person.
(161) a. Thank you, little kid who keeps pushing the button on the Danc-
ing Santa Doll at the drugstore
b. *Thank you, little kid who keep pushing the button on the Danc-
ing Santa Doll at the drugstore
As a result, we have an odd situation in a sentence like (161): the vocative
corresponds to the pronoun you, which is second-person, in the main sentence,
but the vocative itself is third-person. In the remainder of this section on third-
person vocatives I will look at the restrictions of this mismatch between second
person and third person.
Determiners play an important role in the restrictions. A vocative like little
girl is ungrammatical when a determiner is added, see (162).
(162) *I’m your father, the/that little girl
More precisely it seems to be the D—the head of the DP—that is relevant here.
Neither he nor him is allowed as a vocative, see (163b). A viable explanation
is, of course, that he and him are third-person Ds. The second-person D you
is perfectly acceptable.
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(163) a. Stop complaining, you!
b. *Stop complaining, he/him!
The first-person pronoun as a vocative is also ungrammatical, even when talking
to oneself, see (164a-b).
(164) a. [Looking in the mirror:]
Why the long face, you?
b. [Looking in the mirror:]
*Why the long face, I/me?
To sum up, a syntactically third-person vocative is only possible if there is
no third-person D present. The equilibrium between third-person syntax and
second-person semantics is disturbed by an overt third-person D.
The only exception to the prohibition of third-person Ds in vocatives is
the quantifier everyone, see (165).
(165) Thanks for coming, everyone!
Such a quantifier vocative is also third-person as the sentences with relative
clauses in (166a-b) show.
(166) a. *Thank you, everyone who sent in the photos of yourselves
b. Thank you, everyone who sent in photos of themselves
It may be argued that the exception is only an apparent exception because
everyone is not a D. In the examples in (167a-b) we have DPs in which a
quantifier co-occurs with a determiner, so there are some signs that quantifiers
are not Ds.
(167) a. all the food
b. both my sons
Moreover, we need an additional mechanism that explains why the determiner
every plus noun is ungrammatical as a vocative (168) while the pronoun ev-
eryone is not.
(168) *Thanks for coming, every parent
One explanation comes to my mind and it involves the element one. There are
phenomena in language in which one is obligatory because it has some sort
of ambiguity towards person. As noted in Section 3.3.4 possessive pronouns
that agree with the matrix subject are allowed in the English the only one
who construction, see (169a). A third-person possessive pronoun is also allowed
(169b) so one is not very strict in its person preference.
(169) a. You’re the only ones who tried your best
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b. You’re the only ones who tried their best
If ones is replaced by a noun like parents, however, a possessive pronoun agree-
ing with the matrix subject results in ungrammaticality (170a). Only the third-
person possessive is allowed (170b), so a noun like parents seems to draw too
much attention to the third-person value of its DP. The same may hold for
third-person vocatives, where a similar competition between second and third
person applies: a noun like parent in (168) may tip the balance too much in
the third-person direction.
(170) a. *You’re the only parents who tried your best
b. You’re the only parents who tried their best
To sum up this section, yes, it is possible to have third-person vocatives,
but they need to retain some ambiguity as to whether they are third-person
or second-person. This explains why third-person Ds are prohibited in such
vocatives (they tip the balance too much towards the third person) and why a
quantifier in such a vocative prefers one (one is itself ambiguous with respect
to person). An overview of the acceptability of third-person vocatives is shown
in (171).
(171) Acceptability of third-person vocatives
Example Acceptable Comment
Bill +
Little girl +
The little girl − Third-person D
You +
He − Third-person D
Everyone +
Every parent − Quantifier without one
3.5.4 Imperatives and vocatives
In the previous section I stated that imperative verbs have a complicated re-
lationship with the grammatical category of person. In English an imperative
sentence with a quantificational pronoun can co-occur with a second-person re-
flexive pronoun (172a), but also with a third-person reflexive pronoun (172b).
These data were first discovered by Bolinger (1967).
(172) a. Everyone wash yourselves!
b. Everyone wash themselves!
The issue here is whether the quantifiers in (172a-b) are vocatives or subjects.
Note that–regardless of syntax—all the imperative verbs in this section are
directed to the addressee; for verbs that express commands that are directed
to the speaker or an other see Section 4.3.3.
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I will first focus on the quantifier DP in (172b). There are good reasons
to claim that such a quantifier is a subject (see Zanuttini 2008). Two ways
to distinguish subjects from vocatives is to use comma intonation after the
element (173a) or to move the element to the back of the sentence (173b). For
subjects this results in ungrammaticality.
(173) a. *Okay John. . . went to the market
b. *Went to the market John
With quantifier everyone and an imperative verb it is okay to use reflexive pro-
noun yourselves in these constructions (174a-b), but reflexive pronoun himself
is disallowed (175a-b).
(174) a. Okay everyone. . . wash yourselves!
b. Wash yourselves, everyone!
(175) a. *Okay everyone. . . wash themselves!
b. *Wash themselves, everyone!
This suggests that everyone in Everyone wash themselves! is not a vocative
but a subject.
One question that remains is what the person value of the imperative
verb is in these cases. If a verb co-occurs with a reflexive pronoun, the verb
and the reflexive pronoun should agree in person. The phrases in (176a-b) and
(177a-b) show this. The phrase in (176a-b)—an excerpt of a Christian text—
has the second-person reflexive pronoun as an object, which means that the
verb should be second-person as well. The phrase in (177a-b)—an excerpt of
an Islamic text—has the third-person reflexive pronoun as an object, which
means that the verb should be third-person as well. Thus, it is really the case
that verb and reflexive pronoun should agree.
(176) a. O you who cover yourself with light as with a garment
b. *O you who covers yourself with light as with a garment
(177) a. *O you who cover himself with a garment
b. O you who covers himself with a garment
We must therefore conclude from imperative sentences like Everyone wash
themselves! that an imperative verb in English has the possibility to be third-
person.
The only thing that we still need is an explanation for the second-person
variant of the imperative–quantifier combinations in this section. A first ob-
servation is that the availability of this variant is not universal. In the Italian
example in (178), the verb and the reflexive pronoun are third-person, and
second-person variants are not allowed (see Zanuttini 2008).
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Italian
(178) Nessuno
Nobody
si
self.3
muova
move.3sg.sbjv
‘Nobody move!’
So, it seems that the second-person variant is the odd one in language. More-
over, it seems problematic to analyze the quantifier in such a sentence as a
subject (178a). As the subject of the sentence the quantifier would agree with
the verb and the possessive pronoun and be second-person, and I have argued
against second-person quantifiers in Section 3.2.1. Sentences like (179b-c) ar-
gue against the possibility of everybody being second-person, for example. This
argues for an analysis of everybody in (179a) as a vocative instead of a subject.
(179) a. Everybody try your best!
b. #Everybody should try your best!
c. #Is everybody trying your best!
On the other hand, in this section we have analyzed everybody in Everybody
try their best as a subject, and the parallels between this sentence and (179a)
are strong. Furthermore, we saw in the previous section that a DP like every
boy is generally not allowed as a vocative. In the construction under discussion
here such a DP is allowed, however, see (180).
(180) Every boy try your best!
All in all it seems that the quantifier in the second-person variant of a
imperative–quantifier combination has characteristics of both subjects and
vocatives. Perhaps a hybrid subject–vocative analysis is the best analysis for
these quantifiers.
To conclude, third-person quantifiers like everyone in Everyone behave
themselves! can refer to addressees. This may explain the imperative verbs
that are syntactically third-person in English and Italian: they agree with their
subject, a third-person quantifier DP. Yet, in English (but not in Italian) there
exists an alternative construction that has a second-person verb (Everyone be-
have yourselves! ). The quantifier in this sentence shows some peculiar behavior
and may be analyzed as a subject–vocative hybrid.
3.5.5 Summary
Vocatives have not been studied all that much by linguists (Levinson 1983:71)
which is unfortunate, because they are very interesting for the grammatical
category of person. First of all, the vocative contains a rigid person pattern.
There are a number of functions that can only be performed by a vocative—
e.g. what is called an expressive small clause: idiot in Stop it, idiot!—so these
functions can only be applied to addressees. Since secondary insults and similar
functions are not a priori restricted to addressees, we can establish an rigid
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person pattern here: ///S//A////O/.
Second, vocatives allow second-person determiners (you in Great game,
you moron! for example). Such a DP construction with a second-person deter-
miner could have grammaticalized because the secondary-insult function occurs
with a certain frequency. In the non-vocative part of the sentence only plural
determiners are allowed (both first-person and second-person ones): We/You
teachers should know. Here the determiner has a different function; it allows for
a noun that provides additional identification for the DP. Because additional
identification is needed more frequently for groups than for individuals, the
non-vocative DP construction with a determiner only grammaticalized for the
plural.
Third, vocatives may be syntactically third-person (little girl in Listen to
me, little girl for example). The clash between third-person syntax and second-
person semantics leads to some restrictions on third-person vocatives—overt
determiners are not allowed, for example. We see a similar clash in an English
sentence like Everyone raise your hand! where the quantifier everyone not only
has some characteristics of a third-person vocative, but also some of a second-
person subject.
3.6 Sign language and rigid person patterns
In the previous chapter, in Section 2.3.1, we saw that person enjoys a rather
special status within sign languages: sign languages do not distinguish between
second person and third person in syntax. In this chapter, however, we have seen
three rigid person pattern, two of which distinguish between addressees and
others. In this section I will look at the clash between these two observations.
In Section 3.6.1 I will to look at the VocativeFunctions rigid person pattern
(///S/ A////O/) and in Section 3.6.2 at the InterlocutorFixation rigid person
pattern ( S A ////O/).
3.6.1 Sign language and vocatives
If we want to maintain both that i) there is no distinction between second and
third person in sign language, and that ii) vocative functions are restricted
to addressees, the only way out seems to be that there are no vocatives in
sign language. However, although a language like American Sign Language
(ASL) makes very little use of vocatives (see Baker-Shenk and Cokely 1980),
there is the so-called hey sign. The hey sign is a handwave used to get or
maintain the addressee’s attention. Thus, hey is a sign that is specifically
directed at the addressee. This fits the VocativeFunctions person pattern
from Section 3.5.1, but it is unexpected from the perspective of Section 2.3.1,
in which we established that in sign language there is no difference between
second and third person syntactically.
To solve this issue I want to appeal to the distinction between addressees
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on the one hand, and second person on the other. As we already know the
plural pronoun you is second-person, but not all of its referents have to be
addressees. In (181), for example, the second-person DP you two refers to the
addressee, Bob, and an other (e.g. Bob’s wife).
(181) [Alice to Bob:]
We enjoyed ourselves the other night, did you two also enjoy your-
selves?
For a vocative, however, it is impossible to refer to a non-addressee like, for
example, Carol in (182).
(182) [Alice to Bob:]
#Enjoy yourselves tonight, Bob and Carol!
So, while pronouns involve person (inclusive person, first person, second person
and third person), vocatives directly involve addressees, speakers and others.
The solution to the person issue in sign language, therefore, is that sign
languages distinguish addressees, but do not distinguish between second person
and third person. These are two separate mechanisms. Person is confined to
person markers, whether pronouns or verbal affixes. The role of addressee is
a more fundamental aspect of language and does play a role in sign language.
Besides the sign hey there is the fact that eye gaze in a sentence in sign
language is mostly fixated at the addressee (see Alibašić Ciciliani and Wilbur
2006, Berenz 2002).
3.6.2 Sign language and interlocutor fixation
In Section 3.1 we established that while it is possible to shift between two
others in a sentence, it is impossible to shift between two addressees. These
facts can be replicated for sign language. In (183) we find an example from
Sign Language of the Netherlands (SLN). The pointing signs are directed at
two non-addressees (i.e. others) and shifting back and forth between them is
acceptable. The eye gaze (eg) is directed at addressee A the whole time.
Sign Language of the Netherlands
(183)
q
eg-A
ix-B
point-B
ix-C
point-C
KENNEN
know
‘Does he know him?’
The example in (184), on the other hand, is not acceptable. In this sentence
the eye gaze is directed at person A at first, but after the first pointing sign
the eye gaze shifts toward person B. Such a shift is not acceptable because it
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suggests that first person A is the addressee and then person B. This would
result in an addressee shift within one sentence and those are not acceptable.
(184) q
eg-A eg-B
*ix-A
point-A
ix-B
point-B
KENNEN
know
I explained the prohibition on addressee shift by the principle of Inter-
locutorFixation in Section 3.1.3. The example in (184) suggests that this
principle also holds for sign languages. If this is the case then we predict that
a number of observations from the present chapter also apply to sign language.
We saw that this is true for addressee shift and in the remainder of this section
we will look at some other observations.
In Section 3.2.1 we saw that quantifiers cannot be first- or second-person
syntactically in spoken language. Unfortunately, this cannot be checked for sign
language. As we established in Section 2.3, sign languages do not distinguish
person in their pointing signs, so there is no way to verify the person value of
the quantifier because there is no element with which it may agree. Or, to put
it differently, there are no person values in sign language, so there is nothing
to check.
In Section 3.4 we looked at accommodational binding and concluded that
first and second person cannot be accommodated in spoken language, while
third person can. In the English sentence in (185) pronoun they may be ac-
commodationally bound (which means that they denotes a different group of
people for each company).
(185) In most companies they work hard
To express this reading in a sign language like Sign Language of the Netherlands
(SLN) a word like persoon ‘person’ must be used, see (186).
Sign language of the Netherlands
(186) veel
many
bedrijf
company
persoon
person
hard_werken
work.hard
‘In many companies they work hard’
If a pointing sign is used, only a referential reading is felicitous, see (187).
(187) veel
many
bedrijf
company
ix-A–C
point-A–C
hard_werken
work.hard
‘In many companies you/they work hard’
[point fromA toC]
Thus, pointing signs are obligatorily referential, whether they refer to speakers,
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addressees or others (Liddell 2003). Zwets (2012) points out that a pointing sign
always points to a real-world location and that this location may be directly
or indirectly connected to an entity. It is the pointing to the location which is
obligatorily referential and which produces the restrictions in this section. The
obligatorily referential nature of pointing means that there is no person split in
sign language with respect to accommodation, but a pointing sign–noun split
(similar to a pronoun–noun split in spoken language). In other words, pronouns
referring to speakers and addressees cannot accommodate in spoken language
because they are necessarily anaphoric, but in sign language pointing signs that
point at others are also necessarily referential, which is why there is no person
split here.
In fact, the obligatory referential status of pointing signs to others shows
up in other environments in sign language. In a spoken languages like English
the third-person pronoun he can appear in a sentence with a quantifier like
(188).
(188) Everyone thinks he is smart
This example has two readings for he: a referential one (189a) or a bound one
(189b).
(189) a. Referential
∀(x)(x thinks x is smart)
‘Every person x thinks that x is smart’
b. Bound
∀(x)(x thinks y is smart)
‘Every person x thinks that some salient person y is smart’
How do these two readings work in sign language? In (190) we find an example
of SLN that corresponds to the bound reading for he (see Kimmelman 2009).
Sign language of the Netherlands
(190) ieder-mv
every-pl
denken
think
zelf
self
slim
smart
‘Everyone thinks he is smart’
The crucial word is zelf ‘self’ which acts as some sort of long-distance reflexive.
It is not the construction normally used for expressing ‘you’ or ‘he’; a point to
the relevant individual is of course the normal way to do this. Yet, if such a
point is used, only the strict reading can be obtained, which means that there
is a specific individual in mind, namely the person pointed at, see (191). This
person may be an addressee or an other.
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(191) ieder-mv
every-pl
denken
think
ix-A
point-A
slim
smart
‘Everyone thinks you/he is smart’
[points atA]
Thus, because pointing signs are obligatorily referential they may not be bound
by a distributive quantifier. Again we see no difference between pointing signs
to speakers, addressees or others.
The necessarily referential status of pointing signs stems from their in-
dexical nature: in an indexical system one can only refer to specific entities.
Similarly, if a pronoun in spoken language is given indexical support, the pos-
sibility to be semantically bound goes away as well, see (192).
(192) Everyone thinks he is smart
[points atA]
Thus, the indexical nature of pointing sign prevents pointing signs to others
from being bound, which means that pointing signs to others behave like point-
ing signs to speaker and addressees and that there are no person splits to be
observed in this area.
To sum up, InterlocutorFixation also holds for sign language and
addressee shift is ungrammatical as expected. The principle does not show in
other areas, because sign languages do not distinguish person syntactically and
because all pointing signs are referential in nature.
3.6.3 Summary
Sign languages show that it is wise to distinguish between speech-act roles
(speaker, addressee and other) and person (inclusive person, first person, second
person and third person). Person marking is an indirect way to encode speech-
act roles and shows up as personal pronouns, verbal affixes, etc. Sign languages
do not mark person, as we saw in Section 2.3. Yet, speech-act roles themselves
do play a role in sign language. We have seen two examples in this section: the
hey sign in American Sign language—used to draw attention—only applies to
the addressee, and addressee shift is prohibited in sign language while shifting
between multiple others is no problem.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have been looking for rigid person patterns, i.e. person
patterns that hold for all languages in the world. We found three (and in
Section 4.4.2 we will find another one). The first is the MultipleRefer-
ents pattern (////S/ A O ) which tells us that a sentence can only have one
speaker. The second is the VocativeFunctions pattern (///S/ A ///O//) which
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shows that for functions that are associated with the vocative—expressive small
clauses like idiot in Stop it, idiot! for example—there are no speaker-directed or
other-directed constructions, only the addressee-directed vocative construction.
Vocatives are also in other respects very interesting: they are often syntacti-
cally third-person (little girl in Go away, little girl) but semantically they are
associated with addressees.
These two rigid person patterns go against Lyons’s theory that third person
is fundamentally different from first and second person (Lyons 1977). It seems
that person patterns do not have one single form, but that the form depends
on the phenomenon for which it is a pattern.
The third rigid person pattern, InterlocutorFixation ( S A ////O
), is in line with Lyons’s theory. The pattern occurs in many phenomena in
language, which may explain the popularity of Lyons’s theory. The principle
behind the pattern is that the moment a sentence (or a sequence of sentences)
is uttered the identities of the speaker and the identity of the addressee are
fixated. As a result it is very hard to reset the identity of speaker and addressee
during the sentence. This has a number of consequences. First of all, there are
very strict constraints on speaker shift and addressee shift within a sentence.
Shifting the identity of a third-person pronoun involves no such constraints.
Second, it is impossible to accommodate (i.e. derive their identity from some
other element in the sentence) first- and second-person pronouns. For third-
person DPs, however, it is possible to be accommodated. Moreover, because
third-person DPs can be accommodated they can indirectly refer to speakers
and addressees, while a first-person pronoun can only refer to a speaker (or
speaker group) and a second-person pronoun to an addressee (or addressee
group). Third, quantifiers (the quantificational pronoun some, for example) can
only be third-person. If some of you were second-person, then the addressee
would shift from the you supergroup to the some subgroup and such addressee
shifts are not allowed (a similar case can be made for some of us). Fourth, DPs
like you linguists have to include all addressees; otherwise there would again
be an addressee shift in the sentence. A DP like these linguists with a third-
person determiner, on the other hand, does not have to include all proximate
things. All four phenomena can be derived from the InterlocutorFixation
principle.
We have also encountered some phenomena in this chapter for which there
are no person patterns. For basic semantic binding (We think we’re smart) there
is no distinction in person; the singular–plural distinction is more important
here. In addition, pronouns are never nouns in the languages in the world,
and may therefore not combine with determiners, irrespective of person. That
is, both *every you and *every he do not occur in the languages of the world,
which is predicted by the DP hypothesis (Postal 1966, Elbourne 2005). Pointing
signs in sign languages, finally, are always referential, whether first-, second- or
third-person. This is why there is no distinction between a second-person and
a third-person pointing signs in sign language.
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What sign language also shows is that there is a difference between speech-
act roles and person. Speech-act roles are the three roles important for speech
acts (speaker, addressee and other). These roles are indirectly encoded by
person markers which may be inclusive-person, first-person, second-person or
third-person. Sign language does not make use of person markers (at least, not
of the distinction between second- and third-person) but it does make use of
speech-act roles. In the next chapter—in which we will look at non-rigid person
patterns—the distinction between speech-act roles and person will return.

CHAPTER 4
Person hierarchies
The main purpose of this dissertation is to find out whether there are more
person patterns in language than inclusive/first/second versus third. In the
previous chapter I have looked at rigid person patterns. If a phenomenon has
a rigid person pattern, this means that this phenomenon is the same for every
language. In this chapter I want to look at non-rigid person patterns. These
are person patterns that are also universal, but allow for more than one state:
different languages may have different states and languages may change from
one state to another.
One scholar who has investigated non-rigid person patterns is Silverstein
(1976). He has looked at the interaction between, among other things, the gram-
matical category of person and the grammatical category of semantic roles.
Semantic roles (also known as thematic or participant roles) express the role
an entity fulfills in a predicate (agent, patient, instrument, . . . ) The syntac-
tic markers of semantic roles are commonly known as cases (when affixes) or
adpositions (when independent words). Silverstein investigated ergative mark-
ing (the overt marking on an agent DP) and accusative marking (the overt
marking on a patient DP), and with respect to ergative marking he made the
observation in (1).
(1) Ergative marking on first and second person is more often absent than
ergative marking on third person
With such an observation we predict that the existence of languages with no
ergative marking on first and second person (///1////2/ 3 ) but also the existence
of other types of languages—languages with no ergative marking at all (///1////2
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//3/) for example. This is a big difference with the rigid person predicates from
the previous chapter, which allow only one type of language. In the typological
literature an observation like in (1) is called a person hierarchy. In Section 4.1
we will look in more detail at how such hierarchies work.
In a way these non-rigid person patterns seem to be less fundamental to
language than the rigid ones. Non-rigid person patterns exist because the gram-
matical category of person interacts with some other grammatical category. The
grammatical category with which person interacts in Silverstein’s research is
the category of semantic roles. I will discuss this interaction in Section 4.2. In
the next three sections we will look at other grammatical categories with which
person may interact. Section 4.3 will feature the grammatical category of illo-
cutionary force, which includes markers for things such as questions, assertions
and commands. In Section 4.4 we will investigate the grammatical category
of evidentiality, which expresses the semantic concept of the source of infor-
mation of the utterance. Three nominal categories (spatial deixis, gender and
politeness) and their interaction with person will be discussed in Section 4.5.
We will encounter a number of person hierarchies in these four sections.
In Section 4.6 we will see whether we can predict which person hierarchies
occur in language and which ones do not. Finally, in Section 4.7 we will look
at the difference between rigid person patterns and non-rigid person patterns
(i.e. person hierarchies).
4.1 Person hierarchies and predictability
Silverstein’s observation in (1) on ergative marking (Silverstein 1976) is usually
represented as a person hierarchy, see (2).
(2) Ergative marking absent on pronoun
1,2 > 3
In such a hierarchy the greater-than sign means ‘occurs more often than’. There-
fore, what the hierarchy in (2) says is ‘the absence of ergative marking occurs
more often on first- and second-person pronouns than on third-person pro-
nouns’.
Such hierarchies are commonly known in the literature as markedness hier-
archies. Yet, as Haspelmath (2006) notes, the term “markedness” is rather am-
biguous and not very explanatory by itself. He argues that what really underlies
such hierarchies is predictability : can the addressee predict something without
the need of an overt marker? I will discuss predictability in Section 4.1.1. An-
other issue regarding person hierarchies is the inclusive person value. If the
inclusive is taken seriously as a person value, then linguistic phenomena should
be investigated in the plural rather than the singular, see Section 4.1.2.
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4.1.1 Predictability and morphological reduction
The idea of predictability is that in a language the speaker does not mark
overtly what is highly predictable (see Haspelmath 2006). Let us see how this
works out for Silverstein’s agents and person. When speakers or addressees are
participants in a transitive predicate, most of the time they fulfill the role of
agent, as a speaker typically talks about what she did herself or asks what the
addressee did (cf. van Bergen 2011:Ch. 1). Therefore, since it is very predictable
that a first or second person is an agent, there is no need for an overt agent-
marker (the ergative case). For third person, on the other hand, the agent role
is less predictable, as third persons are often patients. Therefore, it is harder
for an addressee to interpret a third person without ergative case than a first
or second person without ergative case. This is reflected in the hierarchy on
ergative marking in (2): the tendency in languages to have no ergative marker
for first and second person is stronger than the tendency to have no ergative
marker for third person.
Predictability may have a number of observable effects according to
Haspelmath (2006). One effect is phonological reduction. If a marker is highly
predictable sounds may be pronounced more sloppily, because the addressee will
recognize the marker anyway (see Nettle 1999, Lestrade 2010:Ch. 2). A well-
known example is the oft-occurring English collocation want to, which may be
reduced to wanna, in which the t-sound is absent. It is, however, rather hard
to compare two markers on phonological reduction—what should be measured:
phonemes, syllables, feet or something else? Furthermore, it is not always evi-
dent how to define phonological reduction exactly; for example, is a short vowel
plus a consonant longer than a long vowel? Because of these problems I have
decided not to look at the phonological reduction effects of person hierarchies
in this dissertation.
Morphological reduction is another effect of predictability. We already saw
it at work in the hierarchy on ergative marking in (2): the agent-marking mor-
pheme is often absent when it is highly predictable. Another example is English
patient marking (see Trask 1996). Old-English still had patient marking in the
form of accusative case, see (3), but the increasingly rigid word order made
the patient role highly predictable, and in the history of English the accusative
marker on articles was dropped.
Old English
(3) Ic
1sg
hæbbe
have
þo-ne
def-acc
fisc
fish
gefangen-ne
caught-acc
‘I have caught the fish’
These examples illustrate the MorphologicalReduction constraint in (4).
(4) MorphologicalReduction
A marker that is highly predictable tends to have fewer morphemes than
a marker that is less predictable
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I assume that in most cases the tendency in (4) will mean that the marker
with low predictability has one morpheme, and that the marker with high
predictability has no morphemes. This is what occurs with agent and patient
marking in the Australian languages as investigated by Silverstein (1976). Oc-
casionally, however, it happens that higher numbers are in play. In English
number marking, for example, the singular has no marker (5a) and the plural
is marked by a single affix (5b), while the dual marker (the marker that ex-
presses a quantity of 2 conceptually) consists of two morphemes—the affix and
the numeral two (5c). Note that the numeral two is only necessary if it not
clear from the context that the number of books is two; nevertheless, I count
the data in (5b-c) as a difference between plural marking and dual marking in
English.
(5) a. the book
b. the book-s
c. the two book-s
These data are in line with the cross-linguistically attested number hierarchy
(see Corbett 2000). This number hierarchy can be found in (6). One thing
the hierarchy shows is that in a language the dual marker tends to have more
morphemes than the plural marker. We have seen that this is the case for
English (two morphemes vs. one morpheme).
(6) Number hierarchy
sg > pl > dual
There is another mechanism that also contributes toMorphologicalRe-
duction: regularization. Examples of this can be found in the English past
tense. Some English verbs used to have a suppletive past tense form; an exam-
ple is the verb climb, which used to have a past tense form clomb. If these past
tense forms are not so frequent, a speaker can choose to construct a past tense
form based on the more frequent basic verb stem climb instead, adding the
regular past tense marker -ed to get the form climbed. Clearly this also leads
to a situation where the more predictable marker (the present tense marker)
has less morphemes than the less predictable marker (the past tense).
Finally, I would like to discuss the status of exceptions. We have seen that
the rigid person patterns of Chapter 2 are without exception in the languages
of the world. In this chapter we have seen so far that person hierarchies allow
for multiple types of language, but this does not automatically mean that they
allow exceptions. Silverstein’s person hierarchy predicts that the types of agent
marking in (7a) exist and that the types of agent marking in (7b) do not occur.
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(7) a. Types of agent marking expected by Silverstein (1976)
1 2 3
///1/2 3
1 //2//3
///1///2//3
///1///2////3/
b. Patterns of agent marking not expected by Silverstein (1976)
1 2 //3/
///1/2 //3/
1 //2////3/
Yet, in a language like Hungarian it is the third-person marking that is absent
for agents, so Hungarian has 1 2 ///3/ agent-marking (Nichols 1992:49). This is
an exception to the person pattern, and in this chapter we will see that there are
more person hierarchies with exceptions. Such exceptions notwithstanding, a
person hierarchy has its value because it fares better than the null hypothesis,
which says that all types of marking should occur with equal frequency. A
person hierarchy predicts which types occur with high, and which ones with
low frequency.
To sum up this section, what underlies person hierarchies is predictability,
and one effect of predictability is MorphologicalReduction, which will be
investigated in this chapter.
4.1.2 The inclusive, the plural and person hierarchies
Another important aspect of person hierarchies is the number of person values.
I concluded in Chapter 2 that language users split up the category of person in
maximally four parts: the inclusive-person person value (for groups with both
speakers and hearers), the first-person person value (for groups with speakers
but no hearers), the second-person person value (for groups with hearers but no
speakers), and the third-person person value (groups with neither speakers nor
hearers). As a consequence, all four person values should be considered when
investigating person hierarchies. An alternative analysis is that the inclusive is
disregarded as a separate person value and once again follows what the first-
person person value does. Such an analysis is not only at odds with the claim in
Chapter 2 that the inclusive is a fourth, independent person value, but is also
incompatible with the fact that sometimes the inclusive and the first person
behave differently, see the command hierarchy (2 > 1
2
> 3 > 1) in Section 4.3.3
for example. Person hierarchies should therefore always include the inclusive.
However, most scholars do not consider the inclusive person value while
looking for hierarchies. An example is Dixon (1979), who put the observations
on agent-marking from Silverstein (1976) in the form of the hierarchy in (8).
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(8) Silverstein Hierarchy (three-value version)
1,2 > 3
The lack of the inclusive person value is apparent in (8). Yet, Silverstein himself
recognized the importance of the inclusive person value. His version of the
hierarchy is in (9).
(9) Silverstein Hierarchy (four-value version)
1
2
> 1,2 > 3
However, most scholars ignore the inclusive.
An important characteristic of the inclusive value is that it only exists
in the plural. There are a number of ways to deal with this fact in person
hierarchies. One way is to add data from the singular and data from the plu-
ral together for each person value. As a result, the inclusive will be a rather
marginal category because the singular occurs more often than the plural and
the inclusive only exists in the plural. Consequently, the inclusive person value
will probably always be at the right-hand side of a person hierarchy: its pre-
dictability is low because it seldom occurs. As we will see, this is not true for
all person hierarchies—the command hierarchy (2 > 1
2
> 3 > 1) in Section 4.3.3
is an example—so a better solution is needed.
In the second approach to the inclusive person value, emphasis is placed on
a fair comparison between the inclusive and the other person values. Because
of this only the plural values of a linguistic phenomenon are compared, as the
inclusive does not have a singular. In practice this can really be a problem, since
many scholars only look at singular forms in their research, probably because
singular forms occur more frequently and because many Western languages lack
dedicated inclusive markers. We will encounter this problem a number of times
in this chapter, unfortunately.
Another reason to look at the plural is that in the plural the difference
between person and speech-act roles comes to light. As we saw in Section 3.6.1,
the vocative involves speech-act roles and not person because in the plural it
involves multiple addressees and not an addressee group (i.e. a group with an
addressee) which is the semantic translation of second person. In other words,
if we want to distinguish between person and speech-act roles, we should look
at the plural.
To sum up this section, I think there are two very good reasons for looking
at the plural in typological research: both the inclusive person and the dif-
ference between person and speech-act roles only show up in the plural. The
consequence, however, is that scholars should look at the plural instead of the
singular, and this is something that few scholars do.
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4.1.3 Summary
We now have the means to look for person hierarchies in the languages of the
world: for any phenomenon we have to count the number of morphemes for
each person value. Because of the inclusive and the difference between person
and speech-act roles we should look at the plural forms rather than the singular
forms.
4.2 Person hierarchies I: semantic roles
A semantic role is the role that an entity performs in an event. Examples of
semantic roles are agent, recipient and instrument. These semantic role val-
ues can be expressed by case markers and adpositions (i.e. prepositions or
postpositions). Because semantic roles have markers we can consider them a
grammatical category.
We already encountered a person hierarchy on semantic roles in the be-
ginning of this chapter: the Silverstein Hierarchy. This hierarchy is supposed to
be a hierarchy on the marking of the agent role. Silverstein (1976) also devised
a hierarchy on patient marking; we will look at this hierarchy in Section 4.2.1.
This hierarchy is based on a sample of Australian languages and is the reverse
of the Silverstein Hierarchy. When looking at cross-linguistic data, however, it
will become apparent that the two hierarchies have to be revised. Section 4.2.2
will be devoted to this. Finally, in Section 4.2.3 we will investigate whether Sil-
verstein’s proposed reversal between agent- and patient-marking perhaps holds
at the level of the individual language.
4.2.1 Silverstein (1976) and the agent–patient reversal
Silverstein (1976) devised the hierarchy in (10) for ergative marking, i.e. the
marking of the agent role of an entity.
(10) Silverstein Hierarchy
1
2
> 1,2 > 3
For morphological marking the hierarchy means that on average the inclusive
is marked by the least number of morphemes, and that third-person has a
relatively high number of morphemes. In practice this means that the inclusive
will have the highest chance not to have a dedicated morpheme in a language.
Silverstein also posited a hierarchy for accusative marking. Such a hierar-
chy involves markers of the patient role. It expresses which patient-role marker
is most likely to be expressed by a null morpheme—the inclusive-person, the
first-person, the second-person or the third-person marker. According to Sil-
verstein this hierarchy is the reverse of the hierarchy in (10). This means that
for him third-person has the highest chance of being expressed by the null
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morpheme, and the inclusive has the lowest chance, see (11).
(11) Reversed Silverstein Hierarchy
3 > 1,2 > 1
2
Silverstein has only used data from Australian languages, however, to con-
stitute the hierarchies in (10) and (11). In the remainder of this section I will
show that another picture arises when looking at languages from all over the
world.
4.2.2 Against Silverstein (1976)
For cross-linguistic data on the agent and patient marking I have consulted the
Person-Agreement database (PAD). This database is constructed by Siewierska
and Bakker (no date) and contains data on over 400 languages. In this database
it can be found, among other things, for what person values languages express
their semantic roles with an overt morpheme. I have looked at three of their
categories: A (the agent of a transitive predicate), P (the patient of a transitive
predicate) and S (the sole argument of an intransitive predicate). For a marker
in the S category it depends on the verb whether it is an agent or a patient se-
mantically. This makes it not very insightful as a category for present purposes,
but I have included it for the reader who wants to see the full picture.
In (12) I present an overview of the data. The overview shows the frequency
of certain person patterns in agent and patient markers. A value of 37 for “A”
and “1,2”, for example, means that in 37 languages there is an agent marker for
first and second person, but no agent marker for third person.
(12) Presence of marker for semantic roles specified by person
1 1,2 1,2,3 2,3 3 1,3
A 4 37 297 1 5 2
P 4 54 192 1 13 1
S 3 44 295 0 5 2
One thing to note about the data in (12) is that the inclusive is not treated
as a separate category. This means that from this data we can only generate
person hierarchies with three person values: first, second and third person.
Nevertheless, even with only three person values we can still test Silverstein’s
hypothesis that the person hierarchy of Patient marking should be the reverse
of the person hierarchy of Agent marking.
Which person hierarchy fits the data in (12) best? For patient marking
this is a 3 > 2 > 1 hierarchy, as is shown by the second line in the overview in
(12). It accounts for languages in which only the first-person marker is present
(4), languages in which only first- and second-person marker are present (54),
and languages in which all three markers are present (192). So, 250 of 265
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languages fit this profile. Notice that for Silverstein first and second person
were ranked equally, which would amount to a 3 > 1, 2 hierarchy, resembling
the Reversed Silverstein Hierarchy in (11). Yet, because there are four languages
in Siewierska and Bakker’s sample where only the first person is overt, and no
languages where only the second person is overt, the 3 > 2 > 1 hierarchy is
better, although only slightly. The overview in (13) lists the observations in a
more compact form.
(13) Appropriateness of person hierarchies for semantic roles
3 > 2 > 1 1 > 2 > 3
explained unexplained explained unexplained
A 338 8 303 43
P 250 15 206 59
S 342 7 300 49
For Agent marking the picture is more controversial. As the overview in
(13) shows, also in this case the 3 > 2 > 1 hierarchy is the most appropriate
one: it accounts for 338 of 346 languages. A 1 > 2 > 3 hierarchy—which is the
reverse of the patient marking hierarchy and therefore predicted by Silverstein
to be the best fit—accounts for only 302 of these 346 languages. This means
that according to these data agent marking and patient marking are not the
reverse of each other. Instead they seem to behave alike.
A more nuanced view is perhaps that there is both a 3 > 2 > 1 tendency
and a 1 > 2 > 3 tendency in the marking of semantic roles (agent as well
as patient), but that the 3 > 2 > 1 tendency is stronger. Nevertheless this is
still different from the pattern reversion proposed by Silverstein, so his analysis
based on Australian languages cannot be replicated on a worldwide scale.
4.2.3 The agent–patient reversal in individual languages
When languages are lumped together, agent and patient marking apparently
follow the same lines. But is this is also the case for an individual language?
We saw that there is also a 1 > 2 > 3 tendency in languages, which is not that
much weaker than the 3 > 2 > 1 tendency. Theoretically it could therefore be
that that there are three groups of languages: i) a big group with a 3 > 2 > 1
tendency for agent marking and a 1 > 2 > 3 tendency for patient marking; ii)
a big group with a 1 > 2 > 3 tendency for agent marking and a 3 > 2 > 1
tendency for patient marking; iii) a small group with a 3 > 2 > 1 tendency for
both agent and patient marking. In this scenario there would be a hierarchy
reversal between agent and patient marking for most of the languages, which
would be in line with the claims made by Silverstein (1976). But is this the
correct scenario?
Let us look at what kind of patterns of marking actually exist in individual
languages. According to Siewierska and Bakker’s sample the pattern that occurs
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most often has markers in all persons for both agent and patient marking.
Unfortunately, this pattern does not distinguish between persons and therefore
does not point in the direction of one of the two hierarchies. This is why we will
look at two other patterns instead: overt marking of third person on the one
hand and overt marking of first and second person on the other hand. These
two patterns are the most frequent after overt marking of all three persons, see
(12), and the first one favors a 3 > 2 > 1 hierarchy while the second one favors
a 1 > 2 > 3 hierarchy. As a consequence, looking at these two patterns will
probably provide information on how agent and patient marking interact in an
individual language.
In Siewierska and Bakker’s sample I found twenty languages that have
overt marking of first and second person for both the agent and the patient.
One language has overt marking of third person for both agent and patient.
Also one language has overt marking of first and second person for agents and
overt marking of third person for patients. There are no languages, finally, that
have overt marking of third person for agents and overt marking of first and
second person for patients, see the overview in (14).
(14) Correlation of presence of agent and patient markers for different per-
sons
A P languages
1&2 1&2 20
3 3 1
1&2 3 1
3 1&2 0
This overview shows that in twenty-one languages the same hierarchy applies
for agent and patient marking, while in only one language the reverse hierarchy
applies. Thus, also at the level of individual languages Silverstein’s claim that
the agent marking and the patient marking hierarchies should be each other’s
mirror image seems misguided.
4.2.4 Summary
Data from the Person-Agreement Database by Siewierska and Bakker (no date)
show us that in both agent and patient marking there is a 3 > 2 > 1 hierarchy.
What the hierarchy comes down to is that a third-person agent or patient
marker has a higher chance to be absent than a first- or second-person agent
or patient marker. This contradicts the claim by Silverstein (1976) that the
hierarchies of agent and patient marking should be the reverse of each other.
The follow-up question is: why should both agent marking and patient
marking follow a 3 > 2 > 1 > hierarchy? Following Haspelmath (2006) this
would mean that third persons are both more predictable agents and more
predictable patients than first or second persons. I would like to know whether
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that is in line with the actual frequencies of occurrence. In Section 4.3.2 we
will continue this discussion and look at the difference between assertions and
questions.
4.3 Person hierarchies II: illocutionary force
Illocutionary force involves the distinction between assertions, questions, com-
mands, exclamations, promises and the like. We will see that person is very
important for illocutionary force in this chapter. Only the three illocutionary
forces that occur most frequently in the linguistic literature will be investigated:
assertions and questions in Section 4.3.2, and command in Section 4.3.3. But
first we will have a closer look at the concept of illocutionary force and how it
is marked in Section 4.3.1.
4.3.1 The marking of illocutionary force
A sentence is more than a subject and a predicate. A speaker intends to achieve
something by uttering a sentence. I will use the term illocutionary force for
these intentions (the term speech act is also frequently used). The concept of
illocutionary force can be seen as a grammatical category, because it can be
marked by grammatical elements like verbal affixes, see Section 2.1.1. Three
values of the category of illocutionary force can be seen in (15a-c), namely
assertion (‘conveying information’) in (15a), question (‘asking for information’)
in (15b), and command (‘giving orders’) in (15c).
(15) a. You stopped hiccuping.
b. Did you stop hiccuping?
c. Stop hiccuping!
The grammatical category of illocutionary force is notoriously fuzzy (see
Levinson 1983:Ch. 5). In (16a-c) a marker of the illocutionary force often re-
ferred to as the indicative is used. In (16a) the indicative is used to mark an
assertion; the English indicative (and its counterpart in other languages) is of-
ten used to mark assertions, especially in narratives. In the Internet examples
(16b-c), however, the assertion value of the indicatives is overridden, in a sense.
The construction I want to ask you gives (16b) the function of a question, and
the construction I demand that you gives (16c) the function of a command.
(16) a. I have blond hair.
b. I want to ask you whether there is a visa for working in Korea.
c. I demand that you shoot me now.
In other words, an indicative sentence is usually an assertion, but a sentence
with an indicative I want to ask you . . . is a question, and a sentence with an
indicative I demand that you . . . construction is a command. So an indicative
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marker does not automatically mean an assertion.
It gets more complicated than this. It is also not necessary to have overt
constructions in order to change the illocutionary force. The indicative sentence
in (17), for example, is usually taken as a command to come to the table and
eat dinner.
(17) Dinner is ready.
Speech acts like these are known as indirect speech acts. Some scholars argue
that indirect speech acts point at a distinction between semantic meaning and
pragmatic meaning (again, see Levinson 1983:Ch. 5). In this dissertation, how-
ever, I will disregard indirect speech acts. The reason is the following: there
is more data on the frequency of markers than on the frequency of functions,
so I only investigate markers. Yet, indirectly I want to say something about
functions, so for each speech act I will only look at the markers that usually
mark this speech act. For English, for example, this will be the indicative for
questions and assertions and the imperative for commands.
4.3.2 Assertions and questions
As we have seen in the previous section, assertions are utterances that provide
information (The killer had a beard) and questions are sentences that ask for
information (Do you own a laptop? ) The two illocutionary forces show different
preferences for person values. Questions seldom occur with first persons, as a
speaker has no need of being informed about her own actions. Assertions, on the
other hand, tend not to occur with second persons, as an addressee similarly has
no need of being informed about her own actions. This suggests that questions
and assertions should have different person hierarchies, as these preferences
relate to predictability, which underlies person hierarchies.
However, assertions and questions almost always behave alike in a lan-
guage. It happens very infrequently that a language has a different set of per-
son markers for questions and for assertions (see Dryer 2005b). And even if
this is the case, it does not mean that there is a difference in person patterning
between the two sets. Therefore, we may conclude that the hierarchy that was
found in Section 4.2 for agent and patient marking—see (18)—may have been
established on the basis of data on assertions, but that the hierarchy equally
applies to questions. This is in conflict with the idea that the predictability of
person is different for questions and assertions. Therefore, we need to take a
closer look at what really underlies the agent and patient marking hierarchy.
(18) Hierarchy on agents and patients
3 > 2 > 1
Let us look at frequency data, as frequency and predictability are often
closely related: you can easily predict something that occurs very frequently, see
Section 4.1.1. According to Greenberg (1966) the frequency of subject person
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forms (i.e. pronouns and verb agreement taken together) in English has the
distribution in (19).
(19) Frequency of subject person forms
3 > 1 > 2
Greenberg’s study involves text counts of pronouns and both assertions and
questions are included. As questions occur less than assertions and second-
person subjects are rare in assertions, second-person subjects have a very low
frequency. Obviously, these frequency data are not fully compatible with the
hierarchy in (18), since in (18) second person is to the left of first person. This
means that we have to take a closer look at first and second person.
Let us look at the numbers from the Person-Agreement Database (Siewier-
ska and Bakker no date) again. These numbers—specified for transitive A role
and intransitive S role—can be found in the overview in (20), repeated from
Section 4.2.2.
(20) Presence of marker for subject roles specified by person
1 1,2 1,2,3 2,3 3 1,3
A 4 37 297 1 5 2
S 3 44 295 0 5 2
Total 7 81 592 1 10 4
These data first of all show that most paradigms have person markers for all
persons (592 out of 695). If there are so few markers absent, we should ask
ourselves if we want to pose a hierarchy for assertions and questions at all.
However, the eighty-one paradigms that have an absent third-person marker
deserve some explanation, and the high frequency of third-person entities in
language might be this explanation. This leaves us with the issue of the relative
position of first and second person again. In the hierarchy on agents and patients
second person is seen as—on average—shorter than first person. This is based
on only seven languages. This makes it hard to come up with a definitive
judgment on the relative order of first and second person.
Some scholars have adhered to iconicity instead of frequency to explain the
patterns in person paradigms. Such an iconicity explanation states that third
person is a non-person (see Benveniste 1966, Koch 1995) and that a non-person
is preferably left unexpressed. This would predict a 3 > 1, 2 hierarchy; the issue
of the relative order of first and second person is left unanswered here, which
has some merit. However, it is not clear that zero realization of third persons is
caused by their being non-persons, as a parallel with the grammatical category
of gender shows. In the category of gender the neuter value could be considered
a non-gender, parallel to the non-person third-person value. The prediction for
neuter gender is then that it should be left unexpressed more often than other
genders. Yet, there is no such cross-linguistic pattern (see Corbett 1991). As
a consequence, it seems unlikely that being a non-X automatically leads to a
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decrease of markers, so the iconicity explanation of the high number of absent
third-person markers does not seem feasible.
To sum up this section, it is rather hard to decide whether first or second
person has a better predictability for assertions and questions. First of all,
first person occurs more often in assertions, and second person more often
in questions, but languages rarely have separate sets of person markers for
assertion and question. Second, assertions are more frequent than questions,
which means that overall first person is more frequent than second person.
Third, it is very common for a language to have person markers for all persons,
and if person markers are lacking it is usually the third-person marker. All in
all, it might be best to assume a 3 > 1, 2 hierarchy for assertions and questions
combined, see (21).
(21) QuestionAssertionHierarchy
3 > 1, 2
4.3.3 Commands
Already in Section 2.3.1 we saw that person is important for the grammatical
category of commands. In this section I will look whether there is a person
hierarchy for commands.
Commands are a rather unusual illocutionary force. This becomes apparent
when commands are compared to other illocutionary forces like assertions, polar
questions and promises. In (22) we find definitions of these three illocutionary
forces.
(22) Definition of three illocutionary forces
Assertion ‘speaker informs addressee about proposition p’
Question ‘speaker asks addressee whether proposition p is true’
Promise ‘speaker promises addressee proposition p will happen’
One thing to note is that all three definitions involve the addressee. This is
necessary as an assertion like (23a) can address no other person than the ad-
dressee , a question like (23b) can elicit an answer from no other person than
the addressee and a promise like (23c) cannot be made to any other person
than the addressee.
(23) a. There is tea in the kitchen
b. Does John work here?
c. My grades will improve!
Commands work somewhat differently, though.
It is possible to create a definition for commands with an obligatory
addressee—these commands are usually called imperatives—that parallels the
definitions in (22), see (24).
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(24) Definition of the imperative
‘speaker orders addressee to perform action a’
Yet, we should ask ourselves whether it is is wise to restrict the concept of
commands to addressee-directed commands. First of all, an imperative does
not involve the addressee but second person. In (25) the phrase you guys can
refer to Bob and an absent other person, so the imperative is not restricted to
addressees, but it is restricted to second person.
(25) [Alice to Bob:]
You guys be careful tomorrow!
Second, commands can also be extended to other person values. Let us
compare for example a second-person command like (26a) with something that
is usually called a hortative, see (26b).
(26) a. Stop judging yourselves!
b. Let’s stop judging ourselves!
These hortatives are exhortations directed at an inclusive-person group. The
conceptual closeness of imperatives and hortatives is why I think it makes
sense to compare the morphological marking of the two cross-linguistically (cf.
van der Auwera et al. 2005). A broad, person-neutral definition of commands
can be found in (27).
(27) Definition of command
‘speaker orders x to perform action a’
For imperatives x will be equal to ‘the second-person group’ (note that a group
may consist of one individual here), and for hortatives x will be equal to ‘the
inclusive-person group’. Note that this definition makes commands different
from assertions, questions and commands, which may only have the addressee
as the participant alongside the speaker and not any x. Perhaps this special
status of command is due to the fact that commands specifically deal with
actions, and not with predicates in general like assertions or questions.
If the definition of command in (27) is true, we would expect that there
are languages that have a similar construction for second-person commands
and inclusive-person commands. An example of such a language is Hungarian
(de Groot 2010) where the construction—verb stem plus imperative marker
plus person marker—is the same for second person, see (28a-b), and inclusive
person, see (28c).
Hungarian
(28) a. Öl-j-él!
kill-imp-2sg.indef
‘Kill someone!’
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b. Öl-j-etek!
kill-imp-2pl.indef’
‘Kill someone, you guys!’
c. Öl-j-ünk!
kill-imp-1pl.indef’
‘Let us kill someone’
It has not been investigated exactly how many languages have similar con-
structions. Yet, we can extract some numbers from a study on imperatives
by van der Auwera et al. (2005). In their 375-language sample, 133 languages
have constructions that are similar for second person and inclusive person, 20
languages do not, 21 languages have both constructions that are similar for
second person and inclusive person and constructions that are not, and for 201
languages the situation is unclear. This means that at least one third of the
world’s languages have a construction that is similar for second person and
inclusive person.
Which definition of commands predicts these typological data? The nar-
row definition of command predicts that similar constructions for imperatives
and hortatives should only occur by accident, because the definitions of imper-
atives and hortatives are different. Compare this to the marking of assertions
and questions: these have different definitions and Dryer (2005b) notes that
only one language out of 954 has a single construction to express both. The
broad definition of commands, on the other hand, predicts the high occurrence
of paradigms that express both imperatives and hortatives straight away, as
this definition does not restrict the identity of the performer of the command.
The fact that both often have their own construction can be explained by fre-
quency of occurrence: second-person commands occur much more frequently
than inclusive-person commands and profit more from a special short form.
Therefore, the broad definition of commands is the better definition.
Up until now we have looked at second-person and inclusive versions of
commands. The definition in (28) predicts that there are also first-person and
third-person versions of commands, however. Such commands are indeed en-
countered in the languages of the world and are sometimes given the name
jussive. English also has jussives; they are formed by using the auxiliary let. In
(28) there is an example of a third-person command directed at Bill.
(29) [John heard that Bill needs his help for the umpteenth time; he says
to his wife:]
Let him solve it himself!
Yet, jussives in English are rather complicated (see Mastop 2005), as the aux-
iliary let is also used for causatives (I let him go is an example of such a
causative). This causative let can also be put in imperative form; in (30) we
find an example.
Person hierarchies 123
(30) [John’s wife wants to help her child with a puzzle, but John holds her
back and says:]
Let him solve it himself!
The sentence in (30) is an second-person causative command and directed
at John’s wife. Notice that it has the same form as the third-person (non-
causative) command in (29). This shows that it is rather complicated in English
to talk about third-person commands.
To avoid the ambiguity in English, I will use Dutch examples of jussives.
Dutch also uses a let auxiliary for both third-person commands and second-
person causative commands, but may use a different case form for the topic
(i.e. the person who should perform the action specified). In (31) we find a
Dutch example of a third-person command; nominative case is used on the
third-person pronoun.
Dutch
(31) [John heard that Bill needs his help for the umpteenth time; he says
to his wife:]
Laat
let
hij
3sg.nom
het
it
zelf
self
maar
just
oplossen!
solve
‘Let him solve it himself!’
The sentence in (31) cannot be a second-person causative command. Thus in
order to have unambiguous examples of a jussive I will use Dutch examples
featuring topics with nominative case.
We have seen second-person, inclusive-person and third-person commands
so far, but a first-person command is also possible, as the Dutch example in
(32) shows.
(32) Laat
let
ik
1sg.nom
maar
just
eens
once
een
a
positief
positive
onderwerp
subject
aansnijden
broach
‘Let me broach a more positive subject’
This example can be seen as a self-imposed command. Interestingly, the Dutch
let auxiliary can be used for inclusive-person, third-person and first-person
commands, but not for second-person commands, see (33).
(33) *Laat
let
jij
2sg.nom
het
it
zelf
self
maar
just
oplossen!
solve
The same holds for English, see (34).
(34) *Let you solve it yourself!
For both languages the reason is probably that there is already an imperative
verb form (Solve it yourself ! in English) that expresses the intended meaning.
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The combination of let and second person is blocked by the existence of the
imperative form. Similar blocking effects exist in other languages, for example
Indonesian (see Sneddon 1996). This shows once again that imperatives and
other commands are interconnected in language, and that it makes sense to
perform cross-linguistic research on the category of commands as a whole.
Some languages have a very opaque command paradigm. An example is
Hungarian (see de Groot 2010). The Hungarian command paradigm can be
found in (35).
(35) Hungarian command paradigm
Öl-j-ek! kill-imp-1sg.indef ‘Let me kill!’
Öl-j-él! kill-imp-2sg.indef ‘Kill!’
Öl-j-ön! kill-imp-3sg.indef ‘Let him kill!’
Öl-j-ünk! kill-imp-1pl.indef ‘Let’s kill!’
Öl-j-etek! kill-imp-2pl.indef ‘Kill!’
Öl-j-enek! kill-imp-3pl.indef ‘Let them kill!’
These six forms all have a command marker (affix -j ) and a meaning that corre-
sponds to their person affix (imperative, hortative or jussive). Such a paradigm
also serves as an illustration of the command as a single concept for all persons.
Hungarian shows only one way of how a language expresses commands, of
course. Many other languages put more emphasis on the differences in person.
Often there is a rather short construction in a language for expressing com-
mands to the hearer, while the constructions for expressing commands to other
persons is longer. Dutch is an example of such a language; in (36a) there is
an example of an second-person command in Dutch, and in (36b) there is an
example of a first-person command in Dutch.
Dutch
(36) a. Zeg
say
maar
just
niets!
nothing
‘Just say nothing!’
b. Laat
let
ik
1sg
maar
just
niets
nothing
zegg-en!
say-inf
‘Let me say nothing!’
The first-person command in (36b) has three morphemes more (glossed as let,
1sg and inf) than the second-person command in (36a). Such a system of
command marking is exemplary for the languages in the world. Aikhenvald
(2010:379) has investigated the cross-linguistic behavior of command markers
and has come to the hierarchy in (37).
(37) CommandHierarchy
2 > 1
2
> 3 > 1
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What this hierarchy says is that markers of second-person commands tend to
have the fewest morphemes, and markers of first-person commands the most.
One important aspect of this hierarchy is that the inclusive shows different
behavior than the first person. An example is French: it has dedicated command
forms for second person (lis! ‘read.2sg’, lis-ez! ‘read-2pl’) and inclusive-person
(lis-ons! ‘read- 1
2
pl’). First-person and third-person commands, on the other
hand, have to be expressed by longer, periphrastic means, see (38).
French
(38) Que
that
je
1sg
mett-e
put-1sg.sbjv
l’=amour
the=love
‘Let me sow love’
In Section 4.6 we will come back to this difference between first person and
inclusive.
To conclude this section on commands: it makes sense to compare com-
mands for different persons on a cross-linguistic scale, and the result of this
comparison is the CommandHierarchy in (37).
4.3.4 Summary
In this section on illocutionary force we have seen that person is especially
important for the illocutionary force of commands. Commands have a per-
son hierarchy that is very interesting: 2 > 1
2
> 3 > 1. The hierarchy means
that for commands the second-person marker is usually the shortest, and the
first-person marker the longest. This hierarchy shows that inclusive person can
behave differently from first person.
4.4 Person hierarchies III: evidentiality
Evidentiality is a relatively new addition to the group of grammatical cate-
gories in the history of linguistics. It marks the type of information that a
speaker relies upon in making the utterance. In (39) there is an example of
an evidentiality marker. This language, Shipibo-Konibo, has a sensory eviden-
tiality marker, the affix r- (see Valenzuela 2003). Sensory evidentiality markers
convey that the speaker has direct sensory evidence for the information in her
utterance. Therefore, what (39) means is that some herb is really effective, and
that the speaker has seen—or observed in another way—that this is so herself.
Shipibo-Konibo
(39) jakon
good
baken-ti
give.birth-inf
waste
herb
r-iki
sens-cop
ainbo
completely
bi-ti
true
‘The herb for easy births is really effective’
Person plays an important role in evidentiality. Most prominently this can
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be seen in the source of information. In (39) the source of information is the
speaker herself. We will deal with the person value of the source of information
in Section 4.4.2. The category of person also has an effect on the topic (which
is in most cases the subject) of a predicate marked by evidentials. In (39) the
topic of the evidential is waste ‘herb’. The effects of person on the topic is
more subtle and will be investigated in Section 4.4.3. But first, let us see what
other values the category of evidentiality has besides sensory evidentiality in
Section 4.4.1. These values often behave differently with respect to the category
of person, which is why it is important to discuss them.
4.4.1 Types of evidentiality
For present purposes I will only discern four types of evidentiality. Besides
sensory evidentiality these types are performative evidentiality, inferential evi-
dentiality and reportative evidentiality. Performative evidentiality occurs with
events that the speaker performed herself. In (40) we find an example from
Kashya (see Oswalt 1986).
Kashaya
(40) qowá-qala
pack-1sg.pfrm
‘I am packing (a suitcase)’
The speaker knows the suitcase is being packed because she performs the act of
packing herself. In most languages with evidentiality markers, sensory and per-
formative evidentiality are lumped together syntactically: they are marked by
the same marker. Such markers are known as firsthand (or direct) evidentiality
markers.
Inferential evidentiality means that the speaker makes an inference based
on some other evidence or on general knowledge. In (41) we find an example of
an inferential-evidentiality-marker (-ine from Eastern Pomo, a Hokan language
from the United States (see McLendon 2003).
Eastern Pomo
(41) b?·k-al
3pl-p
pha·b?-k-ine
burn-punct-infer
‘They must have gotten burned (because I see signs of, for instance, a
fire, bandages, burn cream)’
Reportative (or quotative, or hearsay) evidentiality means that the speaker
has heard the information from another person. In (42) we find an example of a
reportative-evidentiality marker (-ri) from Oksapmin, a language isolate from
Papua new Guinea (see Lawrence 1987). English uses markers like reportedly
or it is said that . . . .
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Oksapmin
(42) Hapareaapnong
Haperap.to
mahan
over.there
kuu
woman
gaamin
husband.and.wife
tit
one
pipaa-ri
went-rep
‘A husband and a wife went (reportedly) over there to Haperap’
This concludes the overview of the types of evidentiality. With this infor-
mation we can continue our search for person hierarchies.
4.4.2 Person and source of information
All four types of evidentiality strongly prefer certain values for their source of
information. Performative evidence obligatorily stems from the speaker; it is
after all the speaker herself who experienced the situation. I assume that source
of information is about speech-act-roles (i.e. speakers) and not about person
(i.e. first person) as the meaning of a performative evidential can be described
as ‘. . . and the speaker experienced it’ not as ‘. . . and the whole first-person
group experienced it’. This already suggests that source of information is a
rigid person pattern. It seems that it is a priori impossible for a speaker to
base her sentence directly on the experience of another person. To do this the
other person first has to report their experience. This also goes for a language
like English, which does not have a dedicated marker of performative eviden-
tiality. A sentence like (43a) has the speaker as the source of the performative
evidentiality, but there is no way in which the person referred to by he can be
source of some performative evidentiality in a sentence like (43b). This sentence
is probably an observation by the speaker.
(43) a. I’m happy today
b. He’s happy today
I therefore propose that we have found the fourth rigid person pattern
here, see (44). The principle behind the pattern is that only the speaker can
be the information source of performative evidentiality.
(44) EvidentialitySource
S ///A/////O/
The pattern also pertains to sensory and inferential evidence. Sensory ev-
idence obligatorily stems from the speaker, as all the sensory information that
a speaker has, she acquired herself by definition. The same goes for inferential
evidence: inferential evidence always stems from the speaker. A speaker only
has access to her own system for generating inferences. Again, if another person
wants to share their inferences with the speaker, this person has to report the
inferences, which automatically makes it reportative evidence.
In light of this last observation, it may not come as a surprise that the
source of reportative evidence is predominantly a third person. Aikhenvald
(2006) nevertheless reports a reportative evidential with a second person as
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source.
Jarawara
(45) ti-fimiho-none,
2sg-be.hungry-rep.f
ti-ra
2sg-say.f
‘You said you were hungry’
Languages differ with respect to the second person. LaPolla (2003) states that
in Qiang, a Tibeto-Burman language spoken in China, it is impossible for a re-
portative evidential to have an addressee as the source of information. A longer,
periphrastic direct-speech construction should be used instead (cf. English But
you said you’d come). As no author has ever mentioned the first person as the
reportative source of information of a reportative evidential—as far as I can
see—I assume that a first-person source of information is even rarer than a
second-person one in the languages in the world, although it is theoretically
not impossible.
We can ask ourselves whether the information source of reportative ev-
identials involve speech-act roles or person. Aikhenvald (2006:217-218) found
no significant differences between the first person singular and the first person
plural in these cases, which argues for person over speech-act roles. Aikhen-
vald’s remark also signals that no differences between first person and inclusive
person have been observed. Moreover, because languages may differ with re-
spect to reportative evidentiality (the choice is between a dedicated marker or
a periphrastic construction, which may differ for different sources of informa-
tion) we may propose a tentative person hierarchy for reportative evidentials
(3 > 2 > 1).
In sum, for sensory, performative and inferential evidentiality we have
found a rigid person pattern, and for reportative evidentiality a tentative per-
son hierarchy (3 > 2 > 1). In (46) we find an overview of the interaction of
evidential type and source of information.
(46) Person and the source of information in evidentials
Evidential type Pattern type Pattern
Performative Rigid S ////A////O//
Sensory Rigid S ////A////O//
Inferential Rigid S ////A////O//
Reportative Hierarchy (tentative) 3 > 2 > 1
4.4.3 Person and topic of the predicate
A more subtle effect of person on evidentiality can be found in the topic of
the predicate marked for evidentiality. For sensory, inferential and reportative
evidentiality we can construct a person hierarchy. In (47a-b) we find examples
from Tariana (see Aikhenvald 2006).
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Tariana
(47) a. amiRi-sika
be.drunk-pst.infer
‘He/she/they/you must be drunk’
b. amiRi-naka
be.drunk-prs.sens
‘He/she/they/you is/are drunk’
In the example in (47a) there is an inferential evidentiality marker, which means
it is assumed that the person under discussion is drunk (for example, because
there are a lot of empty beer bottles). Crucially, the topic does need to be
present when it is second or third person, as in (47a). If, on the other hand, the
topic is first-person it has to be present in the sentence. The same observation
applies to a sentence marked by sensory information in Tariana, see (47b).
In this sentence the drunkenness of the person under discussion is directly
observable (a staggering walk, for example) and here it is again second- and
third-person topics that may be left out.
According to Aikhenvald (2006) more languages behave like Tariana. On
the basis of her observations on sensory, inferential and reportative evidentiality
I have established the EvidentialityHierarchy in (48).
(48) EvidentialityHierarchy
2, 3 > 1
2
, 1
What the hierarchy says is that for sensory, inferential and reportative evi-
dentiality the marker of first- and inclusive-person topics tends to have more
morphemes than the marker of second- and third-person topics.
Frequency patterns confirm the validity of the hierarchy in (48). Aikhen-
vald (2006:Ch. 7) notes that only in rare occasions there is a first-person topic
for sensory, inferential and reportative evidentiality. She illustrates this with
examples from Jarawara (see Dixon 2003:170). In (49a) we see the performative
evidentiality marker, which is normal for a predicate with a first-person topic.
This sentence means that the speaker was fully aware of getting drunk.
Jarawara
(49) a. o-hano-hara
1sg-be.drunk-pst.pfrm
o-ke
1sg-decl
‘I got drunk (deliberately)’
b. o-hano-hani
1sg-be.drunk-pst.infer
o-ke
1sg-decl
‘I got drunk (and don’t recall it)’
In (49b) an inferential evidentiality marker is used instead. Now the sentence
means that the speaker was unaware of getting drunk. Perhaps for getting drunk
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this makes sense, but for most actions that are performed by an individual, this
individual is usually aware of performing them. From this it follows that sensory,
inferential and reportative evidentials with first-person topics are expected not
to occur very often (note that this is hard to test for sensory evidentiality, as
most languages lump performative and sensory evidentiality together). Thus,
the hierarchy on topics in (48) is supported by frequency patterns, which means
that first-person topics have low predictability within sensory, inferential and
sensory evidentiality.
For performative evidentiality there is no person hierarchy. Take the
Jarawara sentence in (49a) as an example. In this sentence the speaker is
the topic of the predicate. No other individual can be the topic of a sentence
with performative evidentiality. This follows from the nature of performative
evidentiality—the performer of the predicate is the source of information—and
the fact that the speaker is the source of information, as shown in the rigid
EvidentialitySource pattern from the previous section. As a consequence,
there is no person hierarchy for the topic of a performative evidential.
In short, I have constructed a 3, 2 > 1
2
, 1 person hierarchy in this section
that applies to the topic of three types of evidentiality-marked predicates. For
performative evidentiality there is no such hierarchy.
4.4.4 Summary
Person matters for at least two aspects of evidentiality-marked predicates. First
of all there is the source of information, i.e. the person who provided the infor-
mation in the utterance. For three of four types of evidentiality this source of
information can only be the speaker. This constitutes a rigid person pattern (
S ////A////O//).
The second aspect pertains to the topic of the predicate marked by the
evidentiality marker. For sensory, inferential and reportative evidentiality the
marker of such a topic follows a 3, 2 > 1
2
, 1 person hierarchy.
4.5 Person hierarchies IV: nominal categories
Thus far we have looked at three grammatical categories in this chapter: se-
mantic roles, illocutionary force and evidentiality. Illocutionary force and ev-
identiality mark information at the sentence level, semantic roles mark the
relation between argument and predicate, but there are also potentially inter-
esting grammatical categories at the nominal level. In this section I will inves-
tigate a selection of nominal categories: spatial deixis (Section 4.5.1), gender
(Section 4.5.2), and politeness (Section 4.5.3).
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4.5.1 Spatial deixis
Spatial deixis involves the location of an entity. In a language like English
spatial deixis is relative to the speaker of the utterance. In (50) we find the
demonstratives there and here. These can be used for a number of things, but
especially in a contrastive situation like (50) they tend to express spatial deixis.
The weather close to the first person (here) is contrasted with the weather
further away from the first person (there).
(50) The weather is better there than here
An expression like there does not specify whether the weather is near the ad-
dressee or near an other. An alternative construction is needed to express this
explicitly:
(51) a. How is the weather where you are?
b. How is the weather where he is?
In other words, the marker of first-person spatial deixis is shorter in English
than the marker of second-person or third-person spatial deixis.
Not all languages are like English, however. First of all, not all languages
have a person orientation for spatial deixis; there are also more absolute sys-
tems like upriver/downriver and north/east/south/west (see Diessel 2005). But
languages that do have a person orientation for spatial deixis may also be differ-
ent from English. Japanese, for example, has a three-way system that explicitly
distinguishes between first, second and third person (Janssen 2002). We find
the Japanese demonstrative system in (52).
(52) Japanese demonstratives
kono near first-person or inclusive-person group
sono near second-person group
ano away from first- or second-person groups
Janssen explicitly notes that kono is used for something that is close to an
inclusive-person group. This suggest that we are dealing with person and not
with speech-act roles here. This is supported by the fact that the Japanese
system can deal with a group that includes both an addressee and an other. A
system purely based on speech-act roles should break down here.
To sum up, we have two types of languages with respect to spatial deixis:
first/inclusive short and second/third long (English), and all markers equally
long (Japanese). From these data the hierarchy in (53) can be distilled. The
hierarchy says that on average first-person and inclusive-person spatial deixis
needs less morphemes than second- and third-person spatial deixis.
(53) SpatialDeixisHierarchy:
1
2
, 1 < 2, 3
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4.5.2 Gender
The interconnectedness between person and gender has been noted by many,
for example by Cysouw (2003:320-321). Cysouw notes that there is a difference
between gender in first and second person and gender in third person: in first
and second person gender is always biological gender (female vs. male) while
in third person other oppositions are possible (animate vs. inanimate, big vs.
small).
More in general, gender distinctions occur far more often in third person
than in first and second person. In addition, there is also a difference between
first and second person: gender distinctions occur more often in the second
than in the first person. In other words, in most languages the first person
needs a periphrastic construction to express its gender explicitly, see the English
example in (54)
(54) I, a man, am the one who wrote that
Siewierska (2004:105) derived the hierarchy in (55) from these observations.
(55) GenderHierarchy
3 > 2 > 1
Because I have emphasized the importance of the inclusive, I would like to
know how the inclusive relates to the GenderHierarchy in (55). Although
Cysouw (2003) notes that few languages that have a first-person/inclusive-
person distinction also have gender distinctions, he does not mention a differ-
ence in frequency between gender marking on inclusive-person and first-person
forms. At any rate, it is probably not possible to transfer the hierarchy in
(55) to the plural anyway. Cysouw mentions that gender distinctions in the
first-person plural are more frequent than in the first-person singular, while
Siewierska (2004:107) mentions that overall gender marking occurs less in the
plural than in the singular. So perhaps for the plural the hierarchy on gender
is not 3 > 2 > 1; I will leave this issue to further research.
In conclusion, for gender marking there is a 3 > 2 > 1 hierarchy, but this
hierarchy probably only applies to the singular.
4.5.3 Politeness
It is very important to distinguish between two types of politeness marking,
as we will see in this section on politeness. The first type is participant polite-
ness (see Potts and Kawahara 2011). Participant politeness involves politeness
regarding some individual in the sentence. We find an example of participant
politeness in English in (56a-b). Referring to an individual with a title and a
surname expresses more politeness to that individual than using a first name.
(56) a. I’m going for a coffee with George
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b. I’m going for a coffee with Mr. Clooney
Another example is Nepali third-person pronouns (see Siewierska 2004:229).
The third-person pronoun tin¯ı is used to refer to an other with a social standing
equal to the speaker, while the third-person pronoun wahă is used to refer to
an other with higher social standing.
Not all politeness distinctions in third-person pronouns are like the one
in Nepali however. In Javanese all pronouns express the social relation be-
tween speaker and addressee (see Siewierska 2004:230). The third-person pro-
noun d
˙
ewege, for example, expresses an equal standing between speaker and
addressee, while the third-person pronoun piyambaqipin expresses that the ad-
dressee has a higher social standing than the speaker. The politeness in the
Javanese pronouns is apparently of a different type than the one in the Nepali
pronouns. The politeness in the Javanese pronouns is called performative po-
liteness (see Potts and Kawahara 2011).
Performative politeness is often observed on linguistic elements other than
pronouns. This makes sense because the addressee is not always overtly present
in the sentence by means of a pronoun. In the English sentences in (57a-b), for
example, the use of the preterit form could (57b) shows more respect from
speaker to the addressee than the present form can (57a).
(57) a. Can I see that again?
b. Could I see that again?
In a language like Japanese performative politeness has a dedicated verbal
morpheme, mashi ‘hon’. In (58) we see the morpheme at work; this sentence
is perceived as polite with respect to the addressee (see Potts and Kawahara
2011).
Japanese
(58) Mary-ga
Mary-nom
ringo-o
apple-acc
tabe-mashi-ta
eat-hon-pst
‘Mary ate an apple’
Is there a hierarchy for either of the two types of politeness? Helmbrecht
(2004:170) provides the hierarchy in (59).
(59) Helmbrecht’s politeness hierarchy
2 > 3 > 1
What type of politeness this hierarchy represents will be the topic of the re-
mainder of this section on politeness. In (60) we find the definitions of the two
types of politeness for ease of reference.
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(60) Two types of politeness
Scope Politeness directed at
Performative politeness sentence addressee
Participant politeness DP referent group of DP
According to the Helmbrecht hierarchy in (60), the second-person is the
person that most often has dedicated politeness forms. Languages in which
second-person pronouns are the only pronouns with politeness marking are
known as languages with a T–V distinction. An example is French with its
distinction between tu ‘2sg.fam’ and vous ‘2hon’. The problem with the T–V
distinction is that it is hard to test whether we are dealing with participant
politeness or performative politeness. Both types of politeness come down to the
same thing for the second-person singular pronoun: politeness from the speaker
to the addressee is expressed . A look at the plural might help us to distinguish
between the two types of politeness. This may also clarify whether we are
dealing with person or speech-act roles here. Dutch distinguishes between jullie
‘2pl.fam’ and u ‘2.hon’ in the plural. A high school teacher, for example, will
address two students with jullie ‘2pl.fam’ and two parents with u ‘2hon’. Let
us look at the context in (61); in this context the plural form is not used. This
is expected if the politeness is performative politeness here: while the parents
of the student need to be addressed politely, only the student is the addressee
here and the student does not need to be addressed politely. Interpreting the
politeness as participant politeness here, on the other hand, makes the wrong
predictions. The whole group (student plus parents) has persons that need to
be addressed politely by the teacher and therefore a polite pronoun should be
used, but this is not the case. Thus, politeness in the second person seems to
be performative politeness in Dutch.
Dutch
(61) [High school teacher talking to a student:]
Hoe
how
doen
do
jullie
2pl.fam
dat
that
thuis?
home
‘How do you do that at your place?’
These data on Dutch suggest that Helmbrecht’s hierarchy is about performa-
tive politeness, but a closer inspection of plural polite second-person forms is
warranted.
What the Helmbrecht hierarchy furthermore predicts is that there are lan-
guages that have politeness distinctions for second and third person, but not
for first person. This brings up the question whether the politeness in such
languages is of the performative type or the participant type. Unfortunately,
Helmbrecht (2004) does not list any of these languages. He refers (p. 294) to an-
other article (Helmbrecht 2005) for the empirical evidence behind the hierarchy,
but unfortunately he does not discuss the hierarchy in that article. Siewierska
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(2004:229-230), however, discusses two languages that have only politeness dis-
tinctions in second and third pronoun. One of these languages is Nepali; in
Nepali there is a participant politeness distinction, as we saw above. The same
goes for San Lucas Quiaviní Zapotec. Thus, for the third person participant
politeness seems to be the relevant type of politeness.
For the first person things are again different. Helmbrecht (2004:294) dis-
cusses first-person pronouns in languages like Korean and those pronouns have
a performative politeness distinction. Participant politeness would be very odd
for the first-person singular: it would express the social standing of a speaker
with respect to herself. It may occur in the plural, but for the first person in
general performative politeness distinctions seems to be more frequent. Note
that the so-called majestic plural (royal “we”) is not an example of participant
politeness; it is inherent to the social relation between speaker and addressee
as well.
What this all comes down to is that Helmbrecht’s hierarchy sometimes
seems to refer to participant politeness (third person) and sometimes to per-
formative politeness (first and second person). The hierarchy is therefore not
useful; the two types of politeness need to be disentangled in the world’s pro-
noun systems first. As a consequence, I will leave politeness hierarchies to fur-
ther research.
4.5.4 Summary
It has been rather difficult to device person hierarchies for nominal grammatical
categories. The reason is that phenomena like gender, spatial position and
politeness are not easily applied to groups. What goes for the singular may
therefore not automatically apply to the plural. The plural is important because
it shows what the position of the inclusive with respect to the other person
values is, but, unfortunately, little is known about the interaction between
person and nominal categories in the plural. I have nevertheless identified two
person hierarchies that apply to the singular: 1
2
, 1 > 2, 3 for spatial deixis and
3 > 2 > 1 (singular only) for gender.
4.6 Predicting the hierarchies
In this chapter we have come across a number of hierarchies. In (62) we find
an overview of these hierarchies.
136 4.6. Predicting the hierarchies
(62) Overview of attested person hierarchies
Hierarchy Name
3 > 1, 2 QuestionAssertionHierarchy
3 > 2 > 1 GenderHierarchy
1
2
, 1 > 2, 3 SpatialDeixisHierarchy
2 > 1
2
> 3 > 1 CommandHierarchy
2, 3 > 1
2
, 1 EvidentialityHierarchy
In all these hierarchies the marker of the leftmost person value tends to have
the shortest form while the marker of the rightmost person value tends to have
the longest form.
In this section I want to find out whether there is a linguistic approach
that predicts the existence of the attested hierarchies in (62). The answer will
give us an insight in the nature of the grammatical category of person, showing
what is possible and what is impossible.
In the remainder of this section we will look at three such approaches to
person hierarchies. The approaches differ in the primitives that they use, see
Section 4.6.1. The approach in Section 4.6.2 has the presence of the speaker
and the presence of an interlocutor as its primitives. As a result, this approach
generates hierarchies in which the first person and the inclusive always occupy
the same position. A different approach can be found in Section 4.6.3. This ap-
proach does not have any primitives and, therefore, allows for a larger number
of possible hierarchies. In Section 4.6.4, finally, we will see a third approach,
which sees the inclusive as a combination of a speaker and an addressee prim-
itive. This approach allows the inclusive to behave differently from both the
first and the second person in hierarchies.
4.6.1 How primitives work
An approach to person hierarchies is defined by the hierarchies it disallows. In
order to disallow hierarchies an approach needs one or more additional con-
straints on person hierarchies. One could apply such a constraint directly at
one or more of the four person values (inclusive person, first person, second
person and third person). An example of such a constraint would be ‘first per-
son and third person may never occupy the same position in a hierarchy’. This
constraint agrees with the attested hierarchies in the overview in (62), but it
is doubtful whether such a constraint reveals any deep conceptual truth about
person as it is not supported by any independent evidence.
Another way to go is to derive the four person values from something
more fundamental. I will refer to these fundamental notions as primitives. A
parallel can be drawn with spatial semantic roles. A spatial semantic role can
be split up into a configuration primitive and a direction primitive (see Lestrade
2010, Lestrade et al. 2011). The English preposition through, for example, has
“inside” as its configuration and “path” as its direction and means therefore
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‘on a path that intersects with the inside of’. The English preposition off, on
the other hand, has “top” as its configuration and “origin” as its direction and
means therefore ‘originating from the top of’. Because only the primitives are
conceptually relevant, it is the primitives on which the hierarchies are based.
As a consequence, the number of hierarchies are reduced, since there are less
primitives than values.
Ackema and Neeleman (2011) deconstruct the four person values by means
of two primitives. Let us call these primitives ego and alter; Ackema and
Neeleman use different labels, but for ease of explanation I will use ego and
alter. These primitives are used as follows: a +ego feature means that there
is a speaker in the group, and a +alter feature means that there are no
interlocutors (i.e. speakers or addressees) in the group. With these definitions
the four person values are generated as in (63).
(63) Person values with ego and alter as primitives
Person value Primitives
1
2
[ego]
1 [ego]
2 []
3 [alter]
Note the inclusive and the first person have the same primitive combination.
In the next section I will argue against the validity of ego and alter
as primitives, but first I will use them as an example to show the relation
between primitives and hierarchies. If we assume that person hierarchies are
about the primitives and not about the person values (which are epiphenomena
to the primitives), we should use the primitives to generate the hierarchies. Take
for example the GenderHierarchy, the hierarchy on gender marking from
Section 4.5.2, in (64).
(64) GenderHierarchy
3 > 2 > 1
In terms of primitives the hierarchy can be restated as in (65). What (65)
intuitively means is that things with an alter primitive go well together with
gender marking, but things with an ego primitive do not
(65) Primitives ego and alter and gender marking
ego: −
alter: +
The hierarchy in (64) can be derived from the description in (65) in the following
way. The first person only has the ego primitive, which has a − value in this
example, so the value of first person in the hierarchy is −. The third person
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only has an alter primitive, so its value is + in this example. The second
person neither has an ego nor an alter principle and its value is zero: neither
+ nor − (the value of the second person is always zero in this theory). If we
then align the person values according to their pluses and minuses we get the
hierarchy in (64).
In a similar fashion we can make person hierarchies out of the other value
combinations for ego and alter. As it turns out, only values −−, −, 0 , +
and ++ are needed; having more values will not generate more hierarchies.
Table 4.1 lists all hierarchies that can be generated with ego and alter as
primitives. These are the hierarchies predicted by the person theory of Ackema
and Neeleman (2011).
ego alter Hierarchy
+ − 1 > 2 > 3
+ 0 1 > 2,3
0 − 1,2 > 3
++ + 1 > 3 > 2
− −− 2 > 1 > 3
+ + 1,3 > 2
0 0 1,2,3
− − 2 > 1,3
+ ++ 3 > 1 > 2
−− − 2 > 3 > 1
0 + 3 > 1,2
− 0 2,3 > 1
− + 3 > 2 > 1
Table 4.1: Hierarchies generated with ego and alter as primitives
Such a table shows how the number and nature of the predicted hierarchies
depends on the primitives with which an approach works.
4.6.2 Against Ackema and Neeleman (2011)
There are, however, a number of problems with Ackema and Neeleman’s ap-
praoch. First of all, Ackema and Neeleman base their approach on a study by
Baerman et al. (2005): in this study 1=2 and 2=3 are allegedly the most domi-
nant homophony patterns, which would show that second person is in between
first and third person. However, Baerman et al.’s claims on the dominance of
1=2 and 2=3 homophony are directed at the plural. Things are different for
the singular: 1=2 homophony is, for example, not attested by Baerman et al.
in the singular. Thus, a number-neutral account of person homophony seems
impossible.
Furthermore, the study by Baerman et al. (2005) has very little data. They
base their claims on the one hand on 27 languages where some homophony is
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present in all verbal paradigms, and on the other hand on 19 languages where
pronouns show some homophony. Homophony seems to be rather restricted.
Baerman and Brown (2005) note that of the 140 languages in their sample
with verbal person markers 54 languages have homophony in only some of
their paradigms and 6 languages have homophony in all of their paradigms. In
other words, person homophony is the exception in languages.
Because of the sparsity of the data it is not surprising that if we look
at a different sample the patterns are different. Cysouw (2003:185–187) has a
sample of 245 languages and in this sample person homophony is rare too, see
(66). The only frequent homophony is 1
2
=1—obviously only in the plural—and
in Chapter 2 I have indicated that we need an additional assumption to account
for this. The other pattern that emerges is that homophony occurs more often
in the plural. No other patterns emerge, so on the basis of Cysouw’s sample
we cannot say that the 1=3 pattern is rare, neither in the singular nor in the
plural.
(66) Occurrence of person homophony in Cysouw’s (2003) sample
1
2
=1 1
2
=2 1
2
=3 1=2 1=3 2=3
sg 8 9 8
pl 121 27 17 23 20 16
All in all, it seems that there is insufficient evidence for Ackema and Neeleman’s
claim that 1=2 and 2=3 are the dominant patterns in person homophony. This
removes the support for a approach that derives person hierarchies from an
ego and an alter primitive.
An additional problem of Ackema and Neeleman’s approach is that the
inclusive and first person have the same set of primitives, which I have already
observed above. This is the reason that the inclusive is not given as a separate
person value in Table 4.1. More importantly, it means that under this approach
inclusive and first person should always occupy the same position in a person
hierarchy. This is problematic for the CommandHierarchy (2 > 1
2
> 3 > 1),
as in this hierarchy inclusive and first person do not behave alike. Thus, because
an approach with only an ego and an alter primitive does not predict the
existence of the hierarchy on commands, it cannot be the right approach.
In this section we have seen two severe drawbacks of Ackema and Neele-
man’s approach to the decomposition of person values: Baerman et al.’s ho-
mophony data do not provide the needed support and the CommandHierar-
chy should not be able to exist. In the next section we will look at an approach
that does not have these drawbacks.
4.6.3 An approach without primitives
In order to correctly predict the existence of the hierarchy on commands (2 >
1
2
> 3 > 1) we need an approach that is less restrictive than the first one.
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This is certainly possible; it is even possible to have a approach without any
constraints. Such an approach does not have any primitives—as primitives are
restrictive—so the generation of hierarchies is rather straightforward. This is
the approach that we will investigate in this section and the question is how
far having no primitives will bring us.
With no restrictions on the possible hierarchies, any order of the four per-
son values is possible. The number of potential hierarchies in such a situation is
seventy-five. These seventy-five possibilities are listed somewhat systematically
in Table 4.2.
1
2
> 1 > 2 > 3 1
2
> 1 > 2,3 1
2
> 1,2 > 3 1
2
,1 > 2 > 3
1
2
> 1 > 3 > 2 1
2
> 2 > 1,3 1
2
> 1,3 > 2 1
2
,1 > 3 > 2
1
2
> 2 > 1 > 3 1
2
> 3 > 1,2 1
2
> 2,3 > 1 1
2
,2 > 1 > 3
1
2
> 2 > 3 > 1 1 > 1
2
> 2,3 1 > 1
2
,2 > 3 1
2
,2 > 3 > 1
1
2
> 3 > 1 > 2 1 > 2 > 1
2
,3 1 > 1
2
,3 > 2 1
2
,3 > 1 > 2
1
2
> 3 > 2 > 1 1 > 3 > 1
2
,2 1 > 2,3 > 1
2
1
2
,3 > 2 > 1
1 > 1
2
> 2 > 3 2 > 1
2
> 1,3 2 > 1
2
,1 > 3 1,2 > 1
2
> 3
1 > 1
2
> 3 > 2 2 > 1 > 1
2
,3 2 > 1
2
,3 > 1 1,2 > 3 > 1
2
1 > 2 > 1
2
> 3 2 > 3 > 1
2
,1 2 > 1,3 > 1
2
1,3 > 1
2
> 2
1 > 2 > 3 > 1
2
3 > 1
2
> 1,2 3 > 1
2
,1 > 2 1,3 > 2 > 1
2
1 > 3 > 1
2
> 2 3 > 1 > 1
2
,2 3 > 1
2
,2 > 1 2,3 > 1
2
> 1
1 > 3 > 2 > 1
2
3 > 2 > 1
2
,1 3 > 1,2 > 1
2
2,3 > 1 > 1
2
2 > 1
2
> 1 > 3
2 > 1
2
> 3 > 1 1
2
,1 > 2,3 1
2
> 1,2,3 1
2
,1,2 > 3
2 > 1 > 1
2
> 3 1
2
,2 > 1,3 1 > 1
2
,2,3 1
2
,1,3 > 2
2 > 1 > 3 > 1
2
1
2
,3 > 1,2 2 > 1
2
,1,3 1
2
,2,3 > 1
2 > 3 > 1
2
> 1 1,2 > 1
2
,3 3 > 1
2
,1,2 1,2,3 > 1
2
2 > 3 > 1 > 1
2
1,3 > 1
2
,2
3 > 1
2
> 1 > 2 2,3 > 1
2
,1
3 > 1
2
> 2 > 1
3 > 1 > 1
2
> 2 1,2,3, 1
2
3 > 1 > 2 > 1
2
3 > 2 > 1
2
> 1
3 > 2 > 1 > 1
2
Table 4.2: Possible person hierarchies with no primitives
However, obviously not all seventy-five hierarchies have actually been at-
tested in the world’s languages. In fact, as we have seen in this chapter, only
five hierarchies have been attested. That only such a small subset is attested
raises the question whether a theory without primitives is the right way to go.
This is why I feel the need to look at a third approach. This approach also cor-
rectly predicts the existence of the five attested person hierarchies, but which
is more restrictive than the present second approach.
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4.6.4 An approach with ego and tu
For this third approach I will try to reduce the number of seventy-five possible
hierarchies that were generated in the previous approach. I need an constraint
on hierarchies in order to do this and this constraint should be independently
motivated.
In Section 2.2.2 I used the primitives ego and tu to explain why languages
have a maximum of four person values (inclusive person, first person, second
person and third person) in their syntax. The primitive ego corresponds to a
group that includes the speaker and the primitive tu corresponds to a group
that includes the addressee(s). With these two primitives we have been able to
explain which groups of individuals behave the same with respect to person.
An SAA group (speaker plus addressee plus addressee) should behave the same
as an SAO group, for example, see (67).
(67) Person values with ego, and tu as primitives
(S=speaker, A=addressee, O=other)
Person value Primitives Groups covered
1
2
[ego,tu] SA, SAA, SAO, SAAA, . . .
1 [ego] S, SO, SOO, SOOO, . . .
2 [tu] A, AA, AO, AAA, AAO, . . .
3 [] O, OO, OOO, OOOO, . . .
The semantics of the person values is connected to the primitives in the fol-
lowing way: a group with an inclusive-person value has both a speaker and an
addressee and has both the ego and the tu primitives, a group with a first-
person value has a speaker but no addressees and only has the ego primitive,
a group with a second-person value has an addressee but no speaker and only
has the tu primitive, and a group with a third-person value contains neither
speakers nor addressees and has no primitives at all. In sum, we need the ego
and tu primitives to explain the number of person values in syntax.
That the inclusive has [ego,tu] as its set of primitives means that the
inclusive has something in common with both the first person and the second
person. We can use this conclusion to restrict the number of potential person
hierarchies: if the inclusive is connected to both first person and second person
some hierarchies are expected not to exist. We find an example of such an
unexpected hierarchy in (68).
(68) Person hierarchy that is not expected to occur
1,2 > 3 > 1
2
It would be strange if such a hierarchy existed, as it has high predictability for
first person and second person, but low predictability for the inclusive. This is
odd because if the phenomenon associated with the hierarchy occurs frequently
with groups with speakers (first person) and groups with addressees (second
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person), then why would the same phenomenon be so rare for groups with both
speakers and addressees (the inclusive)? In other words, if something is frequent
for the first person and frequent for the second person it should be even more
frequent for the inclusive. In the approach of this section I will incorporate this
intuition.
It is apparent how an approach with an ego and a tu primitive differs from
the approach with an ego and an alter primitive from Section 4.6.2. In the
present approach the inclusive has something in common with the second per-
son (the tu primitive)—which makes it distinct from the first person—while in
the other approach the inclusive is equal to the first person. This makes it pos-
sible for the present approach to distinguish between inclusive and first person
in its hierarchies. Moreover, I will not include the alter primitive as a third
primitive into the present approach: having only the ego and tu primitives
instead of having three severely restricts the number of person hierarchies that
can be generated. As the overview in Table 4.3 shows, the number of generated
hierarchies is seventeen. Each of these hierarchies has an intuitive meaning.
ego tu Hierarchy
++ − 1 > 1
2
> 3 > 2
+ − 1 > 1
2
,3 > 2
+ −− 1 > 3 > 1
2
> 2
+ 0 1
2
,1 > 2,3
0 − 1,3 > 1
2
,2
++ + 1
2
> 1 > 2 > 3
− −− 3 > 1 > 2 > 1
2
+ + 1
2
> 1,2 > 3
0 0 1
2
,1,2,3
− − 3 > 1,2 > 1
2
+ ++ 1
2
> 2 > 1 > 3
−− − 3 > 2 > 1 > 1
2
0 + 1
2
,2 > 1,3
− 0 2,3 > 1
2
,1
− ++ 2 > 1
2
> 3 > 1
− + 2 > 1
2
,3 > 1
−− + 2 > 3 > 1
2
> 1
Table 4.3: Hierarchies generated with ego and tu as primitives
The first hierarchy in Table 4.3, for example, has an ego value of ++ and a tu
value of −, which may be translated as ‘the role of speaker goes extremely well
with the phenomenon associated with the hierarchy, while the role of hearer
goes rather badly with the phenomenon.
Now that we have generated the predicted hierarchies, we can see how the
present approach, with ego and tu as primitives, handles the five hierarchies
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that we came across in this chapter. It can handle the CommandHierarchy
(2 > 1
2
> 3 > 1), since it accurately predicts the existence of this hierarchy:
with an ego value of − and a tu value of ++ the hierarchy is generated.
The SpatialDeixisHierarchy ( 1
2
, 1 > 2, 3) and the EvidentialityHierar-
chy (2, 3 > 1
2
, 1) can be generated in a similar way. The GenderHierarchy
(3 > 2 > 1) only applies to the singular—see Section 4.5.2—which is why this
hierarchy does not occur in Table 4.3. The QuestionAssertionHierarchy
(3 > 2, 1) deserves some more attention as there is some data on plural subjects
in questions and assertions.
The hierarchy in Table 4.3 that comes closest to theQuestionAssertion-
Hierarchy (3 > 2, 1) is 3 > 2, 1 > 1
2
. This suggests that an inclusive-person
subject in a question or assertion tends to have a shorter marker on average
than a first- or second-person subject. Silverstein (1976) found evidence for
this suggestion; he noted in his analysis of accusative case in the Australian
languages that in the languages of his sample there are more overt markers
of patients in the inclusive than in the first or second person. In Section 4.2 I
noted that agent marking follows the same pattern as patient marking, so it
makes sense that inclusive-person subjects have shorter markers than first- or
second-person subjects. Thus, it seems that an approach with ego and tu as
primitives can handle the QuestionAssertionHierarchy.
The last thing that needs to be addressed is the thirteen hierarchies in
Table 4.3 that I have not found. The model in this section predicts that these
hierarchies may exist, not that they do exist. For me no linguistic phenomenon
comes to mind that, for example, tolerates the speaker rather well (ego → +)
but the addressee(s) rather badly (tu → −), which is why I have not attested
a 1 > 1
2
, 3 > 2 hierarchy. It may be that such a linguistic phenomenon does not
exist, or simply that I did not find one.
In sum, with some speculation on the QuestionAssertionHierarchy
we have seen that an approach with ego and tu as primitives correctly predicts
the existence of the five attested person hierarchies that we have discussed in
this chapter.
4.6.5 Summary
In this section I have looked at three approaches that make predictions about
the possible person hierarchies in the languages of the world. Without any
restrictions the number of potential hierarchies is seventy-five, which is rather
large since we have only attested four of these hierarchies. It seems that a more
restrictive theory is needed.
Therefore, I have tried to define the four person values (inclusive person,
first person, second person and third person) in terms of primitives and generate
hierarchies on the basis of these primitives. This leads to a smaller number
of potential hierarchies. First I have discussed an approach by Ackema and
Neeleman (2011), which has an ego and an alter primitive. Unfortunately,
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the independent evidence to support these primitves was insufficient. Moreover,
it wrongly predicts that the attested CommandHierarchy (2 > 1
2
> 3 >
1) cannot exist. As a consequence, an approach with an ego and an alter
primitive cannot be the right approach.
Because of the problem with the approach with an ego and an alter
primitive, I have tried an approach with an ego and a tu primitive instead. In
this approach the inclusive is seen as partially distinct from both first person
and second person. I have shown that this approach correctly predicts the four
person hierarchies that are attested. In addition, the existence of these two
primitives is supported by independent evidence.
4.7 Rigid patterns, hierarchies and innateness
We have dealt extensively with person hierarchies in this chapter but in this
section I want to go up one level and look at person patterns in general. We have
seen a number of person patterns by now—both rigid person patterns and per-
son hierarchies—which means that we can return to the question posed in Sec-
tion 1.2, whether person patterns are language-internal (i.e. innately present in
the human genes) or language-external (i.e. originating from the world around
the speaker). In Section 4.7.1 I will argue that both innate and learned person
patterns occur in language, and in Section 4.7.2 I will highlight some differences
between the two types of patterns.
4.7.1 Co-existence
It is difficult to give a definite answer to the question of linguistic innateness.
If a person pattern is innate it should be present in the human genes, but at
the moment it is not possible to test this directly. This means that we have
to rely on circumstantial evidence in order to be able to say something on the
innateness of patterns.
Kiparsky (2008) states that he sees the merits of both historical and syn-
chronic explanations in language, which is why he allows for both language-
internal and language-external phenomena in his analyses. In Optimality The-
ory this dichotomy is also present (see Burzio 1998:111) and is known as the
distinction between hard constraints (innate) and soft constraints (learned). In
this dissertation I will follow this assumption that both types of phenomena
exist. What I need to do next is look at the person patterns that have been
attested and see if the circumstantial evidence for each pattern points in the
direction of a language-internal phenomenon or a language-external one.
I think that Kiparsky’s distinction between the two types of phenomena
may manifest itself in the difference between rigid and non-rigid (hierarchical)
person patterns that I have made in this dissertation. Let us first look at a
non-rigid person pattern, the CommandHierarchy in this case. A language
like French may have the same number of morphemes for an inclusive-person
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command (69a) as for a second-person command (69b).
French
(69) a. All-ons
go-1pl
au
to-the
Mardi
Mardi
Gras!
Gras
‘Let’s go to the Mardi Gras!’
b. All-ez
go-2pl
au
to-the
Mardi
Mardi
Gras!
Gras
‘Go to the Mardi Gras!’
A language like Dutch, on the other hand, may have a larger number of mor-
phemes for an inclusive-person (70a) command than for a second-person com-
mand (70b).
Dutch
(70) a. Lat-en
let-pl
we
1pl.nom
naar
to
het
the
Mardi
Mardi
Gras-festival
Gras-festival
gaa-n!
go-inf
‘Let’s go to the Mardi Gras!’
b. Ga
go
naar
to
het
the
Mardi
Mardi
Gras-festival!
Gras-festival
‘Go to the Mardi Gras!’
If we make a typology of languages (or rather: paradigms) based on the number
of morphemes that the command markers have, we get the overview in (71).
(71) Typology based on the person markers for commands
(the more to the right the more morphemes)
Type I 2= 1
2
=3=1
Type II 2= 1
2
=3 1
Type III 2= 1
2
3=1
Type IV 2 1
2
=3=1
Type V 2= 1
2
3 1
Type VI 2 1
2
=3 1
Type VII 2 1
2
3=1
Type VIII 2 1
2
3 1
The overview lists eight different types of language (note that the overview is
based on the number of morphemes relative to the other markers; if the absolute
number of morphemes had been taken into account, the number of types would
have been even higher). This means that there are eight possible outcomes for
a language with respect to the CommandHierarchy. All person hierarchies
have multiple outcomes (except for the indifferent 1
2
, 1, 2, 3 hierarchy) which
contrasts sharply with how rigid person patterns work.
In the overview in (72) we find the rigid person patterns that I have pro-
posed in this dissertation.
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(72) Rigid person patterns
Name Pattern Introduced in
MultipleReferents ///S/ A O Section 3.1.2
InterlocutorFixation S A ////O/ Section 3.1.3
VocativeFunctions ///S/ A ////O/ Section 3.5.1
EvidentialitySource S ////A/////O/ Section 4.4.2
I will use the VocativeFunctions pattern as the example rigid person pat-
tern. One of the functions that falls under VocativeFunctions is expressive
small clauses, see (73). Crucial for the function is that the insulted referent
does not have to be mentioned in the sentence.
(73) It’s the economy, stupid!
In (73) the insulted referent is the addressee. As I pointed out in section 3.5
it is theoretically possible to have a language with expressive small clauses for
speakers and others. Yet, as far as I know, there are no such languages. The
person pattern on such a vocative function cannot be captured in a hierarchy;
the function only allows one type of language, so the visualization in (74)
suffices.
(74) VocativeFunctions
//S/ A ///O//
Such a visualization shows the big difference between rigid and hierarchical
person patterns.
If a person pattern like the one in (74) applies to every language in the
world it is a better candidate for a language-internal (innate) phenomenon
than a person hierarchy. We saw above that a person hierarchy like the Com-
mandHierarchy leads to multiple types of language. If the hierarchy were a
language-internal, universal phenomenon, then it is unexpected that there is
no single fixed universal template for the command marker (e.g. 2→no mor-
pheme; 1
2
/3/1→one morpheme). This would be much easier for the learner of
the language, whether a child or an adult. The circumstantial evidence, there-
fore, pushes hierarchical person patterns like the CommandHierarchy in the
direction of the language-external phenomena, as they allow for multiple out-
comes.
A universal person pattern like the one in (74), on the other hand, looks
more like a language-internal phenomenon: there is only one possible outcome
for every language in the world. So, if we follow Kiparsky (2008) and accept
that linguistic phenomena may be language-internal or language-external, then
I propose that person hierarchies are language-external phenomena and that
rigid person patterns are language-internal phenomena. What this, for example,
means is that second-person commands being short is not an intrinsic facet
of human language while secondary-insult constructions being restricted to
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addressees is.
To sum up, if we assume that both linguistic-internal and linguistic-
external person patterns exist in language, it seems best to consider rigid person
patterns as linguistic-internal and hierarchical person patterns as linguistic-
external.
4.7.2 The differences
There are big differences between linguistic-internal and linguistic-external phe-
nomena. Linguistic-internal phenomena have to be acknowledged by a language
in every stage of its existence. A human language will always have them. This
would mean, for example, that a rule in a made-up human language that vio-
lates a language-internal prediction cannot be learned by children. Linguistic-
external phenomena, on the other hand, do not matter for a synchronic descrip-
tion of a language. They are just diachronic road maps of language change: they
point out which part of a language is most likely to change first. Or, to put
it metaphorically, things that are used the most will be worn out the quickest
and person hierarchies show this frequency of use. All in all, there are many
areas in which the difference between language-internal and language-external
phenomena plays a role.
Let us look at an example of an application of a person hierarchy. Because
a person hierarchy is a language-external phenomenon it allows for more than
one type of language. The different types of language can change into each other
in specific ways. In order to explain this, I have chosen theGenderHierarchy
(3 > 2 > 1) from Section 4.2.2 as an example. This assertion hierarchy allows
for four types of language, which leads to a model of language change that is
neither too complex nor too simplistic. The four types of language that the
hierarchy allows can be seen in the overview in (75).
(75) Types of languages allowed by the GenderHierarchy based on the
number of morphemes of the marker for each person
3=2=1 3,2 and 1 have the same number of morphemes
3 vs. 2=1 3 has less morphemes than 1 or 2
3=2 vs. 1 3 and 2 have less morphemes than 1
3 vs. 2 vs. 1 3 has less morphemes than 2, 2 has less than 1
The diachronic relation between the four types can be seen in the graph
in (76). A [3=2=1] language may change into a [3 vs. 2=1] language if the
third-person marker loses a morpheme. A possible next step is that the second
person marker also loses a morpheme and the language becomes a [3=2 vs.
1] language. Then, there are two possible next steps: the first-person marker
may wear down resulting in a [3=2=1] language once again, or the third-person
marker may wear down further resulting in a [3 vs. 2 vs. 1] language. In this
last case there are again two options: if the second-person marker diminishes
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the result is a [3=2 vs. 1] language, and if the first-person marker diminishes
the result is a [3 vs. 2=1] language. This leaves one final connection: when in a
[3 vs. 2=1] language the third-person marker is two or more morphemes shorter
than the other two, a change in the second-person marker will result in a [3 vs.
2 vs. 1] language.
(76) Diachronic relations between the four types of languages allowed by
the GenderHierarchy
3=2=1
zzuuu
uu
uu
uu
3 vs. 2=1 // 3=2 vs. 1
ddIIIIIIIII
3 vs. 2 vs. 1
$$
ddIIIIIIIII zz
::uuuuuuuuu
This example shows that for a person hierarchy that allows for only four
types the diachronic relations are already quite complex. It is nevertheless
possible to make such a connection graph for each person hierarchy. For absolute
person patterns, on the other hand, such a graph is rather useless as these
patterns are insensitive to language change and only allow for one type of
language.
4.7.3 Summary
To summarize this section, the issue of whether linguistic phenomena are in-
nate (language-internal) or learned (language-external) is presumably one of the
biggest debates in linguistics at the moment. I will follow Kiparsky (2008) and
take a hybrid approach to this debate: some phenomena are language-internal,
others are language-external. In this section I have hypothesized that the hi-
erarchical person patterns, which featured most prominently in this chapter,
are better suited to be language-external phenomena as they allow for different
types of language. The non-hierarchical person patterns in this dissertation, on
the other hand, are all absolute (i.e. exceptionless). Such absolute patterns are
better suited for language-internal phenomena.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have looked at person hierarchies. An overview of the person
hierarchies that have been found is repeated in (77).
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(77) Overview of attested person hierarchies
Hierarchy Name
3 > 1, 2 QuestionAssertionHierarchy
3 > 2 > 1 GenderHierarchy
1
2
, 1 > 2, 3 SpatialDeixisHierarchy
2 > 1
2
> 3 > 1 CommandHierarchy
2, 3 > 1
2
, 1 EvidentialityHierarchy
What these hierarchies depict is the number of morphemes that a person marker
has for a certain phenomenon.
From the first hierarchy in (77), for example, it can be derived that in
a language a third-person agent marker in an assertion has a higher chance
of being absent than a first- or second-person agent marker. Incidentally, this
contradicts Silverstein’s (1976) claim that for agents the third person marker
should have the lowest chance of being absent. Silverstein claimed that the
hierarchy for agents and the hierarchy for patients are the mirror image of each
other, but I have found no evidence for that claim on a cross-linguistic scale.
The GenderHierarchy in (77) shows that third-person pronouns have
a higher chance to have a dedicated form to convey gender in a language than
first-person pronouns. Spatial deixis is the topic of the third hierarchy; an
example is the English demonstrative adverb here. The fourth hierarchy in
(77) deals with commands. Not surprisingly, it is the second-person command
(the imperative) that usually has the shortest form in a language. The fourth
hierarchy in (77), finally, concerns evidentiality marking, the marking of the
source of information of the utterance. For three types of evidentiality marking
it is the second- and third-person topics that have the shortest markers.
The best model that predicts the existence of the person hierarchies in
(77) does not take the four person values (inclusive, first person, second person
and third person) as its input, but the ego primitive (the group has a speaker)
and the tu primitive (the group has an addressee) instead. The need for the
ego and tu primitives was independently established in Section 2.2.2.
Person hierarchies are different from the rigid person patterns from Chap-
ter 3. Person hierarchies allow multiple types of languages, which is reason to
argue that they are language-external (learned) phenomena. Rigid person pat-
terns, on the other hand, only allow a single type of language, which is reason
to argue that these are language-internal (innate) phenomena.
The hierarchies in (77) also address the central question of this dissertation:
is there an insurmountable difference between first and second person on the one
hand and third person on the other? The EvidentialityHierarchy shows
that for three types of evidentiality marking the main difference is between
second and third person on the one side, and first person on the other. The same
goes for the SpatialDeixisHierarchy: this hierarchy is the mirror image
of the EvidentialityHierarchy. The CommandHierarchy, finally, shows
that for commands first and second person are very far apart, with inclusive
150 4.8. Conclusion
and third person being in between. To sum up, these three hierarchies show
that for some phenomena the image of first and second person versus third
person does not apply.
CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
In this dissertation I have investigated the grammatical category of person. In
Section 5.1 I provide a summary of the main findings. The central question of
this dissertation has been, following Lyons (1977): is the person distinction in
language always first and second person vs. third person? My answer is: no, the
person distinction depends on the linguistic phenomenon under discussion—see
Section 5.2 for a more detailed account.
5.1 Summary of main findings
I will summarize this dissertation by discussing a number of topics that have
played an important role in it. For each topic I will give the main findings that
this dissertation has provided.
The inclusive
Many languages have special inclusive person markers (i.e. pronouns and/or
verbal affixes). These person markers refer to a group with a speaker and one
or more addressees—‘you and me’, in other words. The best way to analyze
inclusive person markers is having a fourth person value specifically for the
inclusive (see Daniel 2005b, Bobaljik 2008, Cysouw 2010) in addition to the
traditional three person values, i.e. first person (I ), second person (you) and
third person (he/she/it). We can therefore speak of inclusive-person pronouns
in the languages that have them. For the sake of parallelism I proposed a
numerical gloss ( 1
2
) for the inclusive person.
The inclusive is, however, not a universal person value in the world’s lan-
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guages. It is not necessary for the syntactic description of languages like English
and Dutch to have a separate inclusive value, on the basis of which we may
conclude that these languages do not have an inclusive person value, see Sec-
tion 2.2.3.
Because the inclusive minimally consists of a speaker and an addressee, the
inclusive does not occur in the singular. This presents a methodological problem
for the cross-linguistic comparison of person, see Section 4.1.2. For a proper
comparison of a person phenomenon across languages we should look at the
plural, because only the plural may have all four person values. Most research
focuses on the singular when discussing a phenomenon, however, so there is
unfortunately little data with which a proper cross-linguistic investigation of
person phenomena may be performed.
Although there is no such thing as a singular inclusive, this absence is
not enough reason to rearrange the singular-plural system of the grammatical
category of number into a so-called minimal–augmented system for pronouns
(pace Bobaljik 2008, Cysouw 2010). There is more evidence for a singular-
plural system in person markers than for a minimal-augmented system, see
Section 2.5.
Language universals
Greenberg (1963) stated that no language has fewer than three number values. I
have argued that this is not true: sign languages appear to have fewer than three
person values. Additionally, it makes more sense to talk about the person values
of specific phenomena (e.g. agent marking, gender marking, question marking)
than about the person values of whole languages. For many phenomena there is
certainly a tendency to have three or more person values (in spoken languages,
that is) but this tendency is not universal, which I have shown in Section 2.4.
What is universal is that there are never more than four person values in
a phenomenon. Why should four be the maximum of person values? Five or
more person values irrevocably leads to a situation where the speaker has to
judge—for example for each person in a group of ten—whether some person is
an addressee or not. It seems that, because this task is cumbersome and not
that informative, language users universally refrain from it, see Section 2.2.2.
The nature of language universals is probably the most debated topic
in current linguistics: are language universals language-internal (innate) or
language-external (learned)? I follow Kiparsky (2008) and take a hybrid ap-
proach to the debate and allow for both language-internal and language-
external universals. If we follow this line of reasoning we can say that the person
hierarchies from Chapter 4 are probably language-external, as they allow for
more than one outcome, but that the rigid person patterns from Chapter 3 are
probably language-internal, as they only allow for one type of language, see
Section 4.7 for more details.
One example of such a rigid person pattern is that a sentence may only
have one speaker. *I and I and I are in favor is ungrammatical when uttered
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by three persons at the same time, even if there is pointing, see Section 3.1.2.
Here, first person differs from second person and third person (So you and you
and you are in favor is perfectly acceptable, for example). The other three rigid
person patterns—concerning identity fixation, vocatives and evidentiality—will
be discussed below.
Sign language
Sign languages tend not to distinguish person in the syntax; signers simply point
to the referent to introduce that referent into the discourse. This pointing sign
is usually the same for all persons; only the first-person pointing sign has some
peculiarities in some sign languages. Furthermore, there are no other domains
in sign language where there are person distinctions, not even in the domain
of commands, see Section 2.3.1.
The resulting situation is that spoken languages have three or four person
values while signed languages have two or less person values. The reason for this
categorical difference is that sign languages do not need person values because
directly pointing at referents will not result in ambiguity, see Section 2.3.2.
Although many sign languages do not distinguish person values, they all
distinguish speech-act roles (speaker, addressee and other), see Section 3.6.
Therefore, because sign languages are also subject to rigid person patterns it
makes sense that rigid person patterns are actually not about person markers
but about speech-act roles.
Nouns, pronouns and binding
In a number of cases in language there is no difference between first, second
and third person at all. Take, for example, the binding of plural pronouns from
Section 3.3.3. Third-person plural pronouns may be bound (They all think they
will become class president), but this also goes for first and second person (e.g.
You all think you will become class president). There is a pronoun–noun split
instead (i.e. binding conditions B and C: #The boys all think the boys will
become class president).
A similar split between nouns and pronouns can be seen in the domain of
quantifiers. I follow the DP hypothesis (Elbourne 2005) which states that pro-
nouns are syntactically different from nouns. The theory predicts that pronouns
can never combine with quantifiers into one DP (*every you for example). I
have shown in Section 3.2.2 that this prediction is correct, even for languages—
Japanese, for example—that allegedly possess pronominal nouns (Déchaine and
Wiltschko 2002).
So-called situational binding (see Section 3.4) also harbors a noun–pronoun
split. The man in In many households the man only watches television may
be bound by many households resulting in a reading about the man in each
household. In many households he only watches television does not have this
reading.
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Speakers/addressees fixation
The main question of this dissertation has been whether first and second person
occupy a special position with respect to third person. My answer is ‘no’—see
Section 5.2 for the details.
There are, however, certainly some constructions that have a first/second
vs. third person split, so for these constructions first and second person do
occupy a special position. All these splits are based on the same principle.
The identity of the speaker and the addressee(s) is fixed at the beginning of
the sentence. As soon as the speaker opens her mouth it is clear that she is
the speaker and that the persons that she addresses are the addressees. It is
therefore a general constraint on effective communication not to change the
identity of speaker or addressee(s) mid-sentence.
We encounter this constraint in several linguistic phenomena. (i) It is diffi-
cult to switch speakers or addressees in the middle of a sentence (So you know
you? vs. So he knows him? ), see Section 3.1. (ii) First- and second-person pro-
nouns cannot be accommodated—which means getting a distributive reading—
by another phrase (During most of my monologues you stay silent vs. During
most of my monologues the addressee stays silent), see Section 3.4. (iii) DP-
quantifiers like some of us/you that select a subset of the addressee-group may
never be first- or second-person syntactically, see Section 3.2.1. (iv) We/you
linguists necessarily includes all of the speaker or addressee group, while those
linguists, for example does not necessarily include all distant things, see Sec-
tion 3.5.2. All four phenomena can be explained by the speaker/addressee fix-
ation at the beginning of a sentence.
Agents, patients and Silverstein
Silverstein (1976) came up with a hierarchy on agent marking: 1
2
> 1, 2 > 3.
What the hierarchy says is that the tendency to mark third-person agents
with an ergative case morpheme is greater than the tendency to mark first-
or second-person agents. Silverstein also distinguished a hierarchy on patient
marking and proposed that this hierarchy should be the mirror image of the
hierarchy on agent marking.
When we look at a cross-linguistic sample of languages, however, this
mirror-image hypothesis is falsified, see Section 4.2. First of all, the tendency
to have a case morpheme for some person values and no case morpheme for
other person values is not that strong. Second, the hierarchy that emerges for
agent and patient marking is exactly the same (3 > 2 > 1). Even at the level
of the individual language the person patterns of agent and patient marking
turns out to be similar instead of reversed. Thus, agent and patient marking
follows the same hierarchy.
Vocatives
Vocatives can have several functions—for example: The keys are still in the
ignition, you idiot! The frequency of this construction explains why second-
person singular determiners grammaticalized for vocatives, but not for normal
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sentences (*You teacher work hard), see Section 3.5.2. In addition, because the
vocative is restricted to the addressee and because there are no secondary-
insult constrictions for speakers or others, we have a rigid person pattern here
(addressee vs. speaker/other). Note that vocatives are about speech-act roles
(addressees), not about person marking (second person).
There can also be a mismatch between syntax and semantics for vocatives,
see Section 3.5. A third-person DP-quantifier like everyone can be a vocative,
referring to addressees: I’m off, everyone! This usage is subject to some restric-
tions, however: *I’m off, every friend. The equilibrium between third-person
syntax and addressee semantics seems to be rather fragile.
Imperatives
In this dissertation I have defined imperatives as second-person commands (e.g.
Behave yourself ! ). In a language like English the subject of an imperative may
be third-person syntactically: Everyone raise their hands, see Section 3.5.4.
Commands are not confined to the second person on the semantic side
either. Inclusive-person (Let’s go!, third-person (Let him be safe! ) and first-
person commands (Let me introduce myself ) also exist. The need for a special
morpheme to explicitly mark the command meaning follows the following per-
son hierarchy: 2 > 1
2
> 3 > 1, see Section 4.3.3. This does not mean that
there are no languages that use the same construction for all four persons. Sign
languages are an example of this type because they do not distinguish between
persons, see Section 2.3.1.
Evidentiality
Evidentiality is a grammatical category that exhibits a great number of per-
son patterns. To identify these person patterns it is important to distinguish
between four types of evidentiality, see Section 4.4.1: performative (‘I know I
fell because I did it myself’), sensory (‘I know John fell because I saw it’), in-
ferential (‘I know John fell because I infer it from something’) and reportative
(‘I know John fell because someone told me’).
Evidentiality has both a rigid person pattern and a person hierarchy. The
rigid person pattern is that for some types of evidentiality only the speaker
may be the source of information, see Section 4.4.2. The person hierarchy is
that for some types of evidentiality it is odd to have a first-person topic, so
such a topic may need extra marking.
5.2 First and second versus third: conclusion
I would like to end this dissertation with the quote with which I began: “That
there is a fundamental, and ineradicable, difference between first-person and
second-person pronouns, on the one hand, and third-person pronouns, on the
other, is a point that cannot be emphasized too strongly” (Lyons 1977). I have
found many instances in which first person may pattern with third person
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against second person in this dissertation, or in which second person may pat-
tern with third person against first person. Consider the following three person
hierarchies:
• The EvidentialityHierarchy (2, 3 > 1
2
, 1) from Section 4.4.3 shows
that with respect to the marking of the topic of sensory, inferential and
reportative evidentials third and second person pattern together against
first person. In many languages it is, for example, odd for a speaker to
use an evidential to make an inference about herself, since normally a
speaker simply knows things about herself.
• Spatial deixis also has a first vs. second/third pattern. The SpatialDeix-
isHierarchy ( 1
2
, 1 < 2, 3) from Section 4.5.1 shows that many languages
have a dedicated demonstrative for things close to the speaker (English
this, for example) but lack separate demonstratives for things close to the
addressee(s) and things close to other(s).
• The third hierarchy that I want to bring up can be found in commands.
The CommandHierarchy (2 > 1
2
> 3 > 1) from Section 4.3.3 shows
that person marking behaves in quite different ways for the agent of
a command. Or, to put it another way, second-person commands (i.e.
imperatives) and first-person commands are miles apart from each other.
Third person and inclusive person occupy the middle ground between
these two extremes. I am not sure how to call this pattern but it is
certainly not a first/second vs. third pattern.
If we do not restrict ourselves to person—the indirect marking of speech-
act roles—but also to speech-act roles themselves, we can distinguish even
more divergent patterns. Lyons (1977) would predict that speaker/addressee
vs. other should be the only rigid person pattern in the languages of the world.
In Chapters 3 and 4 I have come acoss other patterns, however:
• A sentence can only have one speaker, but multiple addressees and others,
see Section 3.1.2. A group of three cannot chant together *I and I and I
want more—even pointing will not help—but one can ask the group Why
do you and you and you want more? Likewise it is okay to say What
did she and she and she want? This pattern (MultipleReferents) is
a speaker vs. addressee/other pattern.
• Another speaker vs. addressee/other pattern of first vs. second/third
can be found in the marking of the source of information of evidentials
(EvidentialitySource). For performative, sensory and inferential ev-
identiality the source of information is always first-person. Sensory ev-
identials, for example, always express sensory information obtained by
the speaker, and never sensory information obtained by the addressee(s)
or by others. Note that for performative evidentials this means that the
speaker is the only person that is allowed as a topic: in performative
evidentiality the topic equals the source of information.
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• A different pattern—the addressee vs. speaker/other pattern—can be
found in vocatives. Some functions can only be fulfilled by a vocative
(e.g. the function of creep in Go away, creep! ) and these functions are
therefore restricted to addressees (VocativeFunctions).
This brings the total number of patterns that go against Lyons’s theory to six.
The overview in (1) displays all six patterns.
(1) Patterns that go against a first/second vs. third view on person
Name Pattern
EvidentialityHierarchy first vs. second/third
SpatialDeixisHierarchy first vs. second/third
CommandHierarchy complex
MultipleReferents speaker vs. addressee/other
EvidentialitySource speaker vs. addressee/other
VocativeFunctions addressee vs. speakers/other
The overview clearly shows that the pattern of first and second person on the
one hand and third person on the other is neither fundamental nor ineradicable.
It all depends on the linguistic phenomenon what the person pattern is. In other
words, it is not always “you and me against the world” for speech-act roles and
the grammatical category of person. “Shifting alliances” is perhaps a better
characterization.
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Samenvatting
Een van de grote vragen van de taalwetenschap is: wat in taal is universeel
(oftewel, wat is aanwezig in elke taal van de wereld) en wat is taal-specifiek
(oftewel, waarop kunnen talen van elkaar verschillen)? Ik heb deze vraag on-
derzocht voor de grammaticale categorie persoon. In het Nederlands omvat de
categorie van persoon de eerste persoon (ik in het enkelvoud), de tweede per-
soon (jij in het enkelvoud) en de derde persoon (hij/zij/het in het enkelvoud).
Er is vaak beweerd in de taalwetenschap dat de derde persoon de vreemde
eend in de bijt is. De bijbehorende voorspelling is dat, indien slechts twee
van de drie personen zich in een bepaald domein hetzelfde gedragen, dat dat
de eerste en de tweede persoon zullen zijn. Een voorbeeld-domein is de “wij
leraren”-constructie. Deze constructie is mogelijk voor de eerste persoon meer-
voud (wij leraren) en de tweede persoon meervoud (jullie leraren) maar niet
voor de derde persoon meervoud (*zij leraren – ik gebruik een asterisk om
aan te geven dat iets ongrammaticaal is). Eerste en tweede persoon gedragen
zich hier inderdaad hetzelfde, terwijl de derde persoon anders is. Ik zal in deze
samenvatting de hypothese dat dit patroon van eerste en tweede tegenover
derde persoon inderdaad het enige patroon in taal is de hoofdhypothese noe-
men. In mijn proefschrift heb ik aan de hand van talen van over de hele wereld
onderzocht of de hoofdhypothese verworpen moet worden of niet.
De vierde persoon
Zoals gezegd heeft het Nederlands drie personen. Maar terwijl in het Nederlands
voor “ik en jij” en “ik en hij/zij/het” in beide gevallen de vorm wij worden
gebruikt, hebben sommige talen hier twee verschillende vormen voor. In zulke
talen vormt de “ik en jij”-vorm (de zogenaamde inclusief ) een aparte vierde
persoon. Talen kunnen dus verschillen in of ze drie of vier personen hebben. Dat
een taal niet meer dan vier personen kan hebben is daarentegen wél universeel.
Ook hebben talen sterk de neiging om in alle domeinen niet minder dan drie
personen te hebben. Een uitzondering hierop zijn gebarentalen. Doordat er in
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gebarentaal direct gewezen wordt naar de spreker en de hoorder is er geen
behoefte aan een grammaticale categorie van persoon.
Sommige talen met een vierde persoon (en dus een aparte vorm voor “ik
en jij”) beschouwen hun “ik en jij”-vorm niet als meervoud maar als enkelvoud,
terwijl er toch duidelijk twee personen mee worden aangeduid. Zulke talen wor-
denminimal–augmented talen genoemd. Voor sommige wetenschappers moeten
vanwege deze talen de traditionele definities van enkelvoud (één ding) en meer-
voud (meer dan één ding) op de schop. Ik laat echter zien dat de meeste talen
met een inclusieve persoon zich gewoon houden aan de traditionele definities
van enkelvoud en meervoud.
Wel geldt voor talen met een vierde persoon dat het te onderzoeken
patroon van dit proefschrift (“eerste en tweede tegenover derde persoon”)
aangepast moest worden. Voor deze talen heb ik onderzocht of er geen an-
dere patronen waren dan het patroon van eerste, tweede en vierde persoon
tegenover derde persoon.
Flexibele patronen
Ik heb vijf patronen gevonden in taal die met persoon te maken hebben en
flexibel zijn. Een flexibel patroon betekent dat talen in een bepaald domein
kunnen verschillen maar dat er niettemin een bepaalde tendens zichtbaar is.
Zo’n flexibel patroon heeft dus zowel een universeel als een taal-specifiek ele-
ment.
1. Het eerste patroon is het markeren van persoon op het werkwoord. Het
Nederlands heeft hier een patroon van eerste persoon (geen markering:
ik loop) tegenover tweede en derde persoon (-t-markering: jij/hij loopt).
Voor de meeste talen is dat echter anders. Als er al een verschil is tussen de
personen dan is het meestal dat de derde persoon geen markering op het
werkwoord heeft en de eerste en tweede persoon wel. Hetzelfde geldt voor
talen die het lijdend voorwerp (Jan in ik sla Jan) markeren op het werk-
woord. Dit botst wel met de zogenaamde Silverstein-hiërachië, die zegt
dat de markering van het onderwerp op het werkwoord en de marker-
ing van het lijdend voorwerp op het werkwoord zich op een tegengestelde
manier moeten gedragen. Wat tot slot interessant is is het geringe verschil
tussen vragende en mededelende zinnen wat betreft persoonsmarkering.
Dit eerste flexibele patroon sluit prima aan bij de hoofdhypothese.
2. Ook het tweede flexibele patroon kan niet echt gezien worden als een
schending van de hoofdhypothese. Dit tweede patroon gaat over geslacht
(mannelijk, vrouwelijk en onzijdig). Het Nederlands maakt een onder-
scheid in geslacht bij persoonlijke voornaamwoorden van de derde per-
soon (hij/zij/het) maar niet bij die van de eerste of tweede persoon. In
het algemeen hebben talen inderdaad eerder speciale vormen voor ges-
lacht voor de derde dan voor de tweede persoon, maar daarnaast eerder
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voor de tweede dan voor de eerste persoon.
3. De andere flexibele patronen spreken de hoofdhypothese wél tegen. Het
derde patroon gaat over aanwijzende bijwoorden, zoals hier en daar in het
Nederlands. Dit Nederlandse patroon, “in de buurt van eerste persoon”
(hier) tegenover “in de buurt van tweede of derde persoon” (daar), komt
in veel talen voor. Dit patroon van eerste tegenover tweede en derde
persoon spreekt inderdaad de hoofdhypothese tegen.
4. Het vierde flexibele patroon gedraagt zich zoals het derde. Dit patroon
gaat over evidentialiteit, een markering die sommige talen aan een zin toe-
voegen en die de bron van informatie aangeeft (bijvoorbeeld “zelf gezien”,
“eigen aanname”, of “van horen zeggen”). Als het onderwerp van zo’n zin
tweede of derde persoon is, dan kan dit onderwerp weggelaten worden
in sommige talen terwijl een onderwerp in de eerste persoon expliciet
genoemd moet worden. De reden is dat een zin met evidentialiteit en
eerste persoon vaak ongewone situaties zijn. Iets vergelijkbaars is te zien
in Nederlandse zinnen met kennelijk ; zinnen als je bent kennelijk van
gedachten veranderd of hij is kennelijk van gedachten veranderd zijn niet
ongewoon, maar uiterst vreemd met de eerste persoon: ik ben kennelijk
van gedachten veranderd.
5. Ook patroon vijf weerspreekt de hoofdhypothese. Dit patroon heeft de
gebiedende wijs als domein. In het Nederlands hebben we een speciale
korte vorm voor de gebiedende wijs van de tweede persoon (begin maar)
maar gebruiken we de laten-constructie voor de vierde persoon (laten
we maar beginnen), de derde persoon (laat hij maar beginnen) en de
eerste persoon (laat ik maar beginnen). In de talen van de wereld komt de
verkorte vorm het vaakst voor bij de tweede persoon, daarna bij de vierde
persoon, daarna bij de derde persoon en daarna bij de eerste persoon.
Samenvattend kunnen we stellen dat er bij de flexibele patronen een paar pa-
tronen zitten die anders zijn dan “eerste en tweede tegenover derde persoon”
en die daarmee de hoofdhypothese weerspreken.
Rigide patronen
Taal kent op het gebied van sprekers en hoorders niet alleen maar flexibele
patronen maar ook rigide patronen. Een rigide patroon betekent dat in het
domein van dat patroon alle talen van de wereld zich hetzelfde gedragen. Zo’n
patroon heeft dus alleen een universele kant, geen taal-specifieke kant. Wat
opvalt is dat rigide patronen nooit over de grammaticale categorie van persoon
gaan maar direct over gespreksrollen als spreker en hoorder. Ik zal het verschil
tussen gespreksrollen en persoon illustreren aan de hand van twee voorbeelden.
Het Nederlandse jullie verwijst naar een groep die een hoorder bevat. Het is
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best mogelijk dat de groep een niet-hoorder bevat; in Hoe deden jullie dat thuis?
kan jullie bijvoorbeeld op niet-aanwezige ouders, broers en zussen slaan. Hoe
anders is dit bij een vocatief (aanspreekvorm) als mensen in Gaat het hier
goed, mensen? Een vocatief is per definitie beperkt tot de hoorders en kan dus
niet naar niet-aanwezige personen verwijzen. Bij de vocatief gaat het volgens
mij dan ook direct over gespreksrollen omdat het daarbij alleen maar exclusief
over hoorders kan gaan. Bij het persoonlijk voornaamwoord jullie is er een
complexere relatie met het concept “hoorder”, aangezien de groep waar jullie
naar verwijst ook niet-hoorders kan omvatten. Deze complexere manier om met
gespreksrollen om te gaan is wat de grammaticale categorie van persoon in feite
is.
Ik heb drie rigide patronen gevonden in taal; deze patronen hebben dus
direct te maken met de gespreksrollen “spreker”, “hoorder” en “buitenstaander”
(mijn term voor iemand die noch spreker noch hoorder is).
1. Het eerste rigide patroon is dat een uiting maar één spreker kan hebben.
Dit klinkt logisch omdat in de overgrote meerderheid van de situaties
een uiting inderdaad door één spreker gedaan zal worden. Toch is een
situatie waar twee mensen opzettelijk tegelijkertijd hetzelfde zeggen niet
ondenkbaar; denk bijvoorbeeld aan een opera of musical. Toch is het ook
dan onmogelijk om zoiets te zeggen als *Dit geldt wel voor mí´ maar niet
voor mí´, zelfs niet als de twee personen erbij wijzen. Bij twee hoorders
(Dit geldt wel voor jóú maar niet voor jóú) of twee buitenstaanders (Dit
geldt wel voor voor háár maar niet voor háár) levert een soortgelijke
situatie geen moeilijkheden op. We zien hier een patroon van spreker aan
de ene kant en hoorder en buitenstaander aan de andere.
2. Het tweede rigide patroon gaat over de vocatief. De vocatief is hierboven
al kort aan bod gekomen. Eén van de functies van de vocatief is dat de
spreker ies naars over de hoorder kan zeggen zelfs als die in de zin verder
niet voorkomt: Het raam staat open, idioot! Het is echter voor een spreker
onmogelijk om iets naars te zeggen over de spreker (zichzelf, dus) als deze
in de zin niet voorkomt: [Jan tegen Piet:] De sleutels zitten nog in de auto,
sukkel! Het woord sukkel kan hier niet op Jan, de spreker, slaan. Ook op
deze manier iets naars over een buitenstaander (in dit geval de eigenaar
van de auto, bijvoorbeeld) zeggen is onmogelijk: Er staat een auto op
mijn parkeerplek, hufter! Dit geldt niet alleen voor het Nederlands; een
nare toevoeging aan een zin over iemand die in de zin niet genoemd wordt
kan in alle talen alleen bij de hoorder. Hier tekent zich dus een patroon af
met spreker en buitenstaander aan de ene kant en hoorder aan de andere
kant.
3. Het derde en laatste rigide patroon is dat zodra een spreker begint te
praten het vastligt wie de spreker en wie de hoorder van de zin is. Die
mogen niet halverwege een zin veranderd worden. Dit is de reden dat
het wisselen van hoorder zoals in *Dus jí´ hebt bij jóú op school gezeten
Samenvatting 173
onmogelijk is, zelfs als er gewezen wordt. Ook een wisseling van spreker
is onmogelijk, maar dat is misschien niet heel verbazingwekkend omdat
we hierboven al zagen dat een zin toch maar één spreker mag hebben.
Deze restrictie is echter te omzeilen door twee sprekers elkaars zin af te
laten maken: [Speker A:] Dus ík . . . [Spreker B:] . . . heb bij Ján op school
gezeten. Maar als er dan expliciet van spreker wordt gewisseld krijgen
we wel weer een ongrammaticale zin: [Speker A:] Dus ík . . . [Spreker B:]
*. . . heb bij mí´ op school gezeten. Oftewel: zowel een wisseling van hoor-
der als een wisseling van spreker is niet toegestaan binnen een zin. Bij
buitenstaanders is er echter geen probleem met wisselen: *Dus zí´ heeft bij
háár op school gezeten. Hier zien we een patroon met spreker en hoorder
aan de ene kant en buitenstaander aan de andere.
Hoewel de hoofdhypothese over persoon gaat en niet over gespreksrollen,
zouden we in het licht van de hoofdhypothese niettemin voorspellen dat er
alleen rigide patronen zouden moeten zijn met spreker en hoorder aan de ene
kant en buitenstaander aan de andere. Het derde rigide patroon komt overeen
met deze voorspelling maar de andere twee patronen duidelijk niet.
Conclusie
Er zijn twee soorten patronen die zich bezighouden met sprekers en hoorders.
Ten eerste zijn er de rigide patronen die direct met sprekers en hoorders te
maken hebben. Ten tweede zijn er de flexibele patronen die over de grammat-
icale categorie van persoon gaan, wat een complexere indeling van sprekers
en hoorders is en de eerste, tweede, derde en vierde persoon omvat. Ook de
hoofdhypothese van deze dissertatie – elk patroon op het gebied van persoon
is eerste en tweede persoon tegenover derde persoon – gaat over persoon. Er
zijn meerdere flexibele patronen die de hoofdhypothese weerspreken. Ook bij de
rigide patronen lijkt het erop dat spreker en hoorder niet automatisch samen-
gaan. Mijn conclusie is dan ook dat “eerste en tweede persoon tegenover derde”
zeker niet het enige patroon is op het gebied van persoon in de talen van de
wereld. In alle gevallen is het goed te verklaren waarom een bepaald patroon
bij een bepaald domein (vocatief, gebiedende wijs, evidentialiteit, enz.) hoort.
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